

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

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The proliferation of non-state armed groups has been one of the defining features of the international system of the new century. Concerns related to national and international security posed by these groups have therefore been debated internally within nations and in bilateral and multilateral forums. An in-depth understanding of the phenomenon is critical to its optimal handling. This endeavour requires sustained engagement not only of policy makers but also scholars whose studies inform policy-making. This book is an effort to proffer a better understanding of non-state armed groups in South Asia.

The term non-state armed group has been borrowed from *Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. The term was first used in the *Military Balance* of 2001-02 and was explained as:

(O)rganised and armed opposition force with recognized political goal, which acts independently from state or government. Groups are only included if they have an effective command structure.... The definition covers groups that might be variously described as guerillas, militia forces, paramilitary or self-defence groups as also terrorist groups with political objectives that have caused significant damage and casualties over the years.¹

It is interesting to note that this definition underwent a significant change and the most current definition includes among the others already included, groups perpetrating criminal acts which it had hitherto explicitly excluded.² Another significant change in the explanation is the acceptance that such groups may have the support of the state, thus diluting the earlier belief that such groups do not necessarily act independent of the states. The datasheet on non-state armed groups even includes two non-violent groups. These changes signify the challenge that confronts peoples and nations.

South Asia, comprising of the countries of the South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a region that figures quite prominently in the worldwide mapping of select non-state armed groups.

Region	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006	2007	2008
Europe								
(NATO- and Non-NATO)	15	17	22	30	37	47	42	52
Russia	01	01	04	04	06	-	08	12
Middle East and North Africa	22	24	33	50	65	71	71	81
Central and South Asia	10	21	26	73	74	83	84	86
East Asia and Australia	21	25	31	33	36	40	40	41
Carribbean and Latin America	06	06	10	09	14	15	15	16
Sub Saharan Africa	21	34	44	64	58	83	84	108
North America	-	-	-	-	-	02	02	03
Georgia	-	-	-	-	03	-	-	-

Source: Military Balance, IISS: London, 2001-02 to 2008. The tabulation for 2009 is based on “identifying characteristics” of groups, not by region. The 2010 issue does not contain the datasheet on non-state armed groups. Data not presented is not available.

The above table, which does not specifically cover South Asia, nevertheless gives some comparative estimate of the presence of non-state armed groups the world over. South and Central Asia, of which South Asia is a subset, has very high numbers of non-state armed groups. It is also interesting to bear in mind that the rising numbers are largely due to increase in the number of groups in South Asia, mostly in India and Pakistan. Several of these groups have existed for long before they were included in these datasheets.

With the aim of arriving at a structured focused comparison of non-state armed groups in the region, 16 groups (including two regional variants of Naxalism in India) were studied along the following eight parameters:

1. Organisation of the Group—hierarchical or network-based; centralized/ localized decision-making; functional sub-units such as military, intelligence, political and financial.
2. Membership—size; recruitment and training strategies; sources of motivation and continued membership; social and political origins.
3. Leadership—nature of leadership and its impact on effectiveness of the group; world-view; motives; sources of legitimacy/moral authority; cohesiveness of or factions among leadership.
4. Ideology—political, social economic vision as a source of legitimacy; justification of violence.
5. Resources—infrastructure; sources of funding, linkages with other non-

state armed groups/state actors, sources of weapons; intention to acquire WMDs.

6. Strategy—operational doctrines; declared strategies and tactics; intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities, flexibility, balance-sheet of operational and strategic effectiveness; targets.
7. State responses to these armed groups and their counter-reactions.
8. Likely course of evolution of the armed groups.

The choice of the method of structured focused comparison that has been applied to the study of 16 of these groups in South Asia must be explained and qualified. The method as explicated by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet “was devised to study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems...the aim was to discourage decision makers from relying on a single historical analogy in dealing with a new case.”³ Attempting to apply this method to the study of a security problem of a very different nature, this book therefore presents only a preliminary structured focused comparison leading to some contingent generalisations. It is a modest first attempt and therefore self-consciously refrains from theory development or theory testing, which is the ultimate aim of the method of structured focused comparison. There is yet another reason for keeping this work less ambitious. George and Bennet conclude that such studies enabling the development of a comparative perspective and theory, must preferably be carried out by one scholar. Since this book deals with the complex phenomenon of non-state armed groups which are best explicated by scholars having domain expertise, the objective of the project had to be limited. However, in sync with the ultimate purpose of following this research methodology, it aims to build on previous studies of the phenomenon in the region as well as methods adopted in research on armed violence.

Such scholarly works have focused on various themes such as characteristics and trends in terrorism in South Asia in general,⁴ perspectives of scholars from countries in the region on the nature of terrorism in their countries,⁵ the impact of terrorism in South Asia,⁶ critical perspectives on terrorism in South Asia,⁷ responses to terrorism,⁸ new terrorism in India.⁹ A small number among them have provided profiles of selected terrorist groups, some of whom are also part of this study.¹⁰ This book however, is the most comprehensive survey of a large number of non-state armed groups in the region. The cases were selected to represent ideologically diverse and prominent groups from all countries of the region. Given the preponderance of India in the region, most groups selected are from India; including left-wing extremism and its local variations.

Plan of the Book

Part I of the book contains three papers on the nature of the challenge related to non-state armed groups in the region.

While several non-state armed groups in South Asia proclaim to represent interests of a particular ethnic/religious identity, Ajay Darshan Behera argues that it would be naïve to ignore certain other elements that have made these conflicts intractable. He asserts that while the primordialist and instrumentalist explanations of the linkages between ethnicity and conflict explain the origins of the conflict; their persistence may be attributed to the “post-ethnicity argument.” Thus, the retreat of the welfare state and the negative fallouts of globalization have prolonged the life-cycle of many a non-state armed group. The already complex process of nation-building has been further complicated by the weaknesses of the state in addressing basic issues related to development. This in turn has fuelled the rise of insurgencies. It has also fanned religious radicalism. Citing examples from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Behera analyses the political economy of the new wars in South Asia.

Commenting on the socio-economic problems that lie at the root of the rise of Maoist insurgency in India, Sudeep Chakravarti asserts that rather than regarding Naxalism as the gravest threat to internal security, it would perhaps be more appropriate to regard poverty, non-governance and corruption as the real threats to internal security. Years of resentment has culminated in what he calls as “Naxalism Mark IV”, i.e., the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The author gives a vivid account of lives of people who have been victims of an exploitative system. Lived experiences of Sabita Kumari of Jharkhand, the Dalits of Khairlanji, the *Maobadi* who can now afford to sit on a *charpoy*, Bant Sikh whose limbs were amputated after securing punishment for the upper caste Sikhs who had raped his daughter, and illiterate tribals who are told that they own merely six inches of land. While this fuels the rise of and support to naxals, redress provided by the state is rare and inadequate.

Any discussion on the contemporary threat of terrorism would be incomplete without an assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Reshmi Kazi analyzes this threat in Asia by locating it in the larger discourse on nuclear terrorism. She argues that before 9/11, the threat of use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons was fairly limited. However, since 9/11, the potential use of nuclear weapons has increased manifold with groups like the Al Qaeda intending to acquire/devise nuclear weapons or intending to cause harm by attacking nuclear facilities. While the prospects for the former are few, chances of the latter cannot be ruled out. The real threat arises from trafficking in nuclear material and technology. In the South Asian context, the unraveling of the A Q Khan network and fears of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the al-Qaeda linked terrorists, and even those in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, are matters of serious concern.

Part II of the book contains the case-studies of non-state armed groups categorized as groups based on ethnic, left-wing and religious motivations. This

categorization is based on their dominant characteristics, though the groups are hardly ever exclusively so.

Groups based on Ethnic Motivations

The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) formed in 1964 represents the desire of a section of Manipuris/Meiteis to become independent from the Indian Union. Amarjeet Singh argues that despite two splits and factional clashes, it has endured and is the main insurgent group that poses a challenge to the national security as it has refused to negotiate with the Government on any agenda short of a plebiscite. In keeping with its ideology, it has established linkages with other groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim (Khaplang-faction, NSCN-K) that support an anti-India agenda. In addition to targeting security forces, the group has also been active in moral policing by campaigning against drug abuse, alcoholism and gambling. It has successfully used Myanmar to escape capture by Indian security forces and is a media savvy organization that has maligned the security forces for indulging in rapes and the use of landmines. The group is also attempting to implement a developmental agenda for the state.

Jaideep Saikia focuses on a rather small, but virulent group, one of many dotting the landscape of North East India. Operating in the hill regions of the North Kachar Hills and Karbi Anglong, the Dima Halam Daoga-Jewel faction (DHD-J) started competing with its rival faction, the Dima Halam Daoga-Nunisa (DHD-N) for any benefits that might accrue from a settlement with the government. It has gradually limited its demand for statehood to the North Kachar Hills. Its following is mainly among the Hasum Sa clan to which its leader, Jewel Gorlosa, belongs. The group grew in importance due to its linkage with the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah faction, NSCM-IM). While its rival faction has largely observed a ceasefire since 2003, the DHD-J has been the target of counterinsurgency operations. There has been renewed violence on the part of the group since May 2008 after it was attacked by the Army despite its unilateral declaration of ceasefire and putting forth of a Charter of Demands. This has hindered the progress of East-West corridor as well as the ongoing broad-gauge conversion projects in the region. The state government had to depute an auxiliary squad to counter the group and more recently joint operational squads of the army, police and the paramilitary were set up.

In her paper Namrata Goswami profiles the evolution of one of the most prominent non-state armed groups in North East India, namely the NSCN (IM). The group is typical example of the radical fringe that opposes a peace agreement with the Government, in this case the Shillong Accord, and carries forward the struggle for an independent Nagalim. The NSCN (IM) functions like a parallel government that not only has a clearly structured army but also a civil government

with Ministries. The tribal nature of the Naga society is reflected not only in the membership of the group but also in the various factions of the NSCN (IM). It uses religion to propagate the idea of a 'Nagalim for Christians'. Nearly three decades into its formation, the NSCN (IM) continues to hold talks with the Government and successfully uses the period of the ceasefire to recuperate. Despite some opposition from the Naga civil society, the group enjoys considerable popular support and is likely to continue its struggle in the near future.

In his paper on the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Nani Mahanta traces the origins of the group from its ideological commitment to scientific socialism and the liberation of Assam from Indian colonial occupation. In its early years the group drew its members from ideologically driven groups such as the Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chatra Parishad (AJYCP) and Assam People's Liberation Army (APLA). However, based on interviews with surrendered ULFA cadre in more recent years, the author concludes that unemployment is the most prominent reason driving people to join the organisation. ULFA has a well-organised women's wing that performs courier, medical and administrative functions. ULFA has come a long way from its camps in Myanmar and Bhutan and training in NSCN camps in Nagaland, to mainly being supported by Pakistan's ISI and Bangladeshi Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI). Despite an insincere attempt at negotiating with the Government through the People's Consultative Group, the group continues to indulge in acts of violence. As a group that is not connected with the civil society in Assam, nor representing the interests of other ethnic groups, the ULFA has transformed into a militant group not supported by the Assamese themselves.

The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) represents a hard-line faction of a group that refuses to accept the peace accord with the state and continues to hold on to its demand for self-determination for the Bodos. Contrary to the view that the NDFB represents the Christian Bodos, Subhrajee Konwer argues that excepting for a few key leaders, all its key members as well as cadre is Hindu. Despite observing a ceasefire with the Government, the NDFB has been able to maintain its own camps, rather than remain in the confines of the designated camps. Support for the group can be gauged from the fact that it sustains the camps with the help of donations rather than Government stipends. Its linkages with NSCN (IM) and ULFA, as well as its connections with the flourishing arms bazaar in Bangladesh make it a serious security concern. Prevalence of its camps in remote areas, its rejuvenation in the form of the Bodo Royal Tiger force and/or Bodo United Liberation Front since May 2008 and its alleged involvement in the Guwahati serial blasts in October 2008 suggest that group will continue to be a security threat.

In his paper on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), N. Manoharan details the origins of the group with a violent ideology as a result of anti-minority

policies of the Sri Lankan government. The birth of violent organization coincided with the formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976, a political party that aimed at representing the interests of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE marginalized the TULF as well as other moderate leaders. It grew in strength and became to most formidable terror outfit with land, sea and air forces. Its distinction comes from the massive support base among the Tamil Diaspora the world over and as the author says, its functioning as a multi-national corporation. Since the LTTE prioritized a military strategy, the state response too was predominantly military. Political and diplomatic initiatives undertaken suo-motu by the Sri Lankan government as well as with Indian and/or Norwegian served a limited purpose. The LTTE and its revolutionary ideology represents the quintessential problem of secession in international relations which arises due to actual and/or perceived minority grievances in the process of state-building.

Groups based on Left-Wing Motivations

P.V. Ramana details the CPI-Maoist formed in 2001 as result of the amalgamation of People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre. In the post-communist era, this group with cadre strength of approximately 15,000, represents the gravest internal threat to India's security. The strength of the Maoists lies in their well organised structure that penetrates right to the village level with political and military divisions. Voluntary membership, use of guerilla tactics, facilities to produce of weapons and access to modern weapons through connections with the ULFA and the LTTE make this group of Left Wing extremists a formidable enemy. Limitations of state-response arising largely from the spread of the network of the group across state boundaries, is only likely to increase the threat posed by the group over the next few years.

Focusing specifically on the phenomenon of Naxalism in Chattisgarh, Medha Bisht dwells on the contemporary nature of the problem since the formation of the state of Chhattisgarh in 2000. While the PWG and the MCC were both present in the region now comprising the state, Chhattisgarh, with its inaccessible forest areas has emerged as the nerve centre of the CPI (Maoist) with four training camps that train naxal cadres from all over the country. While the leader of the movement in the state is Commander Kosa from Andhra Pradesh, there is the village militia and the jan-militia (part-time cadre) that are active at the local level. They use primitive weapons such as axes, sickels, bows and arrows, while small arms and heavier weaponry is also available to those higher in the hierarchy. In 2006, the state is reported to have had 70 local guerilla squads and 30 *dalams* of 5-8 members each. The injustices of the state are used to justify violence, and counterinsurgency by the Salwa Judum, the state-sponsored people's militia, has been countered with severity causing immense harm to the people.

In his paper on Naxalism in the three east-Indian states of Bihar, Jharkhand

and Orissa, Nihar Nayak looks at the working of the Maoists under the overarching guidance of the CPI-Maoist. The Central Military Commission of the CPI-Maoist procures arms and distributes to the respective states according to the operations planned. In each of the three states, there is strong local leadership that manages state-level activities. Also, there are front organizations that are used to popularize the Maoists and recruit from among the locals. Grievances related to land distribution in case of lower castes as well as tribes and tribal displacement due to developmental and industrial projects are used by Maoists to recruit from the aggrieved population. While the military response has been taken recourse to in Jharkhand, it has been inadequate. There is much to be desired from policing in Orissa and Bihar. In each of the states, the rehabilitation and resettlement policies are also weak, with no provision for employment of those displaced.

Groups based on Religious Motivations

In her paper Arpita Anant dwells on the most prominent face of indigenous Kashmiri insurgency, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Formally launched in 1989, the group has a hierarchical organization and geographical divisions that operate on the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir. Whereas several groups merged to form the Hizb, several leaders also left the Hizb since 1990. Some left due to personality clashes, other owing to the growing influence of the Pakistani Jamaat and yet others due to the influx of foreign mercenaries. With an aim to integrate Kashmir with Pakistan, the group has an Islamist ideology that justifies its *jihad*. Despite coming together in the United Jihad Council with several Pakistan-based groups, the group does not share their pan-Islamist agenda and therefore has also made a deliberate attempt to stay away from the Al Qaeda. It has close yet distinct connections with the Jamaat of Pakistan, Jamaat of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) as well as Jamaat of Jammu and Kashmir. The Government has adopted a political as well as military strategy to counter the Hizb. Deriving its legitimacy from its links with the separatist leadership in the Kashmir Valley, the Hizb, in its turn, having suffered many losses since 2004, has made several offers for talks. But given its ultimate goal, the group is unlikely to give up armed resistance.

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was one of the prominent Pakistan sponsored non-state groups that waged a violent jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. Kanchan Lakshman details how it successfully evaded the various proscriptions by the Pakistan government as well as the international community by changing names from Harkat ul Ansar to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen to Jamiat ul Ansar. It has good training facilities within Pakistan that allow it to train recruits from countries of South East Asia as well as Russia. In Jammu and Kashmir, it operates in conjunction with other pro-Pakistan groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. However, it has the operational ability to carry out

attacks across the Indian hinterland. In this it is most likely aided by Dawood Ibrahim's network. Its leaders are Sunni pan-Islamists and continue to be influential despite the recent setbacks to the group. Their proximity to the Taliban has resulted in their designation as the Pakistani Taliban, whose main targets are westerners in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.

The Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is the quintessential non-state armed group representing terrorism of the twenty-first century that is inspired by religious ideology and also enjoys state-support. Priyanka Singh traces its Deobandi origins in the Binori mosque in Pakistan, as also its pan-Islamism that enables it to form linkages with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. As a group that has connections with the Al Qaeda, it is proscribed internationally by the United Nations and several other countries including the United States, UK, Canada and Australia. While the main aim is to liberate Kashmir and secure its union with Pakistan, the group has also targeted former Pakistan President Musharraf and has indulged in anti-Christian violence in Pakistan. Though banned in Pakistan, it continues to flourish with new names and with the help of continuous funding from trusts, the ISI, the Arabs, the Taliban as well as investments in the commodity market, real estate and production of goods.

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) represents the deadly face of a radical Islamist organization that has survived proscription by the international community and Pakistan and has resurfaced with new names for an old identity. D. Suba Chandran and Rekha Chakravarthi trace the resilience of this group to its single-minded pursuit of its goal to first free Kashmir from India and then to absolve all of India into an Islamic Ummah, following the Ahl-e-Hadith ideology. One of its key leaders, Abdullah Azzam is regarded as the mentor of Osama bin Laden. Its jihad in India has extended well beyond Kashmir and the authors give copious details of their network in India. In spite of being Punjabi-Pakistani, the group has some popularity in Kashmir due to its disciplined cadre. Its activities in the rest of the country are supported by the SIMI and connections with notorious underworld network of Dawood Ibrahim. Given its effectiveness in carrying out terrorist attacks in different parts of the country, the authors suggest that Lashkar be regarded as a serious threat to national security and be dealt with appropriately.

In his paper on Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI), Bibhu Routray traces the origins of the group from the Afghan conflict to the present times. He charts the transformation of the group from one fighting the Soviet forces along with the Afghan mujahideen to one operating against India in the Kashmir Valley. His paper traces the parallel development of the Pakistani HUJI as well as the Bangladeshi HUJI. It emerges from his analysis that the leadership of the group, though non-descript, has been able to form linkages with local as well as international non-state groups, thus ensuring its prominence. Interestingly, the Bangladeshi chapter of HUJI even attempted to become a part of the democratic system by forming the Islamic Democratic Party. More recently, its involvement

in several attacks in urban centres in conduit with the ISI, LeT and JeM and linkages with SIMI as well as some armed groups in the North-East make it a source of future concern for Indian and South Asian security.

Through her case study of the Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Smruti Pattanaik explores the complex relationship between the state and radical Islam in Bangladesh. Espousing a Taliban-like ideology of establishing a state with Islamic laws, the JMB distinguishes itself from the HUJI by limiting its goal to Bangladesh as opposed to the larger ambitions of latter. The JMB which formally came into being benefited from a conniving BNP government and the existence of religious groups like the Jamaat Islami (JI) and Islamic Oikyo Jote (IoJ) that were also part of the ruling coalition. It used the Quami madrasas of the JI, IoJ and the Ahle Hadith to gain 5000 active members and attempted to reach out to the household by engaging women in Dawat work. Remittances from West Asia and the presence of a large number of foreign NGOs, many of which had connections with the al-Qaeda and continued to function in Bangladesh as registered NGOs, ensured sufficient funding for the group. However, state response has undergone a change. First, the group was banned under pressure from donor countries and civil society groups, following which the care-taker military Government arrested and convicted some leaders and more recently, the ruling Awami League has declared its resolve to combat radical Islam.

The Taliban have become the epicenter of counter-terrorism since 2001. The close ideological and operational links with the al-Qaeda make them a formidable force to contend with. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza caricatures the transformation of the group from having a strict ethnic hierarchy to a more diffuse group with a substantial foreign element, the latest being the formation of the Pakistani Taliban. In the presence of international forces and the Afghan Government attempting to annihilate the group, the Taliban have successfully adopted strategies to counter these forces. This has even necessitated a surge in US troops. Having suffered severe losses in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban, in mid-2009 controlled nearly 70 per cent of Afghan territory. With plenty of funds flowing in from the drug trade and Islamic charities, and the growing unpopularity of international forces that have inflicted considerable collateral damage, the Taliban are likely to sustain their activities and pose a threat to regional security.

Part III of the book dwells specifically on the rise and decline of insurgencies and means adopted to counter non-state violence in India.

States in India's North-East have witnessed protracted insurgent movements. In his paper Bibhu Prasad Routray clarifies that while the sense of alienation from India remains among many sections of the population and in several instances the insurgencies have lost popular support and ideological commitment, they persist due to a longstanding leadership coupled with severe lacunae in India's

counterinsurgency policy, or rather the lack of it and the inept handling of ceasefire agreements that have provided opportunities for insurgent groups to regroup. He also points to weaknesses in the working of the Unified commands set up in the region, the political patronage to the insurgent groups, the mushrooming of active civil society fronts of insurgent groups and the lack of credible development initiatives. His prognosis is that given these set of circumstances, the insurgencies, will continue to “rise, fall and rise”.

Vivek Chadha analyses India's counterinsurgency operations in North-East India. He contextualizes the approach to counterinsurgency in the larger framework of the working of the Indian democracy, wherein the attempt has been to accommodate alienated segments of the population. He presents a candid assessment of the lessons learnt by the security forces in countering insurgency in the North East. At the operational level these include minimum use of force, protracted operations, small team operations, creating a counter insurgency grid, among others. He contends that these need to be combined with a people-friendly approach that involves better handling of crowds, punishing those guilty of human rights violations and involvement of security forces in developmental activities that help the people.

E.N. Rammohan traces the history of left-wing radicalism arising in different parts of the country since Independence. Providing details on the *Tebhaga* movement, the Telangana insurrection, organization of the *Girijans* of Srikakulam, the Naxalbari uprising and other such instances in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, he highlights the issue of non-implementation of land reforms as the prime cause of the rise of the *Naxal* movement. Drawing a parallel between Naxals in India and Huk rebels in the Philippines, he recommends that the foremost step in countering naxalism is the implementation of land reforms. In addition, formation of tribal cooperatives for use of forest produce as well as providing micro-credit to forest dwellers would also help wean away the tribals from siding with the Naxals.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been a theatre for cross-border terrorism since 1989. Barring the Ladakh region, the rest of the areas in the Jammu region and the Kashmir Valley have been witness to the rise and decline of various armed non-state groups. Analyzing this rise and ebb, D. Suba Chandran argues that the decline in militancy is a result of a combination of factors, not limited to the security response and fencing of the LoC. In the Jammu region, these include improved diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan and the consequent introduction of the Poonch-Rawalkote bus service decline in local, especially non-Muslim support to militancy, the formation of village defence committees and some positive impact of infrastructure development. There is however, some support for violence in the Kashmir Valley. Differentiating between militants, jihadis and counter-insurgents as armed non-state groups, the author underlines

the important role of Pakistani support and as well as local support in determining their prominence in the Valley.

In his paper on counter-terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, S.K. Saini, focuses on the changing nature of terrorism and propounds the essentials of a new counter-terrorism initiative. He conjectures that Pakistani support to terrorism will continue, but the levels of violence will progressively decline. The weakness of the terrorists will mean that they will avoid direct confrontation with security forces, simultaneously using modern technology to communicate, coordinate and carry out effective attacks. Reduction in violence will be compensated for by attempts to create communal hatred, targeting of developmental projects, such as the railways, engineered mass protests against security forces and increased criminal activity in the garb of terrorism. Outlining the features of the counter-terrorism strategy based on his field experience, he goes a step further to outline the imperatives of a new counter-terrorism strategy in Jammu and Kashmir.

Part IV contains the concluding chapter which presents the preliminary contingent generalisations based on structured focused comparison and highlights the contribution of this book to field of research on terrorism.

NOTES

1. Military Balance (IISS: London, 2001-02), p. 306.
2. Military Balance (IISS: London, 2009), p. 468.
3. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet (Eds.), *The Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences* (MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2005), p. 67.
4. Adluri Subramanyam Raju (Ed.), *Terrorism in South Asia: Views from India* (India Research Press: New Delhi, 2004); P.R. Chari and D. Suba Chandran (Eds.), *Terrorism Post 9/11: An Indian Perspective* (Manohar Publishers: New Delhi, 2003); P.R. Chari and D. Suba Chandran (Eds.), *Armed Conflicts in South Asia 2008, Growing Violence* (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Routledge: New Delhi, 2008); Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh (Eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region* (Manak Publications: New Delhi, 2003).
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6. Sridhar K. Khatri and Gert W. Kueck, *Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process* (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies: Colombo, 2003).
7. Imtiaz Ahmed (Ed.), *Understanding Terrorism in South Asia: Beyond Statist Discourses*, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo (Manohar Publishers: New Delhi, 2006).
8. S.D. Muni (Ed.), *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (Colombo Manohar: New Delhi, 2006).
9. Gurmeet Kanwal and N. Manoharan (Eds.), *India's War on Terror* (KW Publishers: New Delhi, 2010).
10. The most comprehensive being P.V. Ramana, "Data Paper on Terrorism", pp. 471-504 and Profile of Terrorist Groups, pp. 505-521 in S.D. Muni (Ed.), *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo (Manohar: New Delhi, 2006).