

Editorial

India received a shocking surprise from across the border right in the beginning of the year when Pakistani terrorists attacked the Air Force Base at Pathankot. A week before, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had made a stopover in Islamabad on 25 December 2015, on his way back from a successful tour of Russia and Afghanistan, signalling his intent to start a new chapter in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Readers will recall that talks between the two neighbours had been stalled for many months owing to a myriad of contentious issues. However, in the wake of the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, terrorism had again emerged on the global agenda. For India, terrorism is a serious issue, especially terror facilitated from militant groups based within Pakistan. Modi's Islamabad stopover, preceded by National Security Advisor level talks held a few weeks earlier in Bangkok would, in the normal case, indicate a desire to mend an acrimonious relationship. However, the terror attack on the Pathankot Air Base in the early hours of 2 January which was quickly traced back to the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammad has dimmed the enthusiasm somewhat. Almost simultaneously was an attack on the Indian Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which, it is now known, had been orchestrated from Pakistan. The Afghan Police has categorically stated that Pakistan Army officers were involved in the attack.

How will the relationship pan out in the course of 2016 is yet to be seen. What is clear though is that despite such instances there is interest in New Delhi to continue engaging Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government has also indicated its willingness to address the terrorism issue. The scourge of terrorism affects both countries adversely and should be addressed soonest and in a sustained manner. A sombre reminder of this was the terrorist attack on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda, Pakistan on 20 January, that led to the loss of many lives.

Defence production in India remains largely in the hands of the Defence Public Sector Units. Moreover, India is today one of the largest

importers of defence equipment and technology globally. Russia (and the former Soviet Union) have been for decades India's largest suppliers of such equipment. While in recent times India has started diversifying its imports—with the US emerging as a significant supplier—Russia remains a key defence partner and supplier for India. During the recent visit of the Prime Minister to Moscow in December 2015, defence cooperation thus was a key area of focus. Around 16 Memoranda of Understanding were signed by Mr Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which highlighted the importance of 'Make in India' in the bilateral strategic relationship. Some important deals were signed on the joint manufacture of Kamov 226 military helicopters; construction of 12 atomic plants and nuclear reactor components; technical cooperation in the railways and in helicopter engineering. As part of the recent decision to involve the private sector in defence production, Reliance Defence signed a \$6 billion deal with Almaz-Antey, which manufactures air defence systems. It is important to note that Russia is the first country to have agreed to take the initiative under the 'Make in India' umbrella in two key strategic sectors—nuclear and defence.¹

Retaining JDS' focus on defence procurement and 'Make in India', we carry a perspective by Amit Cowshish in the issue. In 'Galvanising 'Make in India' in Defence: The Experts' Committee Chips In', Cowshish notes that in spite of spending close to Rs 500,000 crore on capital acquisitions between 2002–03 and 2014–15, the Indian Armed Forces continue to suffer from a chronic shortage of equipment and ammunition, low levels of serviceability of equipment already in service, and a heavy dependence on imports. Procurement programmes either keep getting stalled or take inordinately long to fructify. Key reasons for this are disjointed defence planning, limited budgetary support for modernisation of the armed forces, procedural complexities, and bureaucratic indolence. Of these, the procedural complexity besetting defence procurements receive a lot of attention as well as persisting problems with the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The current government set up a Committee of Experts (CoE) to address this problem holistically, against the backdrop of its 'Make in India' drive. This article presents a perspective on the report of the Committee and ends with a broad approach for phased implementation of the acceptable recommendations of the Committee.

Readers of the journal would recall its publishing articles addressing the key issue of 'jointness' in the functioning of the armed forces in recent issues. Moving forward on that track, this issue features an article

by Ashish Singh titled 'Arms and the Game: Accepting Competition and Encouraging Cooperation'. Singh's article approaches the issue of jointness through a new lense. It first describes how and why arms of the three 'Services', are different from each other. A focus area is airpower, which is shown to be the emerging technological paradigm, triggering paradigm competition. Singh also draws an analogy between anarchy in international relations (IR) and the existence of the services. He then looks at game theory as used in IR to understand both why inter-organisational competition occurs and how cooperation can evolve with a certain kind of behaviour—reciprocity. The article also uses the anthropological/biological lens to show how competition and cooperation will always co-exist. The author concentrates on the behavioural solution towards cooperation, while commenting briefly on the alternative structural solution, which most writings on the subject focus on. Finally, he lays out some measures possible in the Indian scenario, in tune with cooperation behaviour theory.

Over the past decade and more, there has been a conscious effort on the part of the establishment to focus on the maritime domain. India sits at the head of the Indian Ocean and sees itself as a responsible naval power in the region. However, it shares this maritime space with a number of other states, all of whom have a stake in both the promotion as well as preservation of the domain as an arena of competition and cooperation. In 'Addressing Maritime Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region: A Case for Synergising Naval Capacities towards Collective Benefits', Kamlesh K. Agnihotri discusses how the vastness and diversity of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its littorals, and difference in the latter's overall view of regional security, presents a broad spectrum of challenges therein. The maritime capacities of most littoral states are not strong enough to individually address these challenges. However, synergised response strategies, appropriately regulated by one or two collectively mandated apex bodies, would greatly help in managing regional maritime security. The existing maritime cooperative initiatives in IOR, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), have shown great promise and potential. Countries like India and Australia, major players in both these constructs, can possibly rally other IOR littorals into leveraging their maritime capacities under these pan-regional fora by mutual agreement. Concurrently, Agnihotri suggests, both initiatives could find congruence in their maritime security visions, so as to create a collaborative local

environment for collective benefits without dependence on extra regional players.

The virtual cyber domain is increasingly becoming an arena of conflict between nations. With the vast spread and seemingly endless depth of cyberspace and its all-pervasive presence, countries are rushing to claim it as their own. In 'China's Emergence as a Cyber Power', Munish Sharma discusses China's moves to become a dominant cyber power. Similar to the physical domains of land, sea, air and space, superiority in the cyber domain enables a nation state to exert its power. In recent years, China has invested colossal amounts in building the requisite infrastructure and capabilities of its armed forces as well as governance practices to advance towards 'informationalisation'. This article seeks to discern the motives, threats, objectives, strategy and intent that drive China to amass cyber power.

The issue also includes a review essay and five book reviews. Saroj Bishoyi contributes an insightful assessment entitled 'Geostrategic Imperative of the Indo-Pacific Region: Emerging Trends and Regional Responses', where he reviews two volumes: *Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects* and *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*. Akash S. Goud reviews *Honour and Fidelity: India's Military Contribution to the Great War 1914–1918*; Rikeesh Sharma reviews *India's Military Modernization: Strategic Technologies and Weapons Systems*; Sampa Kundu reviews *The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia*; Joshy M. Paul reviews *Strategic Direction of the Chinese Navy: Capability and Intent Assessment*; and Y.M. Bammi reviews *India's Afghan Muddle: A Lost Opportunity*.

NOTE

1. See Shubajit Roy, "Make in India" to be at the Centrestage of India-Russia Strategic Relationship', *The Indian Express*, 25 December 2015, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/first-defence-deal-under-make-in-india-pm-modi-signs-deal-with-russia-to-manufacture-226-choppers/#sthash.zgLtNq0L.dpuf>, accessed on 14 January 2016.