

Pakistan Project Report

UNENDING VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

ANALYSING THE TRENDS



idsa

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE
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रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

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Cover shows a car bomb explosion at Qissa Khawani market, Peshawar.

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FOREWORD

In the past few years, Pakistan has witnessed an upward swing in violence that has resulted in the death of more than 40,000 people. Internal security remains a major challenge not just for Pakistan but for the entire region; it has serious implications for the neighbouring countries. Keeping this in view, the Pakistan Project of IDSA has come up with its third report on Pakistan titled, “Unending Violence in Pakistan: Analysing the Trends”. The report seeks to analyse various dimensions of violence— specifically related to the incidents of terrorism, sectarianism, insurgency and political violence. The first report titled “Whither Pakistan? Growing Instability and Implications for India” was published in 2010 and the second report, “Pakistan on the Edge” was published in 2012. Both these reports were received well by the wider strategic community in India and abroad.

The Pakistan army, mainly responsible for the defence and security policies of the country, has stated over a period of time that the main challenges to the country’s security came from internal sources; however, ironically, it continues to maintain its links with some of the militant groups notorious for their defiance of the state. The army continues to differentiate between good and bad Taliban as the ongoing operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in North Waziristan suggests. It has its known favorites among the sectarian and militant groups who are regarded as strategic assets to be used against India and Afghanistan at will. Given such halfhearted approach of the army towards the whole issue of terrorism and extremism, Pakistan’s intent and ability to deal with militant groups of various hues remains questionable. Moreover, in spite of periodic purges, the lower ranks in the Army do have sympathies for radical elements. As revealed by some observers watching Pakistan army closely, there are instances of officers getting radicalized in the process of dealing with the jihadists.

Links between radical outfits like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ut- Tahrir (HuT) and the armed forces were amply evident during the attack on Kamra airbase in 2012, PNS Mehran attack of 2011, attacks on the GHQ in 2009, as well as the involvement of airmen in the suicide attacks on General Musharraf, way

back in 2003. Apart from the army, most political parties also maintain their links with sectarian organizations like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (ASWJ) especially in central and south Punjab in Jhang and Bhakkar, where it is difficult to win the elections without the support of such militant outfits. In fact, in some cases the parties compete with each other to gain their support. This has further emboldened the sectarian groups, enhanced their stature among the larger public and imparted legitimacy to their activities, complicating the internal security situation in the country.

In such a situation, military operations in the tribal area in the past as well as the current operation in North Waziristan provide only short-term relief, while Pakistan is in dire need of long-term measures to deal with the issue of violence and terrorism comprehensively. It has to be remembered here that Pakistan’s way of defining itself as an Islamic state also adds to the problem. It has, over the years, sought to project itself as a champion of Islam without making it clear which version of Islam it officially recommends or whether it recognizes the diversity within Islam. In the absence of any clear-cut definition, the militants groups have taken it upon themselves to fill in the void and impose their exclusivist world-views on the state and its people. At another level, Pakistan’s internal security is linked to its faulty external policies towards the wider world in general and its neighbours in particular. Search for strategic depth in Afghanistan and constant struggle to achieve parity with India, often termed as an enemy state, has compelled the army to evolve asymmetric strategies involving militant groups limiting its capacity to deal with them in case they turn rogue. There is thus a serious requirement for the Pakistani state, and especially its army which practically dictates its foreign and security policies, to clarify its stand on Islam and modify its strategic outlook towards its neighbours and the region. Such reorientation of foreign policy and strategic outlook must make jihadis irrelevant as strategic assets.

Violence and terrorism have emerged as a major concern for all the political parties in Pakistan today. After assuming power in the centre, like its predecessor, the PML-N government has taken several steps and has put

in place institutions and legal frameworks to deal with the menace—for example, passing of Pakistan Protection Bill, amendment of anti-terrorist Act of 1997 and strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). However, the PML-N government is yet to evolve a comprehensive strategy acceptable to all stakeholders to deal with sectarian and political violence.

This report analyses the approach of the federal government and major political parties to address the issue of violence in Pakistan and also examines the way in which the provincial governments are dealing with these issues at their level. I hope, like the earlier reports, this report will be relevant to policy makers, academia, strategic community and others who have an interest in studying the developments in Pakistan.

Arvind Gupta
Director General

PREFACE

This report is the third in the series prepared by the Pakistan Project at IDSA. It analyses the internal security situation in Pakistan during 2013-2014, and focus especially on the performance of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government one year in office. Despite the fact that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militants were well-disposed towards the PML-N, the federal government headed by Nawaz Sharif at the centre, and the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, the internal security situation worsened in comparison with the previous year; thus begging an analysis of the ground situation in different provinces. Moreover, the PML-N and the PTI appeared to be competing with each other to placate the TTP by their offers of dialogue, distinctly reluctant to support military operation in the tribal areas.

In the course of the electoral campaign in the May 2013, the TTP had openly threatened parties like the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), whereas no such threats were made against the PML-N and PTI. As a result, the PPP and the ANP virtually withdrew from campaigning in the KP. TTP's attitude did not come as a surprise. In the past, the TTP had proposed Nawaz Sharif's name as one of the guarantors, who could mediate the TTP's talk with the government. Soon after assuming power, Sharif government convened All Party Conference (APC) to chalk out a strategy to deal with the TTP. It was decided that government will explore peace talks to negotiate with the TTP. After TTP accepted the Nawaz government's offer for talks, it nominated Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) chief Maulana Samiul Haq, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam cleric Mufti Kifayatullah, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) leader Professor Ibrahim, Lal Masjid's Maulana Abdul Aziz and PTI Chief Imran Khan, to negotiate on its behalf.

However, at the same time, the TTP targeted PTI legislators in KP, and continued its attacks in different parts of the country. This complicated the overall security scenario, even as the Nawaz government continued to make efforts for a sustained dialogue with the TTP, apparently in the face of resistance from the army. The final assault by the TTP that changed the dynamics was

brazen attack on Karachi airport that compelled the government to order military action in North Waziristan – a formidable base of the TTP. Even, Imran Khan, who has been untiringly championing the cause of dialogue with the TTP, had to support the army action.

The TTP violence has overshadowed widespread incidents of militancy, sectarian conflict and insurgency in other provinces. This report devotes separate chapters to comprehensive analyses of the internal security situation in different provinces of Pakistan and the approaches of each provincial government to address the incidence of violence and terrorism arising out of a variety of factors. It charts out the complex linkages between various militant groups and the violence one witnessed in Punjab, Urban Sindh, Balochistan and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).

The report is divided into six chapters and conclusion. The first chapter analyses approaches of various political parties as enumerated in their manifesto and policy statements with regard to the internal security threats faced by Pakistan. It specifically deals with the policies of the federal and provincial governments, over the past one year.

The second chapter focuses on militancy, terrorist and sectarian groups in Punjab and their links with other jihadi groups within the country. This chapter also analyses links between banned sectarian groups and their relations with mainstream political parties and the PML-N government's approach to it.

Chapter three dwells on the challenges posed by presence of various factions of the TTP, sectarian groups and the criminal agents of political parties in Sindh. It also focuses on political violence which is a major cause of killings in Karachi. The problem of resurgence of nationalist violence in Sindh politics is addressed in this chapter. The chapter specially focuses on the provincial government's approach towards terrorism and violence.

Chapter four focuses on violence perpetuated by the TTP in the province. It maps their presence in FATA and various factions that are operating there. It briefly dwells on provincial government approach to the issue of terrorism in FATA. It also deals with military operation

and attempt of hold dialogue with Taliban and evolving security situation in the tribal area and its likely repercussions. Attack on churches in Peshawar and violence in the surrounding area are also dealt in this chapter.

Chapter five deals with violence in Balochistan, approach of the provincial government towards the problem. The security situation in Balochistan is dealt with in detail. It also looks into the insurgency, the continued problem of disappearance and sectarian violence in the state.

Chapter six focuses on the narratives presented in the Urdu press regarding the situation in FATA and TTP violence. It also analyses Urdu press reports on sectarian and nationalist violence in Balochistan, challenges of militancy and terrorism in Punjab, political violence in Sindh and the increasing presence of TTP in Karachi.

Conclusion makes an overall assessment of the situation

as it has evolved in each of the provinces of Pakistan and approach of the PML-N government after it assumed power. It also analyses where Pakistan headed in terms of its internal security situation and likely regional and global implications.

Pakistan project of the IDSA constantly endeavours to discuss and debate the developments in Pakistan and its likely implications for India. The group of researchers study Pakistan as part of their research work and their writings are published from time to time on the IDSA website.

I take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues for contributing to this report. The study also benefitted from research assistance provided by Yaqoob, Shreyas and Akriti in collating data and helping in project work. I would also like to thank Vivek Dhankar of IDSA's GIS lab for mapping out the violence and terrorism figures for the final report.

Smruti S Pattanaik

Project Coordinator

ABBREVIATIONS

AHB: Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan
ANP: Awami National Party
APC: All Party Conference
ASWJ: Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat
AT: Awami Tehrik
ATA: Anti-terrorism Act
ATC: Anti-Terrorist Courts
BLA: Balochistan Liberation Army
BLF: Balochistan Liberation Front
BNP: Baluchistan National Party
BRA: Baloch Republican Army
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Area
FC: Frontier Corps
FIA: Federal Investigation Agency
GHQ: General Head Quarters
HN: Haqqani Network
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence
ISPR: Inter Services Public Relations
JI: Jamaat-e-Islaami
JSM: Jeay Sindh Mahaz
JSMM: Jiye Sindh Muttahida Mahaz
JSQM: Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz
JST: Jeay Sindh Tehrik
JuD: Jamat-us- Dawa
JUI(F): Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur)

JUI(S): Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul)

KP: Khyber Pakhthunkhwa

LEA's: Low Enforcement Agencies

LJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement

NACTA: National Counter-Terrorism Authority

NISP: National Internal Security Policy

PAT: Pakistan Awami Tehareek

PEMRA- Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority

PkMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party

PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PML-Q: Pakistan Muslim League Quaid

PPO: Protection of Pakistan Ordinance

PPP: Pakistan People's Party

PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

QAT: Quomi Awami Tehrik

SMP: Sipah-e-Muhammadi Pakistan

SNM: Sindh National Party

SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

STPP: Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party

SUP: Sindh United Party

SWA: South Waziristan Agency

TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

UBA: United Baloch Army

VBMP: Voice of Baloch Missing Persons

NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MILITANCY AND TERRORISM

Smruti S Pattanaik

A major theme of the 2013 election campaign in Pakistan was terrorism and the approach of the Pakistan state towards it. Officially, the issue of terrorism includes violence of all types; however in reality violence perpetrated by extremist groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), attracted greater attention than the issue of insurgency in Balochistan, worsening security situation in Karachi and the nationalist violence in Sindh. Government's counter-terrorism efforts mostly revolved around the TTP and its affiliates. The National Counter Terrorism Authority remained defunct due to lack of political will to provide the authority with adequate power. This situation did not change despite the change of federal government. In fact all the political parties made terrorism as one of the important focus of their election campaign and recognized it as a primary threat to the country. Even Pakistan's powerful military since Musharraf's time have underlined internal threat to be the greatest security challenge for the country. The National Internal Security Policy (NISP), formulated recently by the Nawaz Sharif government, clearly mentions that the, "internal security environment is dominated by non-traditional threats of extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy."¹ Yet, the effort towards addressing these issues remained disjointed and approach of political parties indicate a lack of common strategy.

The fight against terrorism dominated the manifestos of almost all the political parties that contested the 2013 general elections. It is true that the TTP, which was formed in 2007, has further entrenched itself as a coercive group during the last seven years. Over a period of time it has taken its battle right into the heart of Pakistan, rather than remaining confined to the tribal borderlands. For example, the suicide attack on General Head Quarters

(GHQ), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in Lahore, truck bomb attack on provincial headquarter of the ISI in Peshawar, attack on the Police Training Academy in Manawan in 2009 and the police hostel in Lahore in 2012; daring attack on the PNS Mehran Naval base in 2011, attack on ISI headquarter in high security zone of Sukkur Barrage colony in July 2013 were unprecedented. These incidents shook the state of Pakistan which was otherwise busy using terror as an instrument of its policy towards other countries in the neighbourhood. During the Pakistan People's Party government, Pakistan's relations with the terrorist groups came under severe criticism at the international level. The US insistence that Pakistan should deliver more on its promises as an ally in the war on terror; its pressure to flush out militants from the tribal areas, especially taking action against the Haqqani group in North Waziristan; the Raymond Davis affair the raid that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden; and the ongoing drone attacks in the tribal areas gave further impetus to anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar bill and the Memogate issue added to the anti-US sentiments among the armed forces. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, led by Imran Khan cashed in on the prevailing anti-Americanism and viewed the role played by the US in Pakistan, as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. After the failure of the military to gain control over the tribal areas, and its inability to deal with terrorism, a dialogue with Taliban emerged as an attractive yet short-term option. The dialogue option is mainly floated by right-wing religious political parties, who oppose any military action against the homegrown Islamists.

Taking into account the developments in the last five years and recognising the increasing challenge that terrorism posed, the PML-N in its election manifesto

¹ *National Internal Security policy, 2014 -2018, nacta.gov.pk, See p4, accessed on February 10, 2014.*

before the 2013 elections devoted a separate chapter on terrorism which reads:

Nevertheless, neither militancy nor terrorism can be countered by mere use of force. This is a problem that has penetrated deep into the vitals of society and therefore needs a well-thought out, comprehensive and sustainable plan of action that should include economic, social, administrative and political initiatives.²

While the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) argued for the need to amend the anti-terrorism law, it also emphasised the need to:

...modernise the security sector in order to establish democratic and parliamentary oversight on intelligence services and to achieve better surveillance, improved coordination among intelligence agencies and enhanced capacity for counter insurgency forces at different levels.³

The PML-N offered to create an “alternate narrative to sustain efforts against terrorism” and promised to introduce the same syllabus, in both the regular schools and the madarssas. However, PML-N did not clearly enunciate its approach to militancy while the outgoing PPP was more forthright about the issue.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) election manifesto viewed terrorism, as a challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty. It favoured dialogue, disarmament and deterrence. It went on to say that the rehabilitation of former militants should be conditioned on their acceptance of the Constitution of Pakistan and the writ of the state. The Party also said that it resorted to military action only after dialogue and deterrence had failed to produce the desired results. The PPP, further promised that it would aim to “convince the militants to lay down their arms and come to the dialogue table. However, dialogue and fighting cannot go together so militants must lay down their arms during the process of talks”.

Though the political parties talked of extremism and militancy, they were all relatively silent with regard to sectarian violence that has resulted in widespread killings in recent years. The PPP argued that it had sacked the government of Balochistan because of rising sectarian attacks. But, in its manifesto, the PPP was completely silent over how to address sectarian violence, even though it assured the minorities, that it would provide protection to them in Pakistan. The PPP also claimed that it would take action against terrorist organisations—even those who had renamed themselves after they had been banned under the anti-Terrorism law of 1997. It also passed the controversial ‘Fair Trial Bill’ which allowed “the security agencies to monitor the telephone calls and other communications of suspected terrorists and the evidence collected through such surveillance will be admissible in a court of law.”⁴ The party promised that if elected to power it would dismantle the parallel power structures created by militants and in their attempts to determine the country’s foreign policy and threaten Pakistan and the region.

The PTI in its election manifesto said that problem of terrorism will be addressed through dialogue. It promised stopping drone attack. It also spoke of police reform and changing narrative of the militant groups.

All the major political parties recognised the grievances of the people of Balochistan. The PML-N promised to win hearts and minds of the people of Balochistan, “through meaningful political dialogue and comprehensive programmes to restore their political and economic rights.”⁵ On the issue of violence in Balochistan, the PPP pledged that “We will go further in integrating Balochistan into the national mainstream, giving its due rights on missed entitlements, which has already begun, and by assuaging its legitimate grievances.”⁶ It promised to go beyond *Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan* (AHB) to address the longstanding grievances that have fuelled insurgency and terrorism.

² PML(N), “National Agenda for Real Change”, Manifesto 2013, p.86

³ Ibid.

⁴ PPP Manifesto 2013, p.65

⁵ PML(N), “National Agenda for Real Change”, Manifesto 2013, p.71

⁶ PPP Manifesto 2013, p.5

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLICIES TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF TERRORISM/INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

Soon after it assumed power, terrorism assumed great importance for the PML-N government. The July 2013 jail-break incident, which was followed by a series of bomb blasts, attacks on minorities, the beheading of Frontier Corp soldiers and killing of senior military officials put pressure on the government to come up with a comprehensive plan to deal with terrorism. The government passed the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) to provide legal basis for any operations and actions against terrorists. It also called an All Party Meet to assess the threat of terrorism and seek a broad range of views, on the proposed dialogue with the Taliban.

The All Party Conference (APC) was convened in September 2013 to discuss the security situation in detail. The APC unanimously denounced the drone attacks and described them as “a continued violation of our territorial integrity” and “detrimental to our resolve and efforts of eliminating extremism and terrorism from our country”.⁷ However, there were differences among the political parties on the issue of talks with the TTP. The PPP, MQM and ANP were initially, not convinced about the prospects of these engagements bearing fruit while others endorsed the idea of dialogue. In the end, the APC agreed to give talks a chance.

However, the continued attacks by the TTP vitiated the atmosphere for talks. The death of Hakimullah Mehsud in a drone attack in November 2013, was also a major setback for the talks. The TTP increased its terror activities following this incident. The killing of 13 people in the crowded Royal Artillery Bazaar in Rawalpindi on January 20, again proved that the TTP terrorists could strike anywhere with impunity. This incident was

followed in February this year, by the beheading of 23 Frontier Corps (FC) soldiers, who had been held captive by the TTP since 2010. The military launched a few attacks on the TTP hideouts in North Waziristan as a retaliatory measure. Finally, the TTP was pressurised into announcing a month-long ceasefire on March 1, 2014. Earlier in February this year, the TTP also forwarded its 15 point draft for talks with the government.⁸ While proposal for initiating talks was in progress, a suicide attack in an Islamabad court resulted in the killing of 10 people including a judge. The responsibility for this was claimed by Ahrar-ul Hind, presumably a TTP splinter group, and indicated the fragility of reaching any probable understanding with the TTP in future. As a military operation appeared imminent, the prime minister surprised everyone, by announcing that peace talks would be held with the TTP. Defending the government decision, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar said, “The government is genuinely interested in peace efforts, otherwise, the prime minister will have announced military operation instead of formation of a four-member committee for talks with the Taliban.”⁹ Moreover, direct talks between the government delegation and the Taliban *Shura* members on March 26, 2014 also did not promise much. In fact, the meeting was deadlocked over the supposed reluctance of the government to fulfill the TTP’s initial demand for release of its cadres and the creation of a peace zone to enable free movement of TTP members, during the talks.

While the talks were being pursued with some interest by the government, legal measures were being firmed up to enable the law enforcement agencies to deal with terrorism. The Nawaz government passed the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance in late 2013. It later amended some of the provisions in 2014, under pressure from opposition parties. As many analysts have pointed out, it is unlikely that the dialogue will succeed and Pakistan will have to

⁷ “Resolution of the All parties Conference on September 9, 2013”, *Dawn*, September 9, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1041675/resolution-of-the-all-parties-conference-on-sept-9-2013>, accessed on September 10, 2013

⁸ The 15 points were: Stop drone attacks; Introduce Sharia law in courts; Introduce the Islamic system of education in both public and private educational institutions; Free Pakistani and foreign Taliban captured in jails; Restoration and remuneration for damage to property during drone attacks; Hand over control of tribal areas to local forces; Withdraw army from tribal areas and close down check posts; All criminal charges against the Taliban to be dropped; Prisoners from both sides to be released; Equal rights for all, poor and rich; Families of drone attack victims to be given jobs; End the interest based banking system; Stop supporting the US war on terror; Replace the democratic system of governance with the Islamic system; Break all relations with the US.

⁹ Khawar Ghumman, “Parliament watch: ‘Cracks’ surface in Nisar’s ties with PM”, *Dawn*, June 13, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1112437/parliament-watch-cracks-surface-in-nisars-ties-with-pm>, accessed on June 14, 2014

allow the army to take action. The army is also watched the dialogue process keenly. However, after attack on Karachi airport, finally the military has moved into North Waziristan to conduct *Zarb-e-Azb* operation to flush out militants who have taken shelter there. It is believed that many of the Taliban leaders had adequate time to escape the impending Army operation and moved into Afghanistan and other safe places.

On the issue of insurgency in Balochistan and political violence in Karachi the government has not adopted any specific strategy. The missing persons' issue remains a major issue in Balochistan. The TTP has managed to gain a foothold in Karachi. Political contestation between the MQM and other political forces in Karachi has also added to the violence and insecurity in the state where lawlessness is a major problem. In March, Pakistan announced its National Internal Security Policy (NISP) that was based on dialogue, isolation of the terrorists and deterrence, by building up the capacity of the security forces. This policy relies on the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) for implementation, which according to many is stillborn.

ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS

Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA)

The Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014, gives overwhelming powers to Pakistan's security forces and it provides "for protection against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and the prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan". According to Pervaiz Rashid, the information minister of Pakistan it provides for, "for speedy trial of certain offences."¹⁰ The Act, lists 20 offences as scheduled offences where the security forces including police forces can arrest and detain any person without warrant on 'reasonable' suspicion according to article 3(2a and c). The amendment act was introduced as an Ordinance in 2013 to establish anti-terrorist courts in Karachi and to expand the definition of terrorism. It needs to be mentioned that the Anti-terrorism Act has been amended 22 times since it was passed in 1997. The

PPA defines as "enemy alien" and the government avoided the use of "combatant enemy" which was used in the ordinance of 2013 and its amended version of 2014. It also defines militant as a person who wages war or insurrection against Pakistan or against its citizens and armed forces, takes up, advocates or encourages taking up of arms against the state and commits 'schedule offence' as set out in the schedule. Interestingly this Act also includes offence which "a person who commits any act outside the territory of Pakistan for which he has used the soil of Pakistan for preparing to commit such act that constitutes scheduled offence under this Act and the laws of the State where such offence has been committed, including an act of aiding and abetting such offence".¹¹ The state can use police officers not below BS 15 or member of the armed forces and civil armed forces can use necessary forces to prevent scheduled offence as a method of last resort. The Act also gives extraordinary powers to the government, in the interest of the security of Pakistan "not to disclose the grounds for detention or divulge any information relating to a detainee, accused or internee who is an enemy alien or a militant" It also gives power to enter and search any premises without warrant. The Ordinance further authorises the government to not divulge the grounds for detention or provide any information regarding the detainee, and exclude the public from proceedings of the special courts, in the interest of the security of Pakistan and public safety. Given these intrusive provisions the opposition parties were initially not willing to support the government. After prolonged negotiation with the opposition political parties the PPO was finally passed in July as an Act to empower the security forces engaged in a military operation in North Waziristan. This Act will be applicable to those detainees detained under the PPO ordinances of 2013 and its amended version of 2014.

Anti-terrorism Amendment (2014) Bill

Government also brought amendment to the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA), 1997 (XXVII of 1997) to allow detention of any person not exceeding three months on committing offence "relating to the security or defence

¹⁰ Ordinance No 1 of 2014, (to amend the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (2013), January 22, 2014, p.5

¹¹ Protection of Pakistan Act as passed by Majlis e Shoora. Available at <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/bills.php?status=pass>, accessed on July 24, 2014

of Pakistan or any part thereof, or public order relating to target killing, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion / *bhatta*, or the maintenance of supplies or services, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received"¹² Interesting the ATA which was introduced by Sharif way back in 1997 has undergone 22 amendments since its inception. The anti-terrorism Act of 1997 deals with terrorist or sectarian related offences and established Anti-Terrorist Courts (ATC) which functioned as parallel courts. These courts were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1998. As a result, an amendment was brought to the 1997 Act which allowed a convict to appeal against the verdict of ATC in the High Court and Supreme Court instead of special Appellate Tribunals established by this Act. The 1998 amendment also brought the functioning of these courts in tune with regular courts. In 1998, Sharif government passed Acting in Aid of Civil power Ordinance and established military courts and transferred the cases from anti-terrorist courts to the military courts. This Ordinance was again struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. In 1999, Sharif again amended the anti-Terrorist Act to establish ATC in all the provinces and added civil commotion as a crime to clear the back log of cases pending before the ATC. 15 session courts in Karachi were empowered to hear cases filed under Anti-terrorism Act.¹³ Government established military court in 1998 under the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of Civil power) Ordinance which was passed in 1998 and was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In 1999, the anti-terrorism Ordinance was again amended to include abetment, criminal conspiracy etc. After assuming power, the PML-N government amended the Anti-Terrorism Act to include groups and individuals who can be banned using this act. Any person who makes money by providing property or service available to the proscribed organizations, that property will be forfeited.

This amendment bill addresses the issue of terror financing.¹⁴

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

The government has also taken steps to establish a National Counter-terrorism Authority, because, "the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to the state and needs to be responded to and addressed comprehensively"¹⁵ The Authority will have a total of 20 members, including the prime minister, the minister for interior, the chief ministers of provinces, the intelligence services, the ministers of finance, defence etc.

National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018

The NISP recognises the internal security challenges posed by non-state actors and the many ways in which they impede economic development and social cohesion. It also takes note of the ability of the terrorists to attack the national security apparatus and key installations in Pakistan. Among other aspects, the policy seeks to promote pluralism, democracy, a culture of tolerance; and to resolve and manage the disputes with hostile elements peacefully, without compromising rule of law. The NISP posits a counter narrative to deal with the ideological challenges posed by the narratives of the militants; and promises to set up a de-radicalisation programme. It must be mentioned that government's de-radicalisation programme has not borne fruit as even after spending time in de-radicalisation centres, the reformed militants go back to a society that is already radicalised. The NISP also envisages a programme to integrate the mosques and madrassas into the national and provincial educational mainstream. The ministry of interior is the lead organisation for implementing the

¹² Peer Mohammad, "Anti-terror: President approves Pakistan Protection Ordinance", *Express Tribune*, October 20, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/620059/anti-terror-president-approves-pakistan-protection-ordinance/>, accessed on January 1, 2014

¹³ According to reports, out of the 17,000 cases in Sindh, around 11,000 are from Karachi alone. In Balochistan, according to its Prosecutor General Salahuddin Mengal, there are 344 cases, while prosecution officials in Punjab said that 327 such cases remain pending before the anti-terrorism courts. Tehmina Qureshi, "With Thousands of Pending Terror cases, Karachi Tops the List", *News International*, June 25, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-258027-With-thousands-of-pending-terror-cases-Karachi-tops-the-list>, accessed on June 25, 2014

¹⁴ <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/bills.php?status=pass>

¹⁵ *Gazette of Pakistan*, Senate secretariat, Act No XIX of 2013, 26 March 2013, p.1

NISP which constitutes an institutional response to the threat of internal stability in Pakistan. It is interesting to note that the NISP is going to remain operative for four years, which is too short a time, to develop a long term response to terrorism.

GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO THE PROVINCES:

On the issue of Balochistan and the violence in Karachi, the PML-N government is yet to come up with any specific plan of action or roadmap. It is the state governments who are largely left to deal with the situation in Balochistan and Karachi. In a significant development, the defence minister for the first time lodged an FIR against the army under Section 346, in the missing person case in Khyber Pakhtunkwa in which 35 undeclared inmates were illegally removed from an internment centre in Malakand, and who are now reportedly missing. Interestingly, the KP government has now withdrawn cases against the Army at their request. The Army argues that officials involved in the missing person case in KP would be tried under the Army Act.

A major problem that Pakistan encounters is that these terrorist networks are spread across the country. They have found patronage and shelter in each of the provinces by like-minded militant groups operating there. Tackling the threat of militancy would require close inter-provincial cooperation.

The nature of the threat in other Pakistan provinces has been different. In KP and FATA it is the TTP militant activities that threaten security; though there is also a sectarian dimension, to some of the violence in areas like Tirah valley in Kurram. The al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban groups like the Haqqanis, operate, in tribal areas especially in North Waziristan and sectarian, ethnic and terrorist violence is common in Balochistan. In Sindh, the violence is largely ethnic and political, and sectarian killings occur at regular intervals. Terrorist violence has recently increased as it is believed that the TTP has its sleeper cells in Karachi among the recently migrated internally displaced people from FATA.

According to the NISP, there are 33 organisations that deal with national security in Pakistan leading to problems of coordination. The Cabinet Committee on National Security remains the nodal agency for decision-making and there is little or no involvement, of the Parliament. Even within the cabinet, there are differences

of opinion and a general lack of coordination which is also the case where the federal and provincial governments are concerned. This problem of coordination was clearly visible when the attack on Karachi airport took place on June 23.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMIC AND THE ISSUE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

Tackling terrorism and violence in Pakistan would require coordination between the different organs of the government; and a level of intelligence gathering that would further boost this exercise. The fact that military and intelligence agencies have links with some of the violent and sectarian groups is well known. In the past, the attempts of the civilian governments to rein in terrorist groups, have been foiled by the intelligence agency, the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI).

The PML-N government has completed a year in office, in June 2014. Yet, its approach to terrorism, political violence, insurgency and sectarianism is yet to have any impact. Though numerous Acts were passed to deal with terrorism; inter-institutional coordination among the security agencies is found wanting. Some of these glaring problems are already documented by the Abbottabad Commission. Government's postures vacillated between dialogue and military operation and at times it appeared confused with regard to future course of action. Its decision to have a dialogue with TTP, when the military was preparing for to an operation, shows that the much needed civil-military consensus over pursuing talks with the TTP was lacking. In spite of grave provocation by the TTP, the civilian government tried to remain on course. However, the preconditions put out by the TTP made the dialogue non-starter. Army was against the release of any militants. Though PML-N though had the full support of the PTI and other religious political parties, many Pakistanis remained skeptical about the results of the peace talks and interpret them as an 'invitation to surrender'. Moreover, the TTP is not a monolithic organisation and there are many splinter groups who may not have agreed with the TTP's stated desire for talks. Given the internal fissure within the TTP regarding the talks and Government's decision not to provide peace zones; the TTP called off its ceasefire on April 10. While the government was looking for a reason to cancel the peace talks and go for military operation; the TTP gave it sufficient reason by launching a bold

attack on the Karachi airport. This turned the tide against the TTP and pro-talk groups rallied behind the government in support of a military action. After the attack on Karachi airport, the Army has started the long pending operation *Zarb-e-Azb* in North Waziristan. The parliament also passed the PPO to provide support to Army's counter-terrorism offensive.

Another major problem for the government is lack of coordination between the civil and the military. They also have different perspectives on the issue of terrorism and also differed on the issue of talks with the TTP. While the PML-N government wanted to pursue dialogue and cited the All Party meet resolution that gave it with the political mandate to initiate dialogue, the army which has lost many soldiers and the officers, favoured a military operation. But it does not want to initiate an operation without political backing. The army is also unhappy that while the government released 32 prisoners as a goodwill gesture before the talks with the TTP, no similar demands were made to the TTP to release the army officers who are being held captive by the TTP. Another problem is that some groups are patronised by the Army which limits any counter-terrorism initiatives. Groups like the LeJ have the political patronage of the Punjab government. On the issue of dealing with insurgency in Balochistan the military continues to have the upper hand even though political parties still retain the initiative with regard to FATA and Karachi.

Moreover, the civil-military equation appears strained on the Musharraf trial issue which may have an adverse impact on the government's anti-terrorism activities in FATA. For example, the Army Chief Raheel Sharif

speaking to the Special Service Group at Tarbela said, "Pakistan Army upholds the sanctity of all institutions and will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride."¹⁶ The military initially had undertaken a limited operation, like the one in Mir Ali after the killing of Major General Sanauallah and Lt Col Tauseef in a road side bomb attack claimed by the TTP. In the ongoing *Zarb-e-Azb* operation the Army has claimed to have killed more than 500 militants, however, there is no independent verification of who are these people. Many of the wanted militants went into hiding even before the Army operation began. It is also being speculated that the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan, would have an impact on the internal security situation in Pakistan. Before the withdrawal, the Army wanted an operation so that they have the support of the coalition force across Durand line. Some also argue that the idea of *Zarb-e-Azb* was to push the Taliban to occupy the recently vacated security checkpoints in Helmand which was earlier manned by the British troop. The militants/terrorists have their terror network in place within the country and across the region. A region centric approach would not suffice to meet the challenge this network poses. Moreover, there is a need to reappraise the establishment centric distinction of 'good' and 'bad' terrorist. This distinction is oxymoron and this is evident from the nature of the internal security threat that Pakistan is facing. Against this setting, it appears that the Pakistani state is all but prepared to deal with the menace of terror; and its internal security situation is likely to deteriorate further, despite all the good intentions of the Nawaz government.

¹⁶ ISPR, No PR75/2014-ISPR, April 7, 2014, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2014/4/7

PUNJAB: SITUATION REPORT

Sushant Sareen

On November 15, 2013, something unusual happened in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. Having long been on the receiving end of attacks by Sunni extremists and fanatics, the Shias hit back with a ferocity that no one had expected from them. A Shia procession marching through the city on the occasion of *Muharram*, retaliated against the provocative remarks being made over a loud-speaker by a Deobandi cleric, sitting in a notorious mosque-cum-madrassa complex. Almost as if they had come prepared to respond if provoked, the Shia mourners stopped outside the mosque and first pelted stones and then snatched rifles from the policemen and used them against the people inside the madrassa, before setting it on fire. Around a dozen people were killed, over 50 were wounded and property worth millions was destroyed.¹⁷ On the same day, riots between Shias and Sunnis were reported from Multan in the south of the province. There was palpable tension and reports of violence between the two sects in other cities in South Punjab.¹⁸ In the days leading up to Muharram, the massive deployment of law enforcement agencies across the entire province in anticipation of sectarian tensions boiling over and to prevent any terrorist attack on the Shia processions was in itself, an emphatic statement of the sectarian tensions that existed in the Punjab.

While sectarian violence has been wracking the Punjab for decades now, the Rawalpindi riot shook the federal and provincial governments, in Islamabad and Lahore respectively. Until Rawalpindi, the normal pattern of sectarian violence was that either extremists from both sects targeted each other, or else the Shias were at the receiving end of bombings, mass killings in shootouts in

Imambarahs or processions. An occasional street clash between sectarian mobs was also known to happen. But an organised Shia mob striking back through an armed assault on a Deobandi Sunni establishment represented a radical departure from the past trend. It was seen as a harbinger of a dangerous trend of sectarian polarisation at the level of the society, which if allowed to become the new normal, could rip apart the social fabric. The fact that just a few months prior to the Rawalpindi clash, there was an armed sectarian clash in Bhakkar which left around 10 people dead, only added to the growing sense of disquiet over the ominous dimensions that sectarianism has assumed in Punjab.¹⁹ Such a situation had existed only in a few pockets – notably, Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the Kurram agency in FATA – that were remote enough to be ignored. But for the same situation to start obtaining in the heartland of Pakistan i.e. Punjab, was something that was bound to set alarm bells ringing in the corridors of power, which in many ways, were responsible for the situation having reached such a pass.

One major reason for the rising sectarian tensions in Punjab, is the kind of collusive policy that the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government has pursued in the province since it came into power in 2008. Analysts have alleged that the PMLN has an unwritten understanding with Sunni extremist groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) whose latest avatar, is the Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat (ASWJ) whereby the Punjab government will avoid cracking down on these groups in return for their sparing the province. What is more, the Nawaz Sharif government has been depending


¹⁷ Amir Ahsan and Mohammad Ashgar, "Ashura Clashes Turn Pindi into Ghost Town", *Dawn*, November 17, 2013, <http://dawn.com/news/1056721/ashura-clashes-turn-pindi-into-ghost-town>, accessed on November 18, 2013

¹⁸ Shakeel Ahmad and Gulzar Chaudhry, "25 Injured in Multan Riot", *Dawn*, November 17, 2013, <http://dawn.com/news/1056720/25-injured-in-multan-riots>, accessed on November 18, 2013

¹⁹ Khurshid Anwar Khan, "Sectarian Clash Leaves Five Dead in Bhakkar", *Dawn*, August 26, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1037963/sectarian-clash-leaves-five-dead-in-bhakkar>, accessed on June 12, 2014

on the ASWJ leaders like Ahmed Ludhianvi and other sectarian/Jihadist leaders like Fazlur Rehman Khalil to act as intermediaries with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Punjabi Taliban groups to make them amenable for a dialogue.²⁰ As a result, the ASWJ has had a free run in Punjab, so much so that it brazenly appointed the notorious sectarian terrorist Malik Ishaq (who is accused of involvement in the murder of over 100 Shias and has been named by the US state department as a 'global terrorist') as vice-president of the party after his

release from jail.²¹ Ishaq was subsequently taken into 'protective custody' after an outcry following the massacre of Hazara Shias in Quetta, in early 2013. But the detention is more of eyewash because even when Ishaq was in prison, the PML-N government was paying a monthly stipend to his family.²² It was not only the Punjab government, run by the PML-N, that bestowed its munificence on Ishaq, but also the PPP-led Sindh and Balochistan governments which gave 11 arms licences to him.²³



²⁰ Asim Qadeer Rana, "Government Making Two Pronged Policy for Taliban Talks", *The Nation*, October 23, 2013, <http://www.nation.com.pk/national/23-Oct-2013/govt-making-two-pronged-policy-for-taliban-talks>, accessed on October 24, 2013

²¹ Anwar Iqbal, "US declares LJs Malik Ishaq global terrorist", *Dawn*, February 7, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1085356>, accessed February 8, 2014.

²² Asad Kharal, "Lej's Malik Received Monthly Stipend from Punjab Government", *Express Tribune*, June 16, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/210827/lejs-malik-received-monthly-stipend-from-punjab-govt/>, accessed on June 12, 2014

²³ Asad Kharal, "Punjab Investigates how Malik Ishaq, sons obtained 11 arms Licences", *Express Tribune*, February 28, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/513649/provincial-govts-action-punjab-investigates-how-malik-ishaq-sons-obtained-11-arms-licences/>, accessed on June 12, 2014

The kid gloves handling of Sunni terrorists like Malik Ishaq, is illustrative of not just the fear invoked by the firepower that these groups wield, but also their political clout. According to the chief of the ASWJ, Maulana Muhammed Ahmed Ludhianvi, all political parties seek his support during elections and in the 2008 polls around 25 PPP MNAs owed their victory to support of his party.²⁴ Even in the 2013 general elections, there were reports of the PML-N entering into a covert seat sharing arrangement with the ASWJ.²⁵ Although this tacit understanding did not really take off because the PMLN inducted a prominent Shia politician from Jhang, a number of PML-N candidates with close links with the SSP/ASWJ, or even its terrorist wing, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were fielded in the elections.²⁶ The links between the PML-N and the ASWJ were exposed when the Punjab law minister, Rana Sanaullah, was seen campaigning with the ASWJ chief in a bye-election in the sectarian hotspot of Jhang in February 2010.²⁷ The Punjab chief minister went even further, when he said that since the PML-N was fighting for the same cause as the Taliban i.e. opposing Musharraf's policies and rejecting dictation from abroad, they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab.²⁸

Even after the PML-N came to power in Islamabad in June 2013, it has continued to sidle up to the extremist and militant Sunni groups, and desisted from taking any

serious step to curb the activities of these people. During a visit to Swat in January 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, maintained that the extremists "are not enemies of the country...they have just lost their direction".²⁹ His interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, repeated the same thing in the National Assembly when he declared that most of the Taliban had no animosity towards the state of Pakistan.³⁰ It is precisely this ambivalent approach of the PML-N that is responsible for Punjab emerging as a jihadist hub, not just in terms of providing cadres and support networks, but also in terms of providing the ideological, political and propaganda ballast to the jihadists.³¹

Apart from an Islamist proclivity, the PML-N approach towards extremism and militancy also stems from their desire for self-preservation. In other words, the PML-N government's soft approach towards the extremists is motivated by considerations of personal safety – there have been direct threats to the Sharif family and other top leaders of the ruling party. This is believed to be the main reason why the PML-N suddenly decided to back down from its stated position of executing condemned terrorists, including Dr Usman, who led the attack on the GHQ.³² But another important reason for the pusillanimity of the Nawaz Sharif government is that it is willing to pay any price to keep the flames of jihadist fires from reaching the Punjab. As a result, it is ready to

²⁴ http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C06%5C21%5Cstory_21-6-2010_pg7_18, accessed on June 12, 2014

²⁵ A. Abdul Manan, "PML-N, ASWJ Reach Consensus", *Express Tribune*, September 30, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/444637/election-season-pml-n-aswj-reach-consensus/>, accessed on May 25, 2014

²⁶ Amir Mir, "SSP leader who fixed bounty on Taseer given PML-N ticket", *The News*, May 7, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-175873-SSP-leader-who-fixed-bounty-on-Taseer-given-PML-N-ticket>; also see Nasir Jamal, "Partnerships, Some Solo Ventures in the Sectarian Sector", *Dawn*, April 26, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/794309/partnerships-some-solo-ventures-in-the-sectarian-sector> and Amir Mir, "LeJ Terror Suspect Contesting on PML-N Ticket", *The News I*, May 06, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/todays-news-13-22694-lej-terror-suspect-contesting-on-pml-n-ticket>, accessed on May 25, 2014

²⁷ Amir Mir, *Talibanisation of Pakistan: From 9/11 To 26/11 and Beyond*, Pentagon Press, Delhi, 2010), p 345

²⁸ "CM Shahbaz wants Taliban to spare Punjab", *Dawn*, March 15, 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/news/857697/cm-shahbaz-wants-taliban-to-spare-punjab>, accessed on June 14, 2014

²⁹ "Extremists not our enemies, they have just lost direction!", *Pakistan Today*, January 15, 2014, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/01/15/extremists-not-our-enemies-they-have-just-lost-direction/>, accessed on January 16, 2014


³⁰ Muhammad Anis, "Majority of Taliban not anti-state: Nisar", *The News*, March 7, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28965-Majority-of-Taliban-not-anti-state-Nisar>, accessed on May 25, 2014

³¹ Tufail Ahmed, "The Next Decade of Jihadism in Pakistan", *Hudson Institute*, <http://www.hudson.org/research/9884-the-next-decade-of-jihadism-in-pakistan>, accessed May 25, 2014

³² Amir Mir, "Government Succumbs to TTP Threat?", *The News*, August 19, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-24866-Govt-succumbs-to-TTP-threats>; accessed on August 19, 2013 also see Asad Kharal, "Conspiracy Unearthed: Plot to Kidnap Punjab Chief Minister Foiled", *Express Tribune*, August 21, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/593018/conspiracy-unearthed-plot-to-kidnap-punjab-chief-minister-foiled/>, accessed on August 21, 2013

appease the extremists and cut deals with them, so that they spare the Punjab. But clearly this is a half-baked policy which may work in the short term, but is not going to stop the march of the fundamentalist forces, which have used the space created for them by the PML-N to expand their influence and their networks.

attacks in the province occurred after Nawaz Sharif formed the government at the centre. Spatially, even though South Punjab is often seen as the nursery of sectarian and jihadist terror, around 75 per cent of the incidents occurred in Central and North Punjab, with just Lahore and Rawalpindi accounting for nearly 40 per



Source: Pakistan News Digest, June 2013 to May 2014, at www.idsa.in/pakistannewsdigest.html

On the face of it, compared to other provinces, Punjab appears to have fared much better in terms of terror attacks. Even the massive spike in Taliban attacks after Nawaz Sharif came to power left the Punjab relatively untouched. In the first six months of his government, i.e. June-December 2013, a total of 827 terrorist attacks (including sectarian attacks) were reported from around Pakistan, but only a handful of attacks (21) took place in Punjab and not all of them were carried out by religious extremists. In 2013 Punjab (excluding Islamabad) suffered only 38 attacks out of a total of over 1700 attacks that were carried out in different parts of Pakistan. Seventeen of these were sectarian in nature, including 2013's sole suicide attack in Punjab - on an *Imambarah* in Rawalpindi. Interestingly, although Punjab largely escaped the brunt of terrorist violence, the number of incidents in the province more than doubled as compared to 2012. What is more, more than half of the

cent of the incidents.³³ The above graph reflects increasing violence in Punjab between June 2013 to May 2014.

The statistics however do not reveal the seriousness of the problem of terrorism in Punjab. There are some clearly discernable trends that are emerging, which hold portents of great strife in the not too distant future. The first is of course the coming together of the sectarian terrorists and the Al Qaeda/Taliban type of Islamist terror syndicates. Unlike the past, when a distinction could have been drawn between these two forms of terrorism, they are now increasingly being lumped together. This is hardly surprising since many of the Sunni sectarian terrorists from SSP and LeJ have long had a close relationship with the Taliban/Al Qaeda combine, and it was only a matter of time before they would mount operations in conjunction with each other. According to one report, the Al Qaeda's dependence on the Punjabi

³³ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, published by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

Taliban for operational purposes has increased. Not only does the Punjabi Taliban provide the network and logistics support for strikes rest of Pakistan, they also form the core support base of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, replacing the Pashtuns.³⁴

Ideologically, the Taliban and the Punjabi sectarian terrorists share a common antipathy for Shias and other minority Islamic sects. Worse, they both consider even some Sunni sects like the Barelvis, to be idolaters. Thus it is that many of the sectarian attacks in Punjab were claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Apart from attacking the Shias in their places of worship or congregations, there is also a new trend of targeting professionals belonging to the Shia community. While earlier, it was only Shia clerics who were in the cross-hairs of the Sunni terrorist groups, now an open season seems to have been declared on professors, doctors, businessmen, lawyers, or anyone prominent enough, from the Shia community. The Shias are however, now starting to retaliate. There have been a series of tit-for-tat killings especially in Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Lahore and for every top Shia cleric killed by the Sunni terrorists; a senior Sunni cleric (generally belonging to the ASWJ) has been taken out.³⁵ So far, except for the Rawalpindi madrassa, the Shias have neither bombed Sunni mosques nor massacred Sunnis congregating in any religious place.

There are also some signs of an incipient internecine war within the ranks of the Sunni sectarian terror groups. The busting of a LeJ terror cell revealed that it had been involved in the assassination of the ASWJ Punjab chief, allegedly on the instructions of Malik Ishaq. The police believe that the old guard of the SSP led by Ishaq is cut

up with the ASWJ leadership, under Ahmed Ludhianvi, because while the former made the 'sacrifices' and suffered jail terms and worse, the latter had taken over the entire party organisation along with the funds that flowed in the coffers of the party. Some analysts have speculated that this bloodletting could also have been instigated by the intelligence agencies in order to whittle down the power of the LeJ/ASWJ network, by sowing divisions in its ranks. Even if this is indeed the case, it is no cause for comfort because the virus of sectarianism seems to be spreading through the society and unless checked at both the ideological, political and administrative level, it is bound to have very serious repercussions for both state and society. Equally worrisome are the threats that the LeJ has made against high profile political personalities, including the PPP Co-Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. The PPP has warned the PML-N government in Punjab to act against the '150 sleeper cells' of LeJ in the province. The party has also accused the PML-N government of turning a blind eye to the LeJ since it enjoys close links with it.³⁶ Under these circumstances, if any high profile assassination takes place, it could easily devastate the democratic system and pit the main political parties against each other.

The second trend is involvement of criminal gangs in acts of terrorism, under the cover of the TTP. There are reports of many criminals gangs working together with the Taliban, in a joint venture for running kidnapping and extortion rackets. In the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad there have been many cases of businessmen, especially those who migrated from the trouble Pashtun belt, receiving extortion demands.³⁷ Those refusing or unable to pay have had grenades

³⁴ Fasihur Rahman Khan, "Qaeda now relying on Punjabi Taliban instead of Pashtuns", *The Nation*, February 24, 2014, <http://www.nation.com.pk/national/24-Feb-2014/qaeda-now-relying-on-punjabi-taliban-instead-of-pashtuns>, accessed on February 25, 2014

³⁵ Waseem Ashraf Butt, "Gujrat Varsity Professor, Driver Shot Dead", *Dawn*, November 20, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1057373/gujrat-varsity-professor-driver-shot-dead>, accessed on November 21, 2013; also see Kashif Zafar, "Shia Leader, Son Killed in Rahim Yar Khan", *Express Tribune*, August 2, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/585541/shia-leader-son-assassinated-in-rahim-yar-khan/>, accessed on August 2, 2013; Rana Tanveer, "Head of ASWJ in Punjab Shot Dead", *The Express Tribune*, December 7, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/642371/head-of-aswj-in-punjab-shot-dead/>, accessed on December 7, 2013

³⁶ Zulqernain Tahir, "PPP Wants Action Against LJ's '150 sleeper cells'", *Dawn*, April 2, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1097153/ppp-wants-action-against-ljs-150-sleeper-cells>, accessed on April 3, 2014

³⁷ Mohammad Ashgar, "TTP Demands 'Protection Money'", *Dawn*, June 17, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1018671/ttp-demands-protection-money>, accessed on June 17, 2013

thrown or shots fired at their houses. There has even been a case of a train being bombed, because the private operator did not meet the demand of the extortionists.³⁸ The MNA from Rawalpindi, Sheikh Rashid, has claimed in numerous TV programmes that kidnapping has become a virtual industry in the twin cities and that local kidnapping gangs keep transferring their quarry to other gangs, constantly jacking up the ransom demand, until finally the victim lands up with the Taliban who then extract a huge amount before releasing the hostage. The close links between local criminal gangs and the Islamist/sectarian terrorists was exposed after local bandits operating in the tri-junction of Sindh, Balochistan and Punjab kidnapped some policemen and after a stand-off that lasted days, released them in exchange for three LeJ members. A couple of civilians who were also taken hostage were set free after a hefty ransom was paid.³⁹

The third trend is not just the ever expanding network of the Islamist terror groups in both urban and rural Punjab, but also the sort of outreach and motivational propaganda that sympathisers of the Taliban have unleashed in the province. While earlier the Islamists were distributing videos of their actions, they have now started using a new medium to win support at a mass level. Set to traditional folk and religious tunes and recitation styles, songs and poems lauding the Taliban and portraying them as deliverers from the oppressive and dysfunctional system are going viral.⁴⁰ These are recited and played in congregations organised by the clergy and supporters of the radical Islamic groups in small towns and villages. The result of this sort of propaganda is that just in the last one year, around 3700

madrassa students from Punjab joined terrorist training camps during their vacations.⁴¹ Politically, the support base of the Islamists might not have crossed the tipping point just yet, but it is expanding very fast and in a number of districts in South Punjab religious, extremists hold the balance of power in electoral contests. And while compared to North and Central Punjab, South Punjab has been relatively quiet in terms of terror attacks however it continues to be an important catchment area for recruiting terrorists.⁴² The National Seraiki Party has in fact alleged that South Punjab has also become a fertile ground for recruiting youth, ostensibly as security guards for Saudi Arabia, but actually for despatching them to Syria which has become a sectarian battle ground and a magnet for jihadists from all over the Islamic world.⁴³ Adding to the worries of the security agencies is the huge influx of displaced persons into South Punjab, from the terrorist hotspots like North Waziristan and other agencies in FATA. Officials claim that South Punjab districts like Layyah, Bhakkar, Muzzafargarh, Rajanpur, Khanewal, Rahimyar Khan etc. are not just becoming a base and a sanctuary for the jihadists, but also serve as a gateway to FATA. The new settlers are bringing with them jihadist ideology and are believed to be responsible for the rise in crime – bank *dacoities*, kidnapping, extortion etc. – in the region.⁴⁴

It is not only in the relatively remote parts of Punjab that the Islamist extremists have established their networks. According to some reports, the national capital is today pretty much at the mercy of these people who can run riot in the city when they want with around 14000 madrassa students of around 200 seminaries, set up in

³⁸ "One dies, 35 Hurt as Bomb hits Karachi-bound Train", *The News*, August 6, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-24621-One-dies-35-hurt-as-bomb-hits-Karachi-bound-train>, accessed on August 6, 2013

³⁹ Abdul Manan, "Rajanpur kacha area: Govt Okays Release of LJ Men in Swap for Police Hostages", *Express Tribune*, July 16, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/577312/rajanpur-kacha-area-govt-okays-release-of-lj-men-in-swap-for-police-hostages/>, accessed on July 16, 2013

⁴⁰ For a sample of such propaganda material see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQbmIA341Ao>, accessed on February 24, 2014

⁴¹ Abdul Manan, "Changing Mindset: PUC Weaning Seminary Students off Militancy", *Express Tribune*, July 4, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/572295/changing-mindset-puc-weaning-seminary-students-off-militancy/>, accessed on July 4, 2013

⁴² Nadeem Shah, "Religious Outfits flex Muscles for LG Polls in Punjab", *The News*, December 12, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-219709-Religious-outfits-flex-muscles-for-LG-polls-in-Punjab>, accessed on December 14, 2013

⁴³ "Youth Being Recruited for use in Syrian War: Seraiki Party", *The News*, April 5, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-242432-Youth-being-recruited-for-use-in-Syrian-war-Seraiki-party>, accessed on April 5, 2014

⁴⁴ Nadeem Shah, "Huge Influx of illegal Afghans in South Punjab", *The News*, May 2, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-247665-Huge-influx-of-illegal-Afghans-in-South-Punjab>, accessed on May 2, 2014

and around Islamabad.⁴⁵ Security agencies have identified at least two madrassas in the vicinity of Islamabad, which they claim provide support and sanctuary to the TTP and other terrorists, and which along with the network of smaller seminaries linked to these two main terror hubs are likely to be the launching pads for any terrorist strike in the capital city. Interestingly, one of these madrassas is run by the Ansarul Ummah (the new avatar of the banned Harkatul Mujahideen) chief, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, who has not only acted as an intermediary to open a dialogue between the government and the TTP, but had also played a role to defuse the Lal Masjid crisis in 2007.⁴⁶ In a briefing to the Standing Committee on Interior, the chief of the National Crisis Management Cell described Islamabad as 'an extremely dangerous city' because of the presence of sleeper cells of Al Qaeda, LeJ and TTP.⁴⁷

Equally worrisome has been the discovery of sophisticated communications networks linked with the Al Qaeda and allied groups, from Lahore and other cities. One such gateway exchange that was busted, is believed to have been used in some high profile kidnapping cases for disguising the location from where the calls were being made.⁴⁸ What is significant is that the terrorists did not need to innovate to set up their own secretive communication network; all they needed to do was to exploit the feckless regulatory and administrative system which had given spawned many such illegal operators, who were then tapped by the terror groups.⁴⁹

The infiltration of the terror networks in universities is also a matter of concern. The Punjab University which has been dominated by the Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing, IJT, has gained some notoriety, after an Al Qaeda network on the campus was busted.⁵⁰ Given the close links between the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Al Qaeda (the former practically functioning as the political wing and mouthpiece of the latter and also for a number of top Al Qaeda leaders), it was quite natural for such a cell to exist in the PU. Incidentally, this is the same university whose hand-picked (by the Sharifs) Vice Chancellor has written a book about how a cabal of banking families in the US and UK have planted microchips, in all our heads and are now sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan.⁵¹ Clearly, with administrators and professors of this calibre, it really does not take much to go from the ridiculous to the dangerous. It is not just the discovery of Al Qaeda cells in places like Lahore and Gujranwala, Faisalabad, and most of all Islamabad/Rawalpindi, but also the fact that Kashmiri terrorists, Taliban, Al Qaeda and local jihadists all seem to be have coalesced, which makes the network of terrorists so ominous. Equally worrisome is the involvement of scientists and technologists with the terrorists, something that became known when an Al Qaeda cell was busted and the law enforcement agencies discovered a 'drone' project that was being manned by people who had, or were serving in organisations like the Air Weapons Complex.⁵² Apart from the organised cells, a new emerging trend is that of 'inspired cells' of teenagers with no apparent links with the established

⁴⁵ Liaqat Toor, "Islamabad Sitting on a Powder Keg", *Pakistan Observer*, August 26, 2013, <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=216375>, accessed on August 26, 2014

⁴⁶ Munawer Azeem, "TTP Getting Active Support from Seminaries in Twin Cities: Report", *Dawn*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098291/ttp-getting-active-support-from-seminaries-in-twin-cities-report>, accessed on April 7, 2014

⁴⁷ Iftikhar A Khan, "Terror Threat Stalks Country", *Dawn*, February 20, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1088229/terror-threat-stalks-country>, accessed on February 20, 2014

⁴⁸ Muhammad Faisal Ali, "Al Qaeda-linked' Exchange in Lahore Unearthed", *Dawn*, August 21, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1037262/al-qaeda-linked-exchange-in-lahore-unearthed>, accessed on August 21, 2013

⁴⁹ For a detailed exposition on the magnitude of this problem see Khawar Ghuman, "Grey Traffic Causes \$1bn Annual Loss", *Dawn*, March 31, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1096747/grey-traffic-causes-1bn-annual-loss>, accessed on March 31, 2014

⁵⁰ Usman Manzoor, "More Students Linked to Terrorists: Punjab University", *The News*, October 02, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-205590-More-students-linked-to-terrorists-Punjab-University>, accessed on October 2, 2013

⁵¹ "9/11 and the New World Order: Mujahid Kamran Reveals Plot to Take Over the World", *Express Tribune*, September 12, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/603091/911-and-the-new-world-order-mujahid-kamran-reveals-plot-to-take-over-the-world/>, accessed on September 12, 2013

⁵² Shakeel Anjum, "Capital Police Bust al-Qaeda's Drone Project", *The News*, October 12, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-26035-Capital-police-bust-al-Qaedas-drone-project>, accessed on October 12, 2013

terror groups, getting together to carry out attacks which they thought would meet the approval of the Taliban.⁵³

The point to note is, that while there were not too many terror attacks in Punjab, it is not as though Punjab has remained insulated from the wave of extremism and terrorism that is sweeping through Pakistan. To an extent, Punjab has been lucky that some of the cells were uncovered, often by accident, before they could carry out any attack. Punjab, if anything, is a powder keg that can be set afire at any time, something that the now slain TTP commander made quite apparent when he threatened to exact 'exemplary revenge' from Punjab.⁵⁴ The kind of intellectual, political, manpower and logistic support that the terrorists receive from the Punjab is a critical element of the power and influence they wield throughout Pakistan. More than any other province, it is Punjab that has romantic notions about the Taliban, and there is as yet no counter narrative to combat this trend.

Both at the federal and provincial level the authorities are well aware of the growing problem of extremism in Punjab. And yet, a strange sort of paralysis seems to have afflicted successive governments in Islamabad. Other than cosmetic steps, some fire-fighting and an occasional declaration of resolve, there has been nothing on ground to suggest that the PMLN government is serious about combating, much less eliminating the menace of terrorism in the province. Late last year, after eyebrows were raised, within and without Pakistan, over the news of the killing of Naseerudin Haqqani, a top Haqqani Network (HN) operative and son of the head of HN, in an Islamabad suburb, Bhara Kahu, the government suddenly came into action and mounted a crackdown in the area, which according to many analysts is the base camp for terrorists. But it appeared as though the

terrorists had already got wind of the impending operation, and all that the law enforcement agencies found were locked doors.⁵⁵ A couple of weeks later when it seemed, that finally the Nawaz Sharif government had got over its stasis and was on the verge of moving against Terror Central i.e. North Waziristan, the Punjab law minister declared that the government, was all set to launch targeted operations in 174 areas of the province against terrorist cells in order to pre-empt any retaliation by the Taliban, following operations in North Waziristan.⁵⁶ But within hours of this bombast, the prime minister made a swift U-turn and decided to enter into peace talks with the Taliban. Since then, there has been no major action against the terror cells, even though some big attacks were mounted in the province in the first half of 2014.

The start of peace talks with the Taliban had raised hopes, false as it turns out, of violence levels reducing. Although violence levels did fall sharply for a few weeks, the Taliban continued to carry out attacks despite having announced a 'ceasefire', which lasted just over a month. The big difference was that unlike the past, during the ceasefire, the TTP did not claim responsibility for the attacks. Instead of the TTP, unknown groups believed to be affiliated with the TTP, but claiming to have broken away in protest against the dialogue, took responsibility for the attacks. The two most significant attacks in Punjab after the ceasefire was declared were both in Islamabad. The first on the Islamabad district courts in which 11 people were killed was claimed by a new organisation called Ahrar-ul-Hind, which is believed to have ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Pakistani terror groups like Harkat ul Mujahideen and Jaish e Mohammad⁵⁷. The second attack was the bombing of the Islamabad vegetable market in which over two dozen people died.⁵⁸

⁵³ Shakeel Anjum, "TTP-inspired Terror Gang Busted in Capital", *The News*, February 13, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28544-TTP-inspired-terror-gang-busted-in-capital>, accessed on February 13, 2014

⁵⁴ Pazeer Gul and Sailab Mehsud, "Ruthless Fazlullah is new Taliban Chief", *Dawn*, November 8, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1054876/ruthless-fazlullah-is-new-taliban-chief>, accessed on November 8, 2013

⁵⁵ Munawer Azeem, "After Police crackdown, 'Terrorists' start leaving Bhara Kahu", *Dawn*, May 12, 2014 http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=05_12_2013_004_006, accessed on May 12, 2014

⁵⁶ Jon Boone, "Pakistan 'on War Footing to Smash Taliban", *The Guardian*, January 28, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/28/pakistan-war-footing-taliban>, accessed on January 28, 2014

⁵⁷ Asim Qadeer Rana, "TTP, Ahrar-ul-Hind Ate and Slept Together", *Dawn*, March 06, 2014 <http://www.nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-03-06/page-1/detail-3>, accessed on March 28, 2014

⁵⁸ Shakeel Anjum, "11 Dead in Suicide Attack on Islamabad District Courts", *The News*, March 04, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28890-11-dead-in-suicide-attack-on-islamabad-district-courts>, accessed on March 4, 2014; Shakeel Anjum, "24 die in Islamabad Sabzi Mandi Blast", *The News*, April 10, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-29627-24-die-in-islamabad-sabzi-mandi-blast>, accessed on April 10, 2014

This was claimed by a Baloch-based organisation called United Baloch Army, but investigators dismissed these claims and saw the fingerprints of the TTP and its affiliates in the attack.

Another high profile attack was the attempt on the life of a liberal Pakistani journalist, Raza Rumi, by LeJ terrorists in Lahore. Rumi escaped but his driver was killed.⁵⁹ Before the ceasefire, in January there was one major attack in Rawalpindi, close to the GHQ, where a suicide bomber blew up himself and killed another 13 people.⁶⁰ There was also an attack on an ISI office in Khanewal in South Punjab, in which two guards were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up.⁶¹ An even more serious attack was the one that was planned by the terrorists in Kahuta, infamous for its association with Pakistan's nuclear programme. This attack was pre-empted by the security forces, just on the eve of the announcement of the ceasefire by the TTP.⁶² After the end of the ceasefire, two low intensity blasts took place in Islamabad which security agencies believed were probing attacks by the terrorists and the harbingers of more serious attacks.⁶³ There are also reports of an attempt by the Al Qaeda, to kidnap a Yemeni diplomat and officials fear a major attack on the Egyptian embassy.⁶⁴ These appear to tie in seamlessly with the Jihadist continuum that is sweeping the Islamic world from the Maghreb to Malaysia with its epicentre in the Afpak region.

Despite the expanding web of terror organisations in Punjab, and the spate of intelligence reports flagging

this threat, the PMLN government in the province has remained dangerously complacent, in putting in place systems and structures that would meet the growing challenge head-on. Although the federal government announced its National Internal Security Policy with a lot of fanfare and presented it as a significant step in combating terrorism. Four months after the unveiling of the policy, hardly anything has happened on ground to implement and operationalise it. Security officials complain that the provincial government only reacts to events and has no long-term counter terrorism strategy in place.⁶⁵ Earlier this year, the Punjab government was reported to have started preparing to deal with the fallout of any military operation in FATA by beefing up security along its border with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, to prevent infiltration by terrorists on the run into the province.⁶⁶ But clearly, despite all the tall talk of sealing the borders, nothing of the sort happened.

Faced with criticism over its laxity on the issue of terrorism, the provincial government which never tires patting itself on the back as the flag-bearer of good governance did what all governments do: give statistics to show that it was indeed pro-active. In April this year, the government claimed that it had arrested some 700 militants involved in sectarian violence over six months.⁶⁷ That this did not in any way serve to dismantle the terrorist network that has a presence all over the province did not seem to register with the government and its mouthpieces. Amidst all the talk of setting up a counter terrorism department in the province, the

⁵⁹ "Under siege: Express Media Group Attacked Once Again", *Express Tribune*, March 29, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/688691/under-siege-express-media-group-attacked-once-again/>, accessed on March 29, 2014

⁶⁰ Kashif Abbasi, "Rawalpindi market: Suicide Bombing Kills 13 Near GHQ", *Express Tribune*, January 21, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/661326/rawalpindi-market-suicide-bombing-kills-13-near-ghq/>, accessed on January 21, 2014

⁶¹ "Two Elite Force Men Killed in Khanewal Suicide Attack", *The News*, February 8, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-231245-Two-Elite-Force-men-killed-in-Khanewal-suicide-attack>, accessed on February 8, 2014

⁶² Shakeel Anjum, "Police Foil Terror Attempt in Kahuta", *The News*, March 28, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-240773-Police-foil-terror-attempt-in-Kahuta>, accessed on March 28, 2014

⁶³ Waqas Naeem, "Terror Alert: Twin Bombs Send Reminder of Capital's Vulnerability", *Express Tribune*, March 25, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/712693/terror-alert-twin-bombs-send-reminder-of-capitals-vulnerability/>, accessed on March 25, 2014

⁶⁴ Ikram Junaidi, "Official sees Al Qaeda Behind Failed Bid to Kidnap Yemeni Diplomat", *Dawn*, March 27, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1108790/official-sees-al-qaeda-behind-failed-bid-to-kidnap-yemeni-diplomat>, accessed on March 27, 2014

⁶⁵ Khawar Ghumman, "Punjab govt Accused of Being Soft on Militants", *Dawn*, April 20, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1101115/punjab-govt-accused-of-being-soft-on-militants>, accessed on April 20, 2014

⁶⁶ Intikhab Hanif and Mohammad Faisal, "Punjab Taking Steps to Avert Infiltration of Terrorists from KP", *Dawn*, February 21, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1088498/punjab-taking-steps-to-avert-infiltration-of-terrorists-from-kp>, accessed on February 21, 2014

⁶⁷ Khawar Ghumman, "Punjab Claims it's Coming Down Hard on Militants", *Dawn*, April 22, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1101490/punjab-claims-its-coming-down-hard-on-militants>, accessed on April 22, 2014

government has callously neglected the ushering in of much needed reforms in the provincial police which by all accounts, is the basic building block of maintaining law and order. According to one report, nearly 85 per cent of the budget of the police is spent on salaries and only 2 per cent on operations.⁶⁸ In other words, the Punjab Police is just not equipped, forget about trained, to take on the highly motivated, innovative and committed terrorists.

With the operation in North Waziristan which has displaced many Punjab is now bracing for the backlash from the Taliban. Efforts are being made to take out Taliban cells in the province with the help of an intelligence driven operation so that the network is disrupted and finally dismantled.⁶⁹ But while this operation unfolds, the government has fallen back upon

the military to protect it from the anticipated attacks of the Taliban. The army has been asked to provide troops from the 111 Brigade – infamous as the ‘coup brigade’ – to protect the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. These troops will be given police powers, including the powers of arrest, raids and retaliation.⁷⁰ During his last tenure as Prime Minister; Nawaz Sharif, had deployed the army for everything from unearthing ghost schools to reading electricity meters. A newsmagazine back then had termed this ‘a creeping coup’, which later turned into an unbridled coup that overthrew the Nawaz Sharif government. Will the deployment of the army in Islamabad this time around be the precursor of something similar in the future? And this time, under the pretext of protecting the state and country from terrorism that the civilian government is unable to manage.

⁶⁸ Intikhab Hanif, “Constables Weigh Heavy on Punjab Police”, *Dawn*, March 03, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1090703/constables-weigh-heavy-on-punjab-police>, accessed on March 3, 2014

⁶⁹ Jawad R Awan, “Spy Op in Punjab to Nip TTP Supporter”, *The Nation*, May 26, 2014, <http://www.nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-05-26/page-3/detail-3>, accessed on May 26, 2014

⁷⁰ Munawer Azeem, “111 Brigade asked to protect Islamabad”, *The Dawn*, May 26, 2014, http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=26_05_2014_004_008, accessed on May 26, 2014

SECURITY SITUATION IN SINDH 2012-2013: NO REPRIEVE IN SIGHT

Ashok Behuria

The year 2013 witnessed an upward trajectory in the violence in Sindh. The district, as well as city of Karachi—the financial capital of Pakistan, and regarded as the microcosm of Pakistan, or a ‘mini-Pakistan’ because of the ethnic and religious diversity of its population—emerged as a major trouble spot for the Pakistani security machinery, outside of the tribal regions. The statistics collected by Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) indicate that there were about 390 terrorist attacks in Sindh during the year, of which 356 incidents took place in Karachi alone resulting in the deaths of 523 people and injuring 1031.⁷¹ These included targeted killings, sectarian attacks, political clashes, and violence perpetuated by radical Islamic groups. The remaining 34 incidents took place in the other 11 districts of Sindh, with Hyderabad accounting for 14 alone. These attacks were mainly by Sindhi nationalists who seem to have slowly begun asserting themselves over the last one decade.

violence in Karachi over the last year, i.e., from 215 in 2012, to 356 in 2013. If one were to compare this to the 58 incidents in 2011, the rate of increase is even higher—about six and half times more within a period of two years. While the graph of the terror attacks had started showing an overall decline since 2009 in Pakistan as a whole, there was a clear spike in violence, in the case of Karachi. Over the last year, the number of fatalities in Karachi has gone up by 81 per cent; and the number of those injured by 158 per cent. In the rest of Sindh the attacks have gone up by 21 per cent, from 28 to 34, while the fatalities have gone up 82 per cent (from 17 to 31); and the number of injured by 173 per cent (from 45 to 123).⁷³ According to data released to the media by the Sindh Police and Rangers about 40,848 incidents of crime were reported in Karachi, which resulted in the deaths of 2715 persons in the year 2013, making it by far the deadliest year in history.⁷⁴ There were also about 519 reported cases of extortion during the year.

Table 1: Violence in Sindh⁷²

Nature of Violence	No of incidents (Karachi + Rest of Sindh)	Fatalities (Karachi + Rest of Sindh)	Injured (Karachi + Rest of Sindh)
Terrorist Attacks	390 (356+34)	523 (492+31)	1031 (908+123)
Suicide Attacks	5	16	108
Sectarian	132 (130+2)	215 (210+5)	319 (285+34)
Ethno-Political Violence	193 (183+10)	234 (222+12)	156 (96+60)

THE CASE OF KARACHI

Surge in Violence

There has been a 90 per cent increase in the incidents of

All this took place even as the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) launched a targeted operation against the miscreants. The repeated failures of the state police led to rangers being given police powers, and tasked to

⁷¹ *Pakistan Annual Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.19.

⁷² The data used here and throughout the paper, unless otherwise mentioned, is from the *Pakistan Annual Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS),

⁷³ *Ibid.* p.9 & 20.

⁷⁴ The report cited in Faraz Khan and Gibran Ashraf, “Karachi 2013: The deadliest year of all”, *Express Tribune*, January 6, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/653889/karachi-2013-the-deadliest-year-of-all/>, accessed on January 6, 2014

spearhead crackdowns against criminals. The police and rangers claimed to have undertaken almost 9,229 targeted raids which led to the arrest of 13,906 suspected criminals including: 181 target killers (69 by police, 112 by Rangers) and seizure of 8,469 illegal weapons. However, the miscreants continued to maintain the tempo of their activities throughout the year. The graph below reflects increasing violence in Karachi in last one year.

A detailed analysis of the Karachi situation, based on the data and information culled primarily from the Pakistani media is being provided below.

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Dadu	1	0	0
Hyderabad	14	10	10
Jacobabad	1	1	8
Jamshoro	1	0	4
Karachi	356	492	908
Kashmore	6	7	0
Khairpur	3	0	1
Larkana	1	0	0
Nawabshah	2	0	0
Sanghar	2	0	4
Shikarpur	2	4	31
Sukkur	1	9	65
Total	390	523	1,031


Table 2: District-wise Terror Attacks in Sindh 2013

Region	Casualties in Terrorist Attack		Casualties in Political Violence	
	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
Karachi	492	908	222	96
Interior Sindh	31	123	12	60
Total	523	1,031	234	156
Total Killed	746			
Total Injured	1,146			

Table 3: Casualties in Terrorist and Political Violence 2013


Changing Demography

As a whole, the population of Karachi also went up from about 9.2 million in 1998, when the last census was conducted, to about 21.2 million in 2011, as indicated by the pre-census media reports from Pakistan.⁷⁵ It is said that Karachi, has added more than the entire population of New York, to its population in last 10 years. Commentators from Pakistan say that there has been a



Source: Pakistan News Digest, June 2013 to May 2014, at www.idsa.in/pakistannewsdigest.html

⁷⁵ Arif Hasan, "Karachi's Changing Demography & its Planning-related Repercussions", *The Express Tribune*, February 7, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/668864/karachis-changing-demography-its-planning-related-repercussions/>, accessed on February 7, 2014



progressive decline of the hold of the Mohajirs, and other ethnic groups are increasing their presence in the city. As the two dominant ethnic groups, the Mohajirs and Pashtuns are likely to continue competing for influence in the city, by all means at their command.

Mohajirs vs Pashutns

The Mohajirs have been a dominant majority in Karachi since the 1950s. However, ever since the war on terror targeted the disturbed tribal borderlands of Pakistan extending from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA) to Chaman in Balochistan, there has been a steady trickle of Pashtun migrants from these areas to other parts of Pakistan, and mainly to Karachi. This trickle has turned into a torrent since 2004, when the Pakistan army coordinated its activity with the international security forces in Afghanistan and launched operations in FATA. The estimates of Pashtun migration vary from 300,000 to 700,000 and more, apart from about 50,000 registered Afghan refugees, most of whom are Pashtuns. The total population of the Pashtuns in Karachi today varies from 7 to 8 million, or is estimated to be between 15 per cent and 25 per cent of the total Karachi's population.⁷⁶ The

⁷⁶ Imtiaz Ali, 'Karachi's ethnic composition undergoing radical change', *The News*, November 01, 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=75494&Cat=4>, Zia ur Rehman, "Demographic Divide", *The Friday Times*, Vol. XXIII, No. 22, July 15-21, 2011, p.5, accessed on November 1, 2011.

changing demography of the city and the brutal contestation for power, between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, define the emerging political dynamic in Sindh today.

This has brought about a change in demography, that threatens the Mohajir control over the levers of power in Karachi. It is commonly believed that with the dramatic rise in Pashtun population, and the shifting of base by some Pashtun militant groups to Karachi, the Mohajir monopoly over violence has been challenged, as can be indicated from growing incidents of confrontation between these groups in recent years. Moreover, the Pashtuns, with their numerical rise, feel that they have been politically marginalised and underrepresented in Karachi.

The Sindhi nationalists of Karachi

While there is a competition for influence between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, the Sindhi nationalists believe that they are the most marginalised community in Karachi and their population has dipped from over 61 per cent in 1947 to about seven percent today, despite the fact that Karachi is situated in Sindh, which is the homeland of the Sindhis. The Sindhi nationalists have lost out to the Peoples Party of Pakistan (PPP) in electoral politics since 1970s, especially after the execution (termed as 'martyrdom' by many Sindhis) of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. The political alliance between PPP and Muttahida Quami Mahaz (MQM) has led to an uneasy peace between the Sindhis and Mohajirs in recent years. However, there is a resurgence of Sindhi nationalist sentiment, which could complicate the inter-ethnic equations in the restive city.

The Case of Lyari

No discussion of the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi can ever be complete without a mention of Lyari, an important neighbourhood in the city dominated by the ethnic Baloch population. This

locality is characterised by its high population density with some areas like Nawalane accounting for over 4,000 persons, per hectare. It's million plus population consists of all denominations including Hindus and Pashtuns, Baloch and Punjabis. It is known to be the nerve centre of the Karachi underworld.⁷⁷ Most of the criminal gangs operating in Karachi have their bases in Lyari and are engaged in acts of extortion, kidnapping, trade in narcotics and illegal arms, land-grabbing, robbery, and *dacoiti*. As far as narcotics trade is concerned, Karachi is shaping up as the most dangerous megacity and the next frontier in the global meth trade, as many of these traders operate out of Lyari.⁷⁸

Over the years various rival Baloch gangs have fought each other for influence in the area. Since 2009, a local peace committee established by one of the factions to bring together various gangsters together, now led by Uzair Jan Baloch, has been holding sway over the area despite the efforts of the police, to break into this area. In March 2013, after one of its many unsuccessful attempts to penetrate the area, the government acceded to popular demand and accepted the authority of the peace committee in the area. The result of the May 2013 election further strengthened the hold of this committee. The people of the locality rejected the candidature of Nabil Gabol—a former PPP MNA and federal minister and a three times winner from Lyari, who this time was contesting on the MQM ticket—primarily because he was opposed to the committee. Gabol could not even manage enough votes to save his security deposit.

Political issues

However, ethno-political dimensions of the violence alone, fails to explain the situation. Violence in Karachi is multi-dimensional. As has been indicated above, it is ethno-political, criminal, militant, and sectarian.⁷⁹ Various militant groups operating in Karachi are affiliated to political parties like the MQM, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the MQM-Haqiqi, who use them to further their own narrow interests. Some

⁷⁷ Alok Bansal, "Violence in Lyari: New Fissures in Karachi", CLAWS Website, Article No. 1062, July 20, 2013, <http://www.claws.in/Violence-in-Lyari-New-Fissures-in-Karachi-Alok-Bansal.html>, accessed on July 20, 2013

⁷⁸ See an investigative report by Taimur Khan, "Cooking in Karachi", *Foreign Policy*, September 3, 2013, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/03/cooking_in_karachi_meth_pakistan, accessed on September 3, 2013

⁷⁹ Huma Yusuf, "Conflict Dynamics in Karachi", *Peaceworks* No 82, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Washington, 2012, p.7.

observers in Pakistan hold that “the violence in Karachi is a result of clashes between gangs involved in drug trade, land grabbing, extortion and gunrunning, under cover of political parties”.⁸⁰ In fact, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had produced a 157 page report in 2011 which said that organised crime in Karachi was receiving covert financial support from various political parties, which in turn were using their muscle to advance their own agendas⁸¹.

Sectarian attacks

With the changing demography and penetration of militant groups, known for their orthodox and sectarian outlook, into Karachi, there has been a noticeable spike in the sectarian attacks in the city. Organised attacks have been carried out against both Shias and Sunni Barelvis in the past. Banned militant outfits like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its offshoots, several splinter groups of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)⁸², Sipah-e-Sahaba/Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), Al Qaeda and branches of Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)⁸³, have a presence in the city and have claimed responsibility for the attacks on minorities.

In 2013, there was a marginal increase in sectarian attacks across the country—from 213 to about 220. However, if one were to take into account the 53 per cent rise in such incidents in 2012 as compared to 2011, the attacks have continued at their own pace while the state has failed to contain this menace. For example, the attacks increased by 53 percent from 139 in 2011 to 213 in 2012. As many as 563 persons were killed—a 42 percent rise in fatalities compared to 2011—and another 853 injured— i.e. 44 percent more than in 2011. In 2013, in about 220 incidents, the casualty figures were considerably higher, i.e., about

22 per cent. Thus, from the figure of 563 in 2012, the number jumped to 687 in 2013, and correspondingly, the figure for the injured rose from 853 to 1319, a 46 per cent increase over the last year.

In Sindh, sectarian attacks were reported mainly from Karachi. Of the nearly 132 sectarian attacks in Sindh, 130 occurred in Karachi alone. Two other incidents were reported from Jacobabad and Shikarpur. Karachi accounted for 210 of a total of 215 casualties and for 285 of the 319 injured, in these incidents. The city witnessed a 34 per cent increase in sectarian attacks over 2012 sustaining the upward trend. In 2012, for example, there was a 137 per cent increase in this respect.

The incidents mainly took the form of suicide attacks and drive-by shootings. The main targets of these were Shias. Of the 132 sectarian attacks, 65 targeted the Shias, including a government official, while 57 hit the Sunni Barelvis. Almost 118 of these attacks were target killings and eight were attacks on places of worship. Those killed in the attacks belonged to ASWJ, Sunni Tehreek, Majlis-e-Whadatul Muslimeen, Jaffria Alliance and other such Sunni or Shia organisations. The LeJ or SMP claimed responsibility for most of these. For the first time, the Aga Khani Ismailis were targeted while they gathered at their place of worship. There were about 30 attacks on Shia and Barelvi shrines in Pakistan of which seven took place in Karachi.

SECOND HOME FOR PAKISTANI TALIBAN

TTP consolidated Karachi, as its second most effective operational stronghold in Pakistan after FATA. Compared to its claim of involvement in 36 terrorist attacks in Sindh in 2012, it claimed 175 attacks in Karachi

⁸⁰ Zia ur Rehman, “Demographic Divide”, n 76.

⁸¹ Karim Shah, “Karachi Cop”, *Al Jazeera*, March 27, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2014/03/karachi-cop-2014326133949203559.html>, accessed on March 27, 2014

⁸² The LeJ has splintered into various groups operating in Pakistan. The chapter operating in Balochistan is led by Usman Kurd and it targets the Hazara Shia community in Quetta. This has little interaction with a group led by Asif Chotu, which controls the affairs of LeJ from Karachi to Punjab. Other LeJ groups operating both in Karachi and Punjab are mostly named after their leaders, i.e, Attaur Rehman alias Naeem Bukhari, Qasim Rasheed, Muhammad Babar, Ghaffar, Muaviya, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq groups. See *PIPS Pakistan Security Report 2012*, pp.11-12

⁸³ In 2012, the SMP was believed to be involved in the killing 103 religious scholars and activists associated with the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (now operating as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat). Of these, 77 were from Sindh, and 26 from Balochistan. Most of these killings took place in Karachi and Quetta. Three factions of SMP are active in Karachi and Quetta. They are the Baqar Zaidi, Mohsin Mehdi and the Balti groups. See *Pakistan Security Report 2012*, p.12

Table 4: Attacks on Places of Worship

Dates	Place	Incident	Casualty	Injured
31 May	Karachi	An Imambargah in Block Q of North Nazimabad	-	-
13 August	Karachi	Aga Khani/Ismaili place of worship	Civ (2)	Civ (26)
19 September	Karachi	Hussainia Sajjadia Imambargah near Gulbahar Chowk in Sector-2, Majeed Colony, Landhi.	Civ (1)	Civ (16)
13 November	Karachi	Shrine of Abul Fazal in Pahar Ganj area, North Nazimabad.	-	Civ (7), Rng (2), Pol (2)
13 November	Karachi	An Imambargah	-	Pol (2)
18 December	Karachi	An Imambargah on Khalid Bin Waleed Road	Civ (1)	Civ (2)
24 December	Karachi	An Imambargah in Orangi Town	Civ (4)	Pol (1), Civ (12)
Total Sindh	7		8	70
Total (Pakistan)	30 Attacks	136	455	

and 9 attacks outside it. The TTP groups operating in Karachi are divided into three: the Mehsud faction, the Swat faction and the Mohmand faction. The Mehsud faction is further divided into two on the basis of their loyalty to the late Hakeemullah Meshud and Wali-ur Rehman. Qari Yar Muhammad and Khan Zaman are the leaders of these groups. The Swat faction is led by Ibn-e-Aqeel alias Khog and Sher Muhammad alias Yaseen while the Mohmand faction is led by Qari Shakeel. Some other TTP affiliates/franchisees include: the Al-Mukhtar group, a terrorist cell of the Karachi based Badar Mansoor group; the Qari Shahid group, comprising former students of Karachi University; the Khurooj group, based in Waziristan but active in Karachi and involved in bank robberies; along with the Jundullah, and the Lashkar Jaish-e-Islami in Karachi and Khuzdar. According to the above mentioned Supreme Court report of 2011, about 7000 TTP militants had infiltrated into Karachi.⁸⁴

The TTP carried out some spectacular attacks in the wake of the elections in Karachi and assassinated Sadiq Zaman Khattak of the Awami National Party (ANP) on May 3. On May 11, the day of the elections, TTP militants attacked Amanullah Mehsud another ANP candidate, by detonating a powerful bomb that killed 11 people in the

city's Landhi neighbourhood. The TTP was also involved in the attacks in Hyderabad, Shanghar, Sukkur and Shikarpur, apart from Karachi. All its five suicide blasts in Sindh, including three in Karachi, targeted security forces and political leaders. More than 30 per cent of the total 117 reported attacks in 2013, targeted security forces, check posts and vehicles.

Media reports held that Muhammad Aslam Khan SP, CID, had managed to curtail the activities of criminals in the city to some extent. In early January 2014, the TTP assassinated him by exploding a roadside bomb near Essa Nagri⁸⁵. The incident demonstrates TTP's determination to maintain its sway over the financial hub of Pakistan.

REST OF SINDH: CONTINUING ACTIVITIES OF NATIONALISTS

Radical Sindhi nationalist groups, demanding complete independence and secession from Pakistan, continued their attacks in 2013. It is important to note that in March 2012, Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) organised a freedom march in Karachi denouncing the Pakistan

⁸⁴ Zia ur Rehman, "The Pakistani Taliban's Karachi Network", *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 6, Issue 5, May 23, 2013, p.2, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-pakistani-talibans-karachi-network>, accessed on May 23, 2013

⁸⁵ "SP CID Chaudhry Aslam martyred in Karachi bombing", *The News*, January 10, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-133639-SP-CID-Chaudhry-Aslam-martyred-in-Karachi-bombing>, accessed on January 10, 2014

Resolution and demanded an independent Sindhu Desh. Following this successful march the leader of JSQM, Bashir Khan Qureshi died in suspicious circumstances on April 7, 2012. The forensic reports revealed that he was poisoned to death.⁸⁶ Bashir's death was widely believed to be the handiwork of security agencies and was condemned by most political leaders. There were demonstrations in various places expressing the popular Sindhi resentment against the killing. Radical Sindhi nationalists continued their strategy of targeting railway tracks, banks and inter-provincial transportation systems and making their presence felt in the Sindhi hinterland. In 2012, there were 27 such attacks, without any casualties, whereas in 2013 the number of attacks dropped to 23 but resulted in the death of three civilians and four policemen. These attacks were allegedly carried out by Sindhi nationalist groups, which included the Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA) led by Darya Khan Marri, and the JSMM led by Shafi Burfat, who is reportedly operating from Kabul.

The rise of PPP as a political party has significantly reduced the influence of Sindhi nationalists in Pakistani politics. Nevertheless, various Sindhi nationalist parties do exercise some influence on provincial politics. They follow the ideology of legendary Sindhi leader GM Syed and their demands range from maximum possible autonomy within Pakistan, to total independence. After the demise of GM Syed, his Jeay Sindh Tehrik (JST) split into more than 11 political groups: the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) groups led by Bashir Qureshi and Arisar; the JSMM led by Burfat; JST factions led by Dr Safdar Sarki and Shafi Karnani; the Jeay Sindh Qaumparast Party (JSQP) led by Qamar Bhatti; the Sindh United Party (SUP) led by GM Syed's grandson Jalal Mehmood Shah; Jeay Sindh Mahaz (JSM) led by Abdul Khaliq Junejo; and JSM splinter groups led by Riaz Chandio, Rasool Bux Thebo, and Sufi Hazoor Bux. These groups want to secede from Pakistan.

However, there are other autonomist nationalist groups like Dr Qadir Magsi's Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party (STPP), Rasool Bukhsh Paleejo's Awami Tehrik (AT), Ayaz Latif Palijo's Quomi Awami Tehrik (QAT), SUP led by Jalal Mehmood Shah; the Sindh National Movement (SNM) led by Ali Hassan Chandio; and Amir Bhambaro's Sindh National Party (SNP), who do not subscribe to GM Syed's ideology.⁸⁷ Some of these groups—Ayaz's QAT, Jalal Mehmood Shah's SUP and Magsi's STPP, who had formed a coalition under the name of Sindh Progressive Nationalist Alliance (SPNA) in 2010—entered into a political alliance with PML-N in Sindh on the eve of the 2013 elections to defeat PPP and MQM. Ironically, the 10-party electoral alliance, that these nationalists joined, included several mainstream political parties, such as, the PML (Functional), Jamiat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, Pakistan Sunni Tehreek, and National People's Party, with whom they do not have any ideological affinity. Therefore such an alliance was bound to fail. Sharif cold-shouldered these groups after the elections, which is likely to fuel their sense of alienation and their anti-Punjabi sentiments. While the nationalists may not be able to pose any existential threat to Pakistan, they may continue to exert disintegrative pressures on the state.

In early 2014, the Sindhi nationalists upped the ante and organised a "freedom rally" on March 23, 2014. Two days prior to the rally, the burnt out bodies of two JSQM leaders—Bashir's brother, Maqsood Qureshi, and Salman Wadho—were found in a car near Karachi.⁸⁸ The two leaders had gone to Karachi to mobilise support for the rally. While the rest of Pakistan observed "Pakistan Day", Sindhis from different parts of the province, led by Bashir's son Sunan Qureshi, wearing signature Sindhi caps and *ajrak*, sang the Jiye Sindh anthem amid chants of '*Sindh Ghuray thee Azadi*' (Sindh wants freedom) which rent the Karachi air.⁸⁹ The Sindhi sense of alienation and neglect is likely to continue given the establishment's

⁸⁶ Khurshid Abbasi, "Bashir Qureshi was poisoned to death: medical board", *The News*, April 19, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14025-Bashir-Qureshi-was-poisoned-to-death-medical-board>, accessed on April 19, 2012

⁸⁷ Zia Ur Rehman, "Baloch rebels inspire separatists in Sindh", *The Friday Times*, March 9-15, 2012, <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20120309&page=8>, accessed on March 16, 2012

⁸⁸ "JSQM leader found dead in mysterious circumstances", *Pakistan Today*, March 21, 2014, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/03/21/national/jsqm-leader-found-dead-in-mysterious-circumstances/>, accessed on March 21, 2014

⁸⁹ Ramzan Chandio, "JSQM demands independent Sindh at Freedom March", *The Nation*, March 24, 2014, <http://www.nation.com.pk/karachi/24-Mar-2014/jsqm-demands-independent-sindh-at-freedom-march>, accessed on March 24, 2014

practice of using coercive methods to deal with the nationalist demands.

CONCLUSION

The trend suggests that Sindh in general and Karachi in particular, will continue to reel under terrorism in the near term because of the lack of governmental will and capacity to deal with the menace of terror. Moreover, despite Nawaz government's bid to introduce a national

internal security policy (NISP), the close nexus between political parties, radical elements of all hue, and criminal gangs will keep the phenomenon alive for a long time. The TTP is likely to consolidate its position further in the city, and pose a critical challenge to the MQM; while the Sindhi nationalists are likely to continue with their tactics, both democratic and subversive, to keep the pot boiling. Sindh, and especially Karachi, will continue to epitomise the internal security situation in whole of Pakistan.

TERRORISM AND SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA AND THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA

Smruti S Pattanaik

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) have for a long time been witnessing continuing violence against security forces, the military establishment, government offices, politicians as well as civilians. The government has in the past, signed several peace deals with the militant groups but without much success. Military operations in various Agencies also have not borne fruit as the Army deployment was stretched across tribal areas. The major challenge was to hold the territory as the militants shifted their bases to remote areas of the region. These operations also resulted in large-scale displacement of people from FATA with unpleasant consequences for provinces like the KP and Sindh. There is also an exodus of people from the tribal areas to Punjab, that is creating a security nightmare, that the Taliban widening its base.⁹⁰ During the May 11, 2013 parliamentary elections, the TTP threatened to attack candidates affiliated to the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP), as these two political parties supported military action against militant groups, after the dialogue initiative, with the militants failed. The militants indirectly endorsed parties like the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), because they supported dialogue and thus allowed them to campaign freely.

Therefore, the emergence of PML-N as the party heading the federal government, and the PTI formed the provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—both centre-right parties—generated a great deal of interest with regard to their approach to terrorism in general, and to the TTP in particular. The PTI has been at the forefront of anti-Americanism and supported the

blocking of the NATO supply line to Afghanistan. It led protests against the drone attacks and the Salala incident in which 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed in 2012. It is opposed to any military operation against the militant groups in FATA, and prefers a dialogue to end militancy. Prior to the elections, PTI leaders were seen in the company of the representatives of extremist groups like the Difa-e-Pakistan. The Pakistanis with eager anticipation looked forward to how these parties would deal with radical extremist groups, after assuming power. As Imran Khan while talking to the Press, after twin suicide attack on a church in Peshawar in September 2013 said, "People voted for PTI because they want peace".⁹¹ This chapter seeks to study the trend of violence in the province and analyse the policies of the state and federal governments with regard to the twin issues of terrorism and violence.

MAPPING VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN KP AND FATA:


There are three types of violence that afflict the province of KP and FATA. These are: sectarian violence in FATA, especially the clashes between the Shia and the Sunnis in the Kurram valley; attacks on minorities especially Christians; and terrorist attacks on security forces, politicians, polio vaccination workers and civilians in KP perpetuated by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The violence figures in KP came down last year, though the TTP is now targeting Peshawar where violence has intensified. More than 700 officers and jawans of the KP police have lost their lives to terrorism since 2006.⁹² Some

⁹⁰ Intikhab Hanif and Mohammad Faisal Ali, "Punjab taking steps to avert infiltration of terrorists from KP", *Dawn*, February 21, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1088498>, accessed on February 21, 2014

⁹¹ "Tehreek-e-Taliban should Open an Office: Imran Khan", *Express Tribune*, September 25, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/609208/tehreek-e-taliban-should-open-an-office-imran-khan/>, accessed on September 25, 2013

⁹² Muhammad Quraish Khan "A brief history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police", <http://kppolice.gov.pk/aboutus/History.php>, accessed on February 14, 2014



police officials believe that ambivalent attitude of Imran Khan is responsible for bolstering terrorism in KP and FATA. As a senior official reportedly said, "If Khan says

this is not our war, and then what does he think we are doing here sacrificing our lives?"⁹³The ANP member of senate, Haji Mohammad Adeel said, "Militancy in the

⁹³ "PTI's Attitude Helping Militants", *Express Tribune*, July 28, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-111367-PTI-attitude-helping-Taliban-gain-foothold-in-Peshawar>, accessed on July 28, 2013

province is at an all-time high because of PTI's soft corner towards the TTP, which neither openly condemns the attacks nor makes serious efforts at ending terrorism".⁹⁴ After it assumed power last June, till February 4 this year, a total number of 441 people have been killed and 635 injured in KP and FATA, of which 208 were victims of sectarian killing.⁹⁵ There have been several high profile attacks that include, attacks on minorities. KP had established a Strategy and Analysis Wing (SAW) "with an aim to coordinate efforts at combating crime and terrorism, analysing data and making use of digital and internet data to achieve its objectives" in March last year.⁹⁶ Interior minister Chaudhry Nisar said that the provinces are required to have their own counter terrorism policy - though there is a separate National Security Policy - but the PTI is yet to formulate its own policy taking into account the situation in KP. It is not ready to operationalise the counter terrorism strategy formulated by the ANP government in 2012; but blames the central government for not having a counter terrorism policy.⁹⁷ Asad Qaiser, the speaker of the KPK assembly while speaking to the media said that the government has tried to address, the law and order situation by initiating police reforms, and for the first time in Pakistan, the police are working without political interference. He said that the KPK police are being trained and their pay scales have been brought in line with those of other provinces. He said an anti-terrorism cell has also been set up. Its personnel are receiving specialised training and it will soon become operational.⁹⁸

According to PIPS, Pakistan, terrorist violence decreased in FATA and increased in KP in 2013. There was a 31 per cent decrease in US drone attacks and fatalities also came down by 39 per cent in 2013 compared to 2012.⁹⁹

Terrorist Attacks in KP in 2013

District	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Abbotabad	1	0	0
Bannu	59	25	134
Battagram	2	0	0
Buner	3	5	0
Charsada	51	14	60
D.I,Khan	13	28	45
Hangu	34	76	166
Karak	4	0	0
Kohat	16	12	45
Lakki Marwat	17	6	3
Lower Dir	3	6	8
Malakand	7	28	121
Mansehra	5	4	8
Mardan	29	36	100
Nowshera	15	22	44
Peshawar	160	355	853
Shangla	2	5	2
Swabi	38	27	45
Swat	22	44	91
Tank	15	11	11
Upper Dir	3	2	9
Total	499*	706•	1745

Source: Pakistan Security report 2013, p.14

* This includes 18 suicide attacks

- Among a total of 706 killed; 572 were civilians, 79, policemen, 21, army personnel, 13, Frontier Corp personnel, 2 levies personnel and 19 militants

⁹⁴ Peer Muhammad, "Upper House Proceedings: Senators Slam PTI's role in Curbing Terrorism in K-P", *Express Tribune*, January 14, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/658770/upper-house-proceedings-senators-slam-ptis-role-in-curbing-terror-in-k-p/>, accessed on January 14, 2014


⁹⁵ Pakistan Equality and Human Rights Commission "Full list of terrorist incidents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since PTI came to power in June 2013, <http://pakistanehrc.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/kp/>, accessed on May 3, 2014

⁹⁶ "KP Sets up High-Tech Body to Counter Terrorism", *Dawn*, March 18, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/796378/kp-sets-up-high-tech-body-to-counter-terrorism>, accessed on March 18, 2013

⁹⁷ Sadia Qasim Shah, "Anti-terrorism Strategy for KP on Back Burner", *Dawn*, September 5, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1040691/anti-terrorism-strategy-for-kp-on-back-burner>, accessed on September 6, 2013

⁹⁸ "Speaker KPK Assembly says historical change in the province", *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf*, <http://www.insaf.pk/component/k2/item/1787790-speaker-kpk-assembly-says-historical-change-in-the-province-march-28-2014>, accessed on March 29, 2014

⁹⁹ Pakistan Security Report, 2013, p.9



Source: Pakistan News Digest, June 2013 to May 2014, at www.idsa.in/pakistannewsdigest.html

Terrorist Attacks in FATA in 2013

Districts	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Bajaur Agency	27	24	32
FR Region	7	11	18
Khyber agency	106	82	104
Kurram agency	34	95	270
Mohmand agency	39	26	40
North Waziristan Agency	52	117	287
Orakzai	13	46	131
South Waziristan Agency	15	24	50
Total	293*	425•	932


Source: Pakistan Security Report 2013, p.15 f

- * Three sectarian attacks that killed 57 people and injured 187 people
- Among Othe 425 people killed; 243 were civilians, 32 militants, 5 policemen, and 145 security forces personnel

The daring operation in July in which militants managed to free many of their valued cadres from the DI Khan jail, highlights the larger issue of terrorist networks. The TTP freed around 300 prisoners including, Sufi Mohamad, the commander of the TTP in Swat, and Shaikh Abdul Hakim-Russian an IMU leader. The report of the commission of inquiry, set up to investigate the jail break revealed that most of the militants, including the TTP and Uzbek militants travelled from South Waziristan and took up positions in 10 strategic locations, not far from the military check posts and in a 45 minute operation, freed their prisoners. In September, in a major attack on minorities, two suicide bombers targeted the All Saints Church and killed 78 Christians. In February this year, the TTP beheaded 23 Pakistani army soldiers. According to a report of the Pakistan Equality and Human Rights Commission, 208 Shia Muslims were killed, while 365 were injured between June 1 and February 14 this year.¹⁰⁰ The graph above reflects increasing violence in KP from June 2013 to May 2014.

A senior army officer, Maj. Gen. Sanaullah Khan Niazi was killed in a road side bomb explosion in September last year. In December the military launched an operation in Mir Ali, and flushed out foreign militants in response to a suicide attack by Ansarul Mujahedeen. On January 20, this year, 20 soldiers were killed in a bomb blast. All

¹⁰⁰ Pakistan Equality and Human Rights Commission "Full list of terrorist incidents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since PTI came to power in June 2013, <http://pakistanehrc.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/kp/>, accessed on May 3, 2014



Source: Pakistan News Digest, June 2013 to May 2014 , at www.idsa.in/pakistannewsdigest.html

these attracted only limited military strikes. However after the Karachi airport attack, for which TTP claimed responsibility, the Army initially resorted to aerial strikes in North Waziristan and later undertook full scale operation name *Zarb-e-Azb*. The graph above reflects increasing violence in FATA from June 2013 to May 2014.

THE PTI GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH

While the PTI as a political party has been in existence since 1996, it failed to win any seats in the 1997 elections. In 2002 it managed to win only one seat in the National Assembly and the KP Provincial Assembly. But there was a huge swing in its electoral fortunes in the 2013 elections when it secured 55 seats out of a total of 99 seats in the KP assembly. For the first time the PTI came to power in a province, that has been wracked by violence perpetuated by the TTP and other sectarian and jihadist groups. The PTI came to power on the back of its aggressive campaign against the US-led war on terror, its criticism of drone attacks and its proposal to hold dialogue with the TTP, rather than dealing with them through military action. The TTP has been expanding its network since 2008, and has engineered attacks successfully in other provinces, through its local affiliates. The PTI and other Islamic political parties view this as government’s inability to curb terror attack as a failure

of the former PPP government, which was allegedly corrupt and followed a weak kneed foreign policy vis-à-vis the US.

PTI’S POSITION VIS-À-VIS TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE:

Imran Khan, the chairman of the PTI has persistently argued that much of the violence perpetuated by the TTP, is due to the wrong policies of the government and its decision to partner the Americans, in their illegal war in Afghanistan. According to the PTI, this war is the only reason for the radicalisation and terrorist violence in Pakistan. He terms the TTP leaders and cadres, as misguided youth, and has argued that once the US troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is likely that peace would prevail in Pakistan, as the TTP would have no reason to engage in terrorism. This narrative does not take into account the TTP’s demand for the implementation of Sharia, and its desire to control the state. It also does not recognise that TTP considers the Pakistan army as its enemy.

The PTI in its election manifesto however acknowledged that:

Forty thousand plus people have lost their lives, including over four thousand soldiers

and police. Even worse, a once tolerant society has become polarised into intolerance, fear and hate. PTI stands committed to restoring the spirit of tolerance and acceptance amongst all the citizens of Pakistan¹⁰¹.

It describes terrorism in FATA as a ‘war on terror related militancy’. Interestingly, it claims further that its counter terrorism policy would consist of a “comprehensive approach aimed towards abolishing the narrative of jihad so as to reduce the size of force to be tackled. The financial channels funding militants and extremists will be immediately closed.”¹⁰² But the manifesto is silent on how to tackle the source of funding; rather the PTI has propagated the narrative that the militants are funded by foreign intelligence agencies. That fact that it has links with the Al-Qaeda is not mentioned by the PTI. This contradicts the PTI stance that militancy is a product of war on terror because the war on terror primarily targeted al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

The PTI, which assumed power in KP in June 2013, is however yet to implement any of the policies that have been articulated in its manifesto, and by its leader in speeches and media interaction. The 23 legislations listed in its website¹⁰³ as the achievements of the government and the implementation of its electoral promises, do not have any policy that aims to counter the jihad narrative. Though the jihad narrative has to be tackled at the national level and this not only would require a clamp down on militant networks, especially the ones that are at the forefront of preparing the youths to fight jihad in India and Afghanistan; but it is also essential to take action against the groups, that are at the forefront of the attacks on Shias in Pakistan. The party also wanted to ensure the dissolution of the militant wings of all political parties immediately after coming to power.

Two of its main positions, vis-à-vis militancy in FATA are in the foreign policy domain, over which the party

has no control. Its pledge that it will ‘extricate’ Pakistan from the US war on terror is a matter of concern for the central government and its position on drone attack. The party however, unsuccessfully tried to block the NATO supply line on November 23 along with the Jamaat-e-Islami – its coalition partner. This blockade ended only after the Peshawar High Court, ruled that no private person has the authority to check the vehicles, as some of them are transporting items to Afghanistan under the Afghan Trade and Transit Treaty.¹⁰⁴

The PTI, since its so called ‘Tsunami’ rally in Lahore in 2011, has consistently argued that US drone strikes are not the solution for dealing with terrorism as they target innocent civilian. Whether the drone attacks are the reason for militancy, or whether it is al-Qaeda elements, Haqqani group as well as foreign militants hiding in the tribal areas is the reason for the increased drone attacks remains a debatable issue in Pakistan. Moreover, it is apparent that at times Pakistan has provided the intelligence to the US about the militants’ movements within FATA; while at other times drone attacks become a matter of policy because Pakistan is reluctant to take the militants head on. Some people in FATA support the drone attacks as they are an effective way of eliminating high profile militant leaders. Pakistan has provided intelligence regarding the whereabouts of the TTP cadres, even though it is reluctant to share information relating to the Afghan Taliban and the militants belonging to the Haqqani group. The APC in a meeting in September passed a resolution which said that the drone attacks were fomenting and perpetuating terrorism. The September 9 resolution reads, “We are unanimous that the use of drones is not only a continued violation of our territorial integrity but also detrimental to our resolve and efforts of eliminating extremism and terrorism from our country.”¹⁰⁵ It emphasised the necessity of finding ways to engage the Taliban by initiating a dialogue with them. Pakistan has been accusing foreign countries of sponsoring the TTP to destabilise Pakistan, but the TTP

¹⁰¹ PTI Manifesto, “Inshallah: Naya Pakistan”, 2013, p.1

¹⁰² PTI Manifesto, “Inshallah: Naya Pakistan”, 2013, p.9

¹⁰³ “PTI in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa”, Pakistan Tehree-e-Insaf, <http://www.insaf.pk/chapters/khyber-pakhtoonkhwa/item/1787930-press-release-pti-in-khyber-pukhtunkhwa>, accessed on April 25, 2014

¹⁰⁴ “PTI ends Nato Supply Blockade”, *Dawn*, January 23, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1089878/pti-ends-nato-supply-blockade>, accessed on January 23, 2014

¹⁰⁵ For the text of APC resolution see <http://www.dawn.com/news/1041675/resolution-of-the-all-parties-conference-on-sept-9-2013> accessed on September 9, 2013

has rejected such accusations. In one of his articles in *The News*, Imran Khan argued that:

...peace cannot be restored in Pakistan through continuing military operations...What I am suggesting is the initiation of a mechanism whereby we can begin to structuralise the dialogue process. We should know the nature of the enemy - there are 15 big Taliban groups and around 25 smaller ones, some of whom are funded by our enemies.¹⁰⁶

JI, JUI (F), JUI (S) AND THEIR APPROACH TO TTP

The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) which is an alliance partner of the PTI, under Syed Munawar Hussain, went to the extent of supporting the TTP. The JI described the TTP militants, as martyrs but refused to pronounce the Army personnel who were killed in the military operation against the TTP as martyrs much to the discomfiture of the Army. An Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) statement, issued by the Army stated that the, "families of *shuhada* of armed forces demand an unconditional apology from Syed Munawar Hassan for hurting their feelings. It is also expected that JI should clearly state its party position on the subject."¹⁰⁷ The JI's position on the drone attacks and the war on terror is the same as that of the PTI.

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur) or JUI (F) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul) or JUI(S) have been at the forefront of initiating a dialogue and have even offered to mediate between the Taliban and the government. Both parties vie with each other to broker peace and promote dialogue with the TTP. However, the JUI-F did not allow Mufti Kifayatullah, its member of the Provincial Council, to be part of the TTP nominated team even though the Maulana, was very keen to be on it.¹⁰⁸ JUI-F leader, Maulana Fazlur Rahman had also escaped two suicide attacks in the past. It is well known that the JUI-F favours a dialogue within the framework of Pakistani constitution. However, in April this year the JUI-F

withdrew support to Nawaz Sharif government, over the issue of talks with the TTP, the Protection of Pakistan bill and internal security bill. Later, the party abstained from voting when the Bill was presented in the Parliament.

The JUI(S) Amir, Maulana Samiul Haq, known as father of the Afghan Taliban, was part of the TTP team to negotiate with the government, until the Taliban suspended the talks. The Maulana right from the beginning when the government was contemplating to initiate dialogue has been offering to mediate between the TTP and the government to bring about peace. However, the Nawaz Sharif government was reluctant to take his help. It was only after government announced talks with Taliban as last effort to establish peace and declared its own team of negotiators; Samiul Haq was nominated by the TTP among others. The Quami Watan Party (QWP) was one of the alliance partners of the PTI but two of its ministers were sacked by PTI government over corruption charges. The QWP has been critical of the PTI's stance on the TTP and dialogue.

HISTORY OF PEACE TALKS

During the Muttahida Majlis-e-Aimal (MMA) regime, many militant groups set up bases in Pechar area of Swat. After the military operations in tribal areas especially in Mohmand, Swat and Bajaur, some displaced persons from FATA, settled in and around Peshawar city, thereby increasing the possibilities of TTP infiltration. KP is strategically located and is adjacent to the FATA and Afghanistan. Thus Islamabad's approach to the TTP and other militant groups in FATA will have direct repercussions for the regime in KP which faces three problems: First, the presence of Afghan refugees; second, the tribes who have been displaced from FATA; and the sectarian/militants groups along with the TTP who sometimes target minorities and security agencies in Peshawar to mark their presence and demonstrate their strength.

¹⁰⁶ Imran Khan, "Dialogue the Best of Difficult Options", *The News*, October 2, 2013. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25804-Dialogue-the-best-of-difficult-options>, accessed on October 2, 2013

¹⁰⁷ ISPR Press Release, November 10, 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2013/11/10, accessed on November 10, 2013

¹⁰⁸ "JUI-F Leader Longs to represent TTP in the Talk", *Dawn*, February 6, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1085249/jui-f-leader-longs-to-represent-ttp-in-talks>, accessed on February 6, 2014

The proposals for peace talks with the militant groups are not new in Pakistan's political history and the PTI is not the first political party to support a dialogue mechanism to end the violence that has engulfed FATA. After the killing of Bashir Ali Bilour in December 2012, Afsandar Wali Khan, the Awami National Party (ANP) leader, said that dialogue with the militants is necessary to resolve violence and for this, the militants would not need to surrender their arms as the possession of arms is a tradition in KP. However, the militants would be required to renounce violence.¹⁰⁹ The proposal for allowing the militants to retain their arms, was not accepted by the PPP government, and some members of the ANP were opposed to it. The PPP government made it contingent upon the TTP to surrender arms, for the peace dialogue to resume. Thus the offer of peace talks became a nonstarter as the militants refused to surrender arms and set their own terms and conditions for a dialogue. In a video message, Hakimullah Mehsud had said:

The government will have to quit its alliance with the US and it is required to come out of its war in Afghanistan. It will have to rewrite the country's constitution according to *Shariah* in place of the present secular system and also apologize for the war launched against us in the country.¹¹⁰

The JUI-F also convened an all Party Conference to devise a strategy for the dialogue in February last year which was attended by all the political parties.

PTI AND PEACE TALKS

With the political transition in KP following the victory of the PTI, the proposal to hold dialogue again gained currency. And, interestingly though the TTP put up a 15 point demand charter, it did not make it a precondition for a dialogue. Interestingly, the TTP had earlier proposed the names of Nawaz Sharif, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the JUI (F), and Syed Munawar Hasan Amir of the JI


(Amir) as guarantors for the dialogue with the PPP government. Therefore it was not surprising that the TTP this time also included the name of Imran Khan, in the list as a negotiator from the Taliban side. Though both sides have announced their teams for the talks, there was no concrete progress. Many feared that dialogue was being initiated to buy time. The PTI, also understands the dynamic of the dialogue with the TTP. Its core committee of the PTI set five preconditions for the dialogue with the TTP. These are: (i) It must be within the parameters of the Constitution; (ii) to create a positive environment, there must be a ceasefire from both sides, especially that terror attacks must cease; (iii) the talks must be open and transparent so everyone knows how they are progressing, what are the impediments and who are the saboteurs. We must be prepared for sabotage by enemies of Pakistan; (iv) the prime minister should demand that the US government end the drone attacks, so that the talks are not derailed as happened last time; (v) once talks commence, timelines must be set so that results can be achieved. Timeline is important as powerful vested interests and anti-Pakistan elements will be looking to sabotage the process.¹¹¹

Giving peace a chance through dialogue was the line taken by most the political parties during the campaign. In his first televised address to the nation, Nawaz promised to hold talks with the militants in keeping with his electoral promise. The All Party Conference (APC) held on September 9, 2013 gave the go ahead for peace talks with the militants. The military which had borne the brunt of the militant attacks, during counter insurgency operations also agreed to the peace talks because the military does not want to act against the militants without total political backing. While the PPP has supported the government effort; the MQM has not been very keen on a peace dialogue. The PTI which is in power in KP, has been supportive of the talks though the talks are being spearheaded by the centre. In a press release the PTI said, that its "principled position on dialogue was premised on the strong logic that one must divide the adversary so that those who are prepared to

¹⁰⁹ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Talking of Peace Talks", *Newsline*, January 2013,

¹¹⁰ Raza Khan, "JUI-F APC to cut no Ice", *FATA Research Centre*, <http://frc.com.pk/commentaries/jui-f-apc-to-cut-no-ice/>

¹¹¹ "PTI will Support all Developments Towards Peace Through Dialogue: PTI Core Committee", *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf*, <http://www.insaf.pk/news/national-news/item/1787629-pti-will-support-all-developments-towards-peace-through-dialogue-pti-core-committee>, accessed on February 4, 2014



dialogue should be separated from the hardcore groups".¹¹² It needs to be mentioned here again, that the parties that favoured military operations were targeted during the 2013 election campaign.

The ambiguity with regard to terrorism was apparent when the PTI and PML-N condemned the killing of

Hakimullah Mehsud in a US drone strike. Reacting to the killing of Mehsud, Pakistan's interior minister said that the US action amounts to "the murder of progress for hope and peace in the region". Even though it was clear that the TTP is not serious about taking the talks forward or really wanting a negotiated settlement; the government wanted the charade of talks to continue so

¹¹² "PTI will Support all Developments Towards Peace through Dialogue: PTI Core Committee", Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, <http://www.insaf.pk/news/national-news/item/1787603-pti-core-committee-reaffirms-ptis-stance-on-terror-attacks-shows-concerns-on-govts-indecision>, accessed on February 4, 2014

that the PML-N, whose links with the right wing are no secret, does not lose ground to the PTI. The Pakistan foreign ministry had summoned the American ambassador after the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud.

The constant reiteration that terrorism in Pakistan, is due to external reasons and that violence is perpetuated by external forces, is a strategy adopted by the PTI to shrug off any responsibility and is just political rhetoric. In December 2013, PTI circulated a leaflet based on a religious edict of Mufti Azam that said "suicide attacks are haram and unIslamic"¹¹³ On October 16, Israrullah Gandapur, the PTI law minister and a senior PTI member was killed in a suicide attack in DI Khan by a little known group the Ansar al Mujahideen. The PTI's official website does address anything relating to terrorism in its policy section.

Pakistan Ulema Council in a meeting denounced all forms of violence against Muslims and non-Muslims in the name of the religion. The threat posed by the TTP is also affecting the drive to eradicate polio. Pakistan continues to be affected by the polio virus and therefore could face a travel ban. Providing security to polio vaccination teams has not proved effective as the polio workers are being regularly shot dead by the militant groups. The situation has been particularly worse after the suspected involvement of a polio team in the tracking down of Osama Bin Laden. In a significant development, the Pakistan army has now been asked to provide security to the polio vaccination teams. Nawaz Sharif's decision to depute Irfan Siddique, the Advisor on National Affairs, veteran journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, former ambassador and expert on Afghanistan affairs Rustam Shah Mohmand and former ISI official Major (Retd) Amir Shah – to hold talks with the militants, did not bear any result, given the TTP's known stance on Sharia, establishment of peace zones cessation of military operation etc. However, both the PML-N and PTI are playing to the gallery and trying to prove that they are committed to dialogue. Similarly, the TTP wants to buy time by agreeing to the dialogue process.

FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE TTP:

The government's policy of dialogue with the TTP is being challenged by factionalism within the group. The deaths of Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rahmani have also weakened the TTP as an organisation. In South Waziristan, Sajna declared himself as the commander angering Sehriyar Mehsud and others in the central *shura*. However, a direct confrontation was avoided after Hakimullah Mehsud persuaded Sehriyar to move to North Waziristan to maintain the unity of the TTP.¹¹⁴ Asmatullah Shaheen Bhattani, another commander of the TTP was also killed in 2013. All these high profile killings have weakened the organisation and has created internal rift between various leaders regarding succession in the organisation.

The split in the TTP took place after Mullah Fazlullah, who is a non-Mehsud, was made the head of the TTP. He also moved his headquarters to Dir. He selected Shiekh Khalid Haqqani as his deputy who is from Swabi, a settled district in KP. Fazlullah's selection is contested by Sajna; and even Sheriyar Mehsud was unhappy with Fazlullah's appointment as the TTP chief.

Peace talks have driven a wedge between various Taliban factions. Asmatullah Muavia, the head of Punjabi Taliban was sacked from the central *shura* for welcoming the talks. Earlier he had made a conditional ceasefire offer to the Pakistan government, for holding talks in December 2012. Jundul Hafsa, a group created by Muavia, was accused of killing ten foreign tourists in Gilgit and Baltistan in June last year.

The Ansar Al Aseer, is a group that has been formed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Pakistani Taliban. This group has been tasked to free jihadi prisoners from jail, and support their families. It is headed by Adnan Rasheed, who was a Pakistani airman, and was convicted for an attack on General Musharraf. This group was formed in February 2013.¹¹⁵ Another group the Towheed ul Islam is operating in Khyber

¹¹³ Shamim Shahid, "KP Govt Issues Leaflet Against Suicide Attacks", *Pakistan Today*, December 29, 2013, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/12/29/national/kp-govt-issues-leaflet-against-suicide-attacks/>, accessed on December 29, 2013

¹¹⁴ S.M.Hali, "Chinks in TTP Armour", *Daily Times*, May 6, 2014, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06-May-2014/chinks-in-the-ttp-s-armour>, accessed on May 6, 2014

¹¹⁵ Amir Mir, "Taliban form a Special Unit for Operations to Free Prisoner", *The News*, February 7, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-158599-Taliban-form-special-unit-for-operations-to-free-prisoners>, accessed on February 7, 2013

Agency. It is supposed to be a government backed militia group, that is fighting the Lashkar Islam established by the hardline Deobandi cleric Mufti Munir Shakir. Another group the Ansar ul Islam established by Pir Saifur Rehman is fighting the Lashkar Islam and the TTP.

Ansarul Mujahideen, which is based in North Waziristan is a TTP affiliate group and is responsible for the killing of the 6 Frontier Corp soldiers in Hangu bombing. This group claims to be anti-drone and says that its attacks are a response to the drone strikes in tribal areas and the killing of Muslims by US. It was also responsible for the twin blasts in Parachinar which killed 57 people in June 2013. Umar Khalid Khorasani is the head of TTP's Mohamand agency and Qari Shakeel Ahmed Haqqani is his deputy. Khan Saeed is the TTP's head in South Waziristan. Maulvi Abu Bakr heads the TTP Bajaur while Hafiz Saeed is the head of TTP's Orakzai Agency. Apart from this the TTP has branches in Khyber, Swat and Darra Adam Khel. There were serious differences between the Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur Rahmani factions over the appointment of the head of the TTP after Baitullah Mehsud was killed. Hakimullah Mehsud chose Waliur as his deputy to keep both the factions together. However, after Waliur Rahman was killed, his supporters appointed Khan Saeed or Sajana, as the successor of Waliur Rahman without consulting Hakimullah Mehsud and other members of the Taliban Shura. As a retaliatory measure, Hakimullah Mehsud appointed Latif Mehsud as his deputy. After Hakimullah Mehsud was killed, the Waliur Rahman faction wanted Khan Saeed Mehsud alias Khalid Sajna as the Chief of TTP; The Hakimullah faction with the intervention of Mullah Omar chose Fazlullah to lead the TTP. Sheriyar Mehsud who is based in North Waziristan, is opposed to Sajna and wants to eliminate him in order to take over his faction. Similarly as reported Khan Saeed alias Sajna alias Khalid Mehsud wants to eliminate Fazlullah, who he views as a stumbling block in his ambition to takeover TTP. More than 40 people were killed in the fighting

between the two factions.¹¹⁶The Hakimullah Mehsud faction was initially opposed to talks with government whereas the Waliur Rahman faction supported the talks. Sajna has declared that his faction is breaking away from the TTP. Its spokesperson Azam Tariq announced that, "the central leadership has gone into the hands of unseen forces, sectarian issues and extortion in the name of Taliban... We have decided to go our own way."¹¹⁷ The formal break came after Fazlullah sacked Sajna and appointed Sheriyar as the chief of the Mehsud in South Waziristan. Interestingly the TTP is now divided on tribal lines, and the dominant tribe in a particular agency heads the TTP local unit.

There are other groups like the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, who is based in North Waziristan; and the Mullah Nazir group, who oppose the TTP. The Lashkar Islam, Ansarul Islam and the Nahi-wa-Anil-Munkar were not part of the peace talks that the government proposed at one point of time. Therefore peace talk with one faction is unlikely to bear fruit. Initially the army has commenced limited operations in North Waziristan, which the government describes as a "calibrated and measured response"¹¹⁸ to acts of violence, rather than a full-fledged military operation. According to media reports, around 80 people were killed. The army operation evoked a strong reaction from Hafiz Gul Bahadur, pro-government militant, who also heads the Utmanzai Wazir tribe. He called for an open confrontation with the army and has asked people of the area either to join the fight, or move out.¹¹⁹ He has asked all fighters to end their operations in Afghanistan and come to the defence of Waziristan. It needs to be emphasised that Hafiz Gul Bahadur had supported the army after he came to an understanding with it, in 2007. The *Zarb-e-Azb* operation that military initiated against the TTP in the North Waziristan has led to more than 500 'militants' dead and has displaced nearly 9 lakhs of people. However, none of the top commanders of various militant factions have been killed or captured leading to

¹¹⁶ S.M.Hali, "Chinks in TTP Armour", *Daily Times*, May 6, 2014, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/06-May-2014/chinks-in-the-ttp-s-armour>, accessed on May 6, 2014

¹¹⁷ Tim Craig and Haq Nawaz Khan, "Pakistani Taliban Splits into Two Major Groups Amid Infighting" *Washington Post*, May 28, 2014.

¹¹⁸ Baqir Sajjad Sayeed, "Sharif, Top Brass Brainstorm on FATA", *Dawn*, May 31, 2014, http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailNews.php?StoryText=31_05_2014_001_004, accessed on May 31, 2014

¹¹⁹ "Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group Revokes Peace Accord", *Express Tribune*, May 30, 2014 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/715331/taliban-revoke-peace-accord/>, accessed on May 30, 2014

a belief that the Army did not want to go after the 'good Taliban'. Though the TTP have shifted its base from North Waziristan for the time being and its strength to launch spectacular attack might have got affected, there is nothing to indicate that its capacity and network has got dented.

CONCLUSION

The PTI's stance on terrorism has been ambivalent. While it says it will fight the jihadi narrative; but it is yet not clear, how it is going to do so. It has developed no new approach with regard to school text books or curriculum, which many in Pakistan feel is responsible for the emergence of militant mindset. Its chief minister has said on record, that the Pakistani Taliban are like his brothers. While the PTI must have taken its cue from the killings of ANP leaders since their party supported military operation against the TTP; its stance on how to move the dialogue process forward was not clear. What happens if dialogue process fails? It is therefore not surprising, the party opposed the military operation in North Waziristan and said "Conducting such a military operation when most of the groups in NWA want talks is suicidal," later supported the operation reluctantly. It is apparent that the initial violence which was limited to KP and FATA has widened both in terms of geographic spread and target. It now includes blatant attacks on the minorities in 2013. Earlier, the TTP usually targeted the police and the security forces and its activities were largely confined to the tribal areas. For the first time, US drones also targeted the settled area which previously was not the case. Drone attacks however have witnessed a decrease.

The provincial government's approach to militancy and violence has been extremely confusing. While on the one hand the PTI keeps on upping the ante against drones and military operations; the Nawaz Sharif government ensures its own political benefit by not opposing the PTI's narrative. While preparing for a military operation in February it suddenly made a U-turn and announced it was ready for a dialogue with TTP when the Army

was preparing to get into North Waziristan. It has – unsuccessfully- requested the US to stop the drone attacks. Instead of welcoming Hakimullah Mehsud's killing, Nawaz's government accused US of derailing the peace talks by killing the TTP leader in a drone attack.

The PTI government which is in power in the province is yet come up with any counter terrorism policy. Its narrative describes the TTP militants as 'misguided' youth. It continues its harangue, that the TTP is a product of the drone attacks and the erstwhile military government's decision to join the war on terror and attributes the militancy in FATA to the US presence in Afghanistan. The government's constant refusal to acknowledge that the TTP has its own objectives; and its effort to ignore its links with various other jihadi groups, only aggravates the situation in FATA. This also limits any attempts to counter terrorism given its compartmental approach. The PTI's ally, the JI terms the bomb attacks as being "part of the international great game to sabotage the peace talks"¹²⁰ even though the responsibility these attacks are claimed by the TTP. The then Amir, Munawar Hasan reiterated that the government should detach itself from the "war on terror" for lasting peace in the country, as that war was not ours, but that of the United States of America.¹²¹ These stances pose a political threat to the PML-N, which draws its votes from same support base – the centre-right constituency. At present, there is no counter narrative to the PTI's posture. The ANP is weakened because of internal problems and also it has been at the receiving end of TTP attacks. The PTI has not taken any steps to reverse the TTP narrative regarding the implementation of Sharia and Islamic rule. By sympathising with the TTP, it has in fact not taken into account the real political intentions of the group. The narrative will not change unless and until the PTI addresses the issue of terrorism seriously, and supports federal government efforts in dealing with it. It has to realise that there cannot possibly be any alternative to a military operation which aims at eliminating the TTP and its affiliates, and it cannot continue to externalise the war and ignore domestic dynamics.

¹²⁰ "JI terms Peshawar Blasts Foreign Agents Activity", Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, http://jamaat.org/beta/site/general_detail/news/3937, accessed on February 15, 2014

¹²¹ "Terrorism can Only be Defeated Through Dialogues: Munawar Hasan", Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, http://jamaat.org/beta/site/general_detail/news/3931, accessed on April 7, 2014

VIOLENCE IN BALOCHISTAN SINCE 2013

Sumita Kumar

INTRODUCTION

One year after Nawaz Sharif assumed power, there seems to be no significant change in the political situation in Balochistan, either with regard to the resolution of Baloch grievances or incidents of violence in the province. The most glaring manifestation of this was the Long March led by Qadeer Baloch from Quetta to Islamabad to highlight the failure of the state to address to the cause of missing persons. Reviewing the situation in Balochistan over the past one year, one comes to the conclusion that democracy or no democracy, PPP or PML (N), the people of Balochistan continue to be neglected and victimised, by the state and non-state actors.

In 2013, Balochistan was among the most violence prone regions in Pakistan, and stood second only to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in terms of the number of terrorist attacks within its territory (487); yet the number of lives lost was the highest (727); and the number of those who were injured was the second highest (1,577), when compared to all the other provinces and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).¹²² When compared with the statistics of 2012, terrorist attacks in 2013 increased by three per cent, and the number of people killed and injured went up by 15 per cent and 52 per cent respectively. While the numbers of attacks have only increased marginally in percentage terms, the impact of the attacks seems to be more pronounced.¹²³

It is the civilians who have been bearing the brunt of the terrorist attacks, with 560 killed and 1,301 injured in 2013. While police officials, Frontier Corps (FC) troops, the Levies and army personnel have been killed or injured in significant numbers, and some militants have also lost their lives, they are in no way comparable to the number of civilians affected. While the nationalist insurgent groups were responsible for the majority of the attacks, the rest were the handiwork of a combination of sectarian groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and other militant groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan. Quetta was the most affected by violence followed by Dera Bugti, Kech, Khuzdar, Mastung, Bolan and Naseerabad.¹²⁴

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Balochistan has been wracked by insurgency for more than six decades. The Baloch people harbour a number of grievances against the policies of the state. The forced incorporation of Balochistan into the new state of Pakistan in 1948¹²⁵ gave rise immense nationalist anger. The Baloch have felt the need to protect their national and cultural identity to prevent it from being subsumed under the Punjabi identity.¹²⁶ They have also felt persecuted due to, what they perceived to be the gradual erosion of their autonomy, due to the federal government's 'interference' in areas deemed as falling within the ambit of the provincial government. Under representation in the

¹²² *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.7.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.9.

¹²⁴ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.17-18.

¹²⁵ For details see B.M. Kutty (Ed.), *In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo*, Pakistan Study Centre, Karachi, 2009; Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008; Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch (Khan-e-Baluch, Ex-Ruler of Kalat State), *Inside Baluchistan: A Political Biography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi: Khan-e-Azam-X-III*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1975.

¹²⁶ Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism and Its Origin and Development*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2004, p.263.

political, economic and military spheres at the federal and provincial levels¹²⁷ has fuelled anger against successive governments in Islamabad. The exploitation of natural resources and the discriminatory policies of the federal government vis-à-vis the province have also created resentment. The Baloch have felt marginalised as other ethnic groups like the Pashtuns, Sindhis and Punjabis, gained influence in commercial activities in the province. It became increasingly apparent that the various development projects being undertaken in the province, while providing greater scope for employment to people of other provinces, were giving jobs to only a miniscule number of local Baloch people,¹²⁸ giving rise to opposition to such projects. Baloch grievances can perhaps be understood in the context of its social indicators which in most cases score below other provinces on variables like literacy, level of education, health, housing, water, sanitation, and labour force participation. For instance, the literacy rate in Balochistan is 40.91 per cent, while the national rate is 47.42 per cent.¹²⁹ The labour force participation rate in Balochistan is 28.38 per cent while the national rate is 32.88 per cent.¹³⁰

The necessity of bringing the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists back into participatory politics to resolve the problems plaguing the province, and of arriving at a negotiated settlement with Baloch militant groups has perhaps been realised by the mainstream political parties only in the past few years, following the boycott of the 2008 general elections by most of the Baloch nationalist parties and a major Pashtun nationalist party, to protest against on-going military operations in different parts of

Balochistan. While Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties persisted in participating in the May 11, 2013 general elections even in the face of threats, intimidation and violence in the run up to the elections by the militant organisations,¹³¹ the low voter turnout cast doubts over the legitimacy of the elections.

Even though the PML-N emerged as the largest single party in the Balochistan Assembly, and formed a coalition with the National Party (NP) headed by Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, and the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) headed by Mehmood Khan Achakzai, party leader Nawaz Sharif nominated Dr. Baloch to head the coalition in the province, thus paving the way for him becoming the chief minister. He further nominated Muhammad Khan Achakzai, the elder brother of Mahmood Khan Achakzai and a former bureaucrat, as governor, ensuring that moderates with pro-federation leanings and representing the Baluch and the Pashtun, who constitute the two largest ethnicities in the province, headed the provincial government, in a bid to promote peace and development. This also gave rise to hopes that the federal government and the provincial government, would be able to work closely to mitigate the problems in the province.

In recent years, while the Baloch movement was being led by tribal chiefs, the middle classes were providing the thrust to sustain the momentum. The movement has slowly acquired a broader base with recruits from professionals such as teachers, lawyers as well as students. Dr. Baloch is the first chief minister to emerge from the educated middle class, rather than from the ranks of

¹²⁷ For instance, in 1979, of the 830 higher civil service posts in Balochistan, only 181 were held by the Baloch. Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1981, p.164. Also, in the 1970s, the ethnic composition of the military in Pakistan comprised 70 per cent Punjabis, 15 per cent Pashtuns, 10 per cent Mohajirs, and 5 per cent Baloch and Sindhis. In the 1990s, though the official quota for soldiers from Balochistan and Sindh was increased to 15 per cent, this quota was not filled. "Baluchis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History", *The Foreign Policy Centre Report*, London, November 2006, p.51, cited in Rajshree Jetly, "Resurgence of the Baluch Movement in Pakistan", in Rajshree Jetly, (ed.), *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, Routledge, New Delhi, 2009, p.221.

¹²⁸ For instance, during the construction of the first phase of the Gwadar project, of the 600 people employed, only 100 were Baloch. Of the 3,000 people employed at the Saindak Copper and Gold Mining Project only 500 were from Balochistan and most of them were employed as labourers. Nasir Rahim, "Canaries in a Copper Mine", *The Herald*, March 2010, p.55.

¹²⁹ Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, "Percentage Distribution of Population by Age, Sex, Literacy and Level of Education 2012-2013", at http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/Labour%20Force/publications/lfs_Annual_2012-13/t03-pak.pdf accessed on June 2, 2014.

¹³⁰ Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, "Labour Force Participation Rates and Un-employment Rates by Age, Sex and Area, 2012-2013", at http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/Labour%20Force/publications/lfs_Annual_2012-13/t14-pak.pdf accessed on June 2, 2014.

¹³¹ Maqbool Ahmed, "Balochistan: Ballot Versus Bullet", *The Herald*, May 2013, p.121.

tribal leaders, that the army has traditionally used to maintain its control. His government, faced a number of challenges ranging from recovery of the huge number of missing persons and the prevention of abductions in the future, to stopping target killings especially of the Hazaras/Shias, to providing good governance including the efficient use of development funds.¹³² Soon after Dr. Baloch assumed charge, a series of terrorist attacks took place. As bodies of missing persons continued to be found, it seemed that there would be no change in the policy of intelligence agencies. He has been under pressure to find a way to end the 'kill and dump' policy, or to take a strong stand on the issue.¹³³ Yet his government's ability to reach a negotiated settlement with other nationalist, militant and sectarian groups and to influence the thinking of the security agencies is constrained by the differing aspirations of the various players. While separatists feel threatened by the participation of nationalist parties in governance as it weakens their case for secession, the security forces feel threatened and fear that their influence within the province could dwindle. Security and intelligence agencies prefer working with non-nationalist Baloch politicians who also have an interest in maintaining the status quo owing to the benefits accruing from illegal trade with Afghanistan and Iran.¹³⁴

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has followed a conciliatory policy, with an emphasis on a broad based reconciliation process in the province. This is quite similar to the accommodative approach of the PPP government, but sharply differs from General Musharraf's primarily militaristic approach. The preceding PPP government had announced a comprehensive package called the *Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan* (Beginning of Rights in Pakistan) in November 2009 which promised to bring about wide ranging constitutional, political, administrative and economic reforms. However, as the

number of missing persons grew, the nationalists disregarded the package as a poorly crafted political stunt. During its tenure, the PPP government could not ensure full implementation of the package, leading to widespread dissatisfaction at the popular level. Therefore, Nawaz Sharif faces a huge challenge. While the Nawaz Sharif government has been stressing on talks with the militant groups as a way of mitigating the situation, security forces have continued their operations against insurgent and sectarian groups in various parts of Balochistan. This led to the arrest of a number of militants belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Army and United Baloch Army.¹³⁵

VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY THE NATIONALIST GROUPS¹³⁶

The Baloch nationalist movement comprising multiple groups is not united in terms of its goals. The objectives of different groups are varied. For some nationalism is perceived as recognition of their tribal identity, for instance Marri or Bugti. Some others would like the rights of nearly 70 Baloch tribes living within Balochistan to be given due importance. Some demand complete independence for Balochistan within the current provincial borders, while still others would like the 1973 Constitution to be the basis for keeping Balochistan as a part of strengthened Pakistani federalism,¹³⁷ and some seek an independent Greater Balochistan covering parts of Afghanistan and Iran. Yet, in spite of these differing aims, the bitterness towards the federal government has united the various groups for a common cause. While there are divisions and differences on tribal lines, many groups share the common agenda for independence. As far as financing of the militants is concerned, some reports indicate that certain sections of insurgents in Balochistan are being financed by well- connected

¹³² Shahzada Zulfiqar, "The New Deal", *Newsline*, June 2013, p.39.

¹³³ Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Still Bleeding", *Newsline*, July 2013, p.25.

¹³⁴ Maqbool Ahmed, "Vote Versus Veto", *The Herald*, April 2013, pp.36-37.

¹³⁵ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, pp.37-38.

¹³⁶ The data on the number of attacks by militant organisations and their areas of operation in this section has been taken from the *Pakistan Annual Security Report*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014.

¹³⁷ Robert G. Wirsing, "Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan", April 2008 at http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/pdf_files/PUB853.pdf, accessed on July 20, 2008

diaspora in countries like Qatar and the UAE who allegedly have links with some Western intelligence agencies.¹³⁸

The **Balochistan Liberation Army** (BLA) is headed by Hyrbyair Marri, son of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri. A proponent of free Balochistan, he was granted political asylum in England. The BLA was responsible for the maximum number of terrorist attacks (173) in Balochistan in 2013. The main areas of operation of the BLA include Quetta, Bolan, Kech, Khuzdar and Kohlu. However, it has also been found to be active in Karachi and the border areas of South Punjab. It is also known to be involved in criminal activities.

The **Baloch Republican Army** (BRA) is led by Brahamdagh Bugti, grandson of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, and primarily comprises of Bugti tribesmen. He is reportedly in Switzerland, where he has sought political asylum. The BRA, a militant Baloch secessionist organisation and supposedly the militant wing of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP), was formed in 2006 after the launch of the fifth major military operation.¹³⁹ It began attacks on Pakistani security forces and infrastructure in July 2007. Brahamdagh Bugti formed the BRP because of his differences with his uncle Talal Bugti over the future of the Jamhoori Watan Party, which was a political outfit founded by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. Brahamdagh Bugti gave up the party's old demand of being included in the federation of Pakistan, and sought separation from Pakistan. The BRA carried out 95 attacks in 2013 which were mostly concentrated in Dera Bugti, Naseerabad, Dera Murad Jamali, Barkhan and Loralai.

The **Balochistan Liberation Front** (BLF) headed by Dr. Allah Nazar has links with the separatist group founded by Jumma Khan Marri in 1964 in Damascus, which played an important role in the 1968-1980 insurgency in Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan. The BLF carried out 85 attacks in Balochistan in 2013 and it operates across Balochistan, but more so in the Makran belt.

The **United Baloch Army** (UBA) is a splinter group of the BLF, being led by Mureed Baloch and is known to attack settlers from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It carried out five attacks within the province in 2013.

The **Lashkar-e-Balochistan** led by Javed Mengel, is a relatively new group which has perpetrated attacks around the Makran coastal belt. It was involved in 60 attacks in 2013.

The **Baloch Students Organisation-Azad** was formed in February 2002. It was founded by Dr. Allah Nazar. The BLF is the militant arm of the BSO-Azad. The latter's goal is a free homeland, and they are against political participation.

Baloch National Front is an alliance of eight Baloch nationalist organisations who are against parliamentary political participation in Pakistan. It was formed in February 2009.


The **Balochistan Liberation United Front** is another nationalist militant organisation in Pakistan, which surfaced in 2009 with its claims of kidnapping American UNHCR worker John Solecki from Quetta. It demanded the release of Baloch nationalist prisoners. It is believed that like the BLF its cadres come from the ranks of some factions of BSO.

These insurgent groups have the ability to carry out acts of sabotage on almost a daily basis across the province. The main targets of the attacks remained the same, as in the previous years when Baloch insurgent groups focused on targeting state institutions and representatives, and the infrastructure. The burning down of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's residence in *Ziarat* by the Balochistan Liberation Army in mid-June 2013 was a symbolic attack on a national monument. In 2013, the security forces and law enforcement agencies bore the maximum brunt of attacks, followed by government installations and functionaries. Infrastructure including gas pipelines, railway tracks and trains and power pylons continue to be attacked as in previous years.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "US Turns Against Musharraf", Asia Times Online, January 12, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HA12Df01.html, accessed on June 2, 2014

¹³⁹ Website of the Baloch Republican Army, <http://balochrepublicanarmy.com/baloch-republican-army/> accessed on June 2, 2014

¹⁴⁰ "Balochistan Assessment 2014", *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html>, accessed on June 2, 2014



Non-Baloch settlers and workers from Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh also faced the wrath of the militant groups and were attacked in Kech, Gwadar, Bolan, Harnai, Khuzdar, and Loralai.¹⁴¹ Such attacks on settlers have led to the loss of professionals like teachers, doctors and barbers which has hindered progress in the province the last few years. While people from all professions have been the victims of target killings, teachers and students have constituted a significant proportion of the victims, as schools and educational personnel, especially Punjabis are considered to be representatives of the Pakistani state and symbols of the perceived oppression by Punjabis. Punjabi settlers have been migrating from Balochistan in huge numbers over

the last few years. It is increasingly obvious that the policy of the federal government allowing non-Baloch people to acquire a major stake within the province is backfiring.

A relatively new trend is that of violent activities being undertaken outside Balochistan, as perhaps the nationalists realise that they are not getting enough media attention. The United Baloch Army claimed responsibility for a bomb blast in a market in Islamabad in early April 2014, which came after a military operation in Khuzdar and Kalat in Balochistan. This assumes significance as it is a non-military target that has been attacked outside Balochistan.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, pp.18-19.


¹⁴² Madiha Tahir, "From Rallies to Armed Resistance in Balochistan", *Al Jazeera*, May 6, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/from-rallies-armed-resistance-ba-20145665338680350.html>, accessed on May 6, 2014

VIOLENCE BY THE SECTARIAN GROUPS

The ideological leanings, goals and targets of the sectarian groups are different from those of the Baloch nationalist militant groups. They are geared towards the elimination of the Shia community in Balochistan, in pursuit of its larger goal of making Pakistan a Sunni state. Sectarian attacks in Balochistan were much fewer compared to the attacks perpetrated by the militant nationalist groups in 2013, and though sectarian attacks in 2013 decreased as compared to the previous year, the number of people killed and injured increased. In 2013, there were 33 attacks by sectarian groups in Balochistan, primarily the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) with a higher number of attacks being targeted at the Hazara Shias in Quetta. The situation worsened to such an extent that the provincial government was dismissed and governor's rule imposed, giving into the demands of the Hazara Shia community in the aftermath of a series of attacks in January and February 2013.¹⁴³ In mid June 2013, soon after Abdul Malik Baloch took over as chief minister, the Sardar Bahadur Khan Women's University in Quetta was targeted by a female suicide bomber who blew herself

up in a university bus. Soon after that two more suicide attacks took place at the Bolan Medical Complex, where the injured were being moved and given treatment. Responsibility for these attacks was claimed by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.¹⁴⁴ The graph below reflects increasing violence in Quetta from June 2013 to May 2014.

Sectarian groups in Balochistan have been able to expand due to their nexus with militants in other parts of the country, an example being that of LeJ Baloch wing leader, Usman Saifullah Kurd, believed to be living in Karachi.¹⁴⁵ Since the head of LeJ, Malik's Ishaq's release in 2012, the LeJ was able to slowly expand and set up cells in Balochistan with local recruits, some who are said to be operating independently of the LeJ central command. The usually secular Baloch, especially the Brahuis, are found to be more and more influenced by the radical Islamist militancy espoused by SSP/LeJ. This is also partly due to the growth of sectarian madrassas in Balochistan. Mastung is home to one of the biggest Sipahi-Sahaba seminaries outside southern Punjab. Adding to the problem is the complicity of the agencies in Mastung where a large number of attacks have taken



Source: Pakistan News Digest, June 2013 to May 2014, at www.idsa.in/pakistannewsdigest.html

¹⁴³ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.18; pp.25-27.

¹⁴⁴ Sajjad Hussain Changezi, "Two Wars", republished in *Baloch Hal*, June 23, 2013, <http://thebalochhal.com/2013/06/24/two-wars/>, accessed on June 01, 2014; Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Still Bleeding", *Newsline*, July 2013, pp.24-25.

¹⁴⁵ Naziha Syed Ali, "Sectarian Killings in Balochistan", *Dawn*, January 10, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1079540/sectarian-killings-in-balochistan>, accessed on January 10, 2014

place. The fact remains that there are several FC check posts in this area and it is difficult to imagine that the perpetrators could move through the area without their knowledge. While official complicity has been blamed for LeJ's Saifullah Kurd and Ramzan Mengel's escape from the high security Anti-Terrorism Force jail in Quetta, security officials have blamed senior Baloch tribal leaders for patronising them.¹⁴⁶

Huge bomb explosions including suicide blasts targeting the Hazara community are being used as a new tactic by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, to instil fear and force them to migrate. Earlier attacks were restricted to targeted killings, attacks on passenger buses and low intensity blasts, and suicide attacks.¹⁴⁷ Intensified sectarian attacks against the Hazara Shia community are worrying trend as sectarian attacks in Balochistan were rare until 2001. According to one source, more than 1,300 Hazaras have been murdered, and more than 3,000 injured in 151 attacks forcing around 60,000 of them to migrate since 2003. Hazara leaders in Quetta have accused important members of the Balochistan provincial government of protecting those indulging in sectarian killings.¹⁴⁸ While it is believed that the situation has improved in the aftermath of two major police encounters with LeJ militants in mid-2013, in Kharotabad, and near the Eastern bypass, in which several middle level and senior operatives were killed; and also due to the fact that security was ramped up on routes to areas where there is a large Hazara population, but "unsecured" areas were still at risk. It is believed that the LeJ has links with the Baloch Musallah Difa'a Tanzeem, a pro-government militant organisation that targets Baloch nationalists.¹⁴⁹

Two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi factions have emerged in Balochistan—the Jaishul Islam which was responsible for carrying out two attacks in Quetta; and the Tahafuz-e-Hudood Ullah which was found to be operating in Bolan district. The Shia sectarian militant organisation Sipah-e-Muhammad was also involved in sectarian attacks.¹⁵⁰ Other militant groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan carried out 8 attacks in 2013.¹⁵¹ It is believed that in a number of attacks against the Hazaras, while the "planning and execution" was handled by the sectarian organisation, the Taliban provided the logistical support for the attacks and communication.¹⁵²

APPROACH OF THE NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT

Despite the fact that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, right at the outset had assured Chief Minister Dr. Baloch that the federal government would support him in a dialogue with separatists in the hope that the separatists would join mainstream politics; it will be difficult to bring the separatists to the negotiating table unless they are given some assurances with regard to the recovery of missing persons and ending the 'kill and dump' policy followed by the security establishment. But the question remains whether this is within the scope of what can be managed by the federal government. The incidents of violence are likely to continue unabated in the near future, even in the face of the federal government's support to the provincial government, given the difficulty of reining in the security and intelligence agencies. Despite repeated denials by Pakistan's security

¹⁴⁶ Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Sectarian Militancy Thriving in Balochistan", April 11, 2012, *Dawn*, <http://www.dawn.com/news/709603/sectarian-militancy-thriving-in-balochistan>, accessed on April 12, 2014

¹⁴⁷ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, pp.26-27.

¹⁴⁸ Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Sectarian Militancy Thriving in Balochistan", *Dawn*, April 11, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/news/709603/sectarian-militancy-thriving-in-balochistan>, accessed on April 12, 2014. See also Matthieu Aikins, "United We Sit", *The Herald*, January 2014, p.67.

¹⁴⁹ Naziha Syed Ali, "Sectarian Killings in Balochistan", *Dawn*, January 19, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1079540/sectarian-killings-in-balochistan>, accessed on January 20, 2014. It is believed that Shafiq Mengal, the head of Baloch Musallah Difaee Tanzeem has provided protection to a number of Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives in Balochistan besides working in close quarters with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. See Saher Baloch, "Mangled Facts", *The Herald*, March 2014, p.42.

¹⁵⁰ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.14; p.26.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* p.11.

¹⁵² Syed Talat Hussain, "United They Stand", *Newsline*, July 2013, p.20.

agencies, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has acknowledged, and human rights groups have documentary evidence of the involvement of the agencies in these enforced disappearances.¹⁵³ The recommendations of the judicial commission of 2010¹⁵⁴ remain mostly unimplemented, and no legislation for regulating the work of the intelligence agencies has been passed till now. The Baloch Musallah Difa' a Tanzeem¹⁵⁵ is an outfit of Pakistan's intelligence agencies and has claimed responsibility for killings of Baloch nationalists, journalists and human rights activists. Till such organisations thrive there will continue to be a clash of vested interests. This will not allow the internal security situation in Balochistan to stabilise, notwithstanding attempts to address issues of socio-economic development and corruption.

It is not likely that any meaningful negotiations can take place until wrongful actions by the army, the intelligence agencies, the FC and death squads are curbed.¹⁵⁶ There are vested interests within the FC that do not necessarily want a resolution of the problems in Balochistan, as a worsening situation guarantees better financial returns for them. The FC is being allocated substantial funds by both the federal government and the provincial government.¹⁵⁷ The challenge to any committee formed for the purpose of negotiations with the nationalists will lie in its ability to assuage hurt feelings and convince the latter, that the brutalities against them will stop. However, the problem is continuously brought into sharp focus as was the case after the recent discovery of mass graves in Khuzdar.¹⁵⁸ Also there are apprehensions that the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance is going to legitimise disappearances and unlawful detention. Though Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised that all

agencies would cooperate with the Baloch government in its efforts to curb terrorism and reiterated the federal government's commitment to resolving the problems in Balochistan, when he visited Quetta along with Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan in January 2014, yet no substantive steps have been taken to assuage feelings of the Baloch nationalists. Talks have not fructified as yet. Perhaps there is a lack of urgency to redress the situation in Balochistan as the nationalist movement is at a level that does give rise to serious concerns within the government. Moreover there are more pressing concerns with respect to the threat from the Taliban, hence the continued attempts to engage with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

The most obvious example of the failure of the state to redress Baloch grievances was manifested in the protest march led by Qadeer Baloch, the Vice President of the Voice of Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) from Quetta to Karachi, and onwards to Punjab and Islamabad in an attempt to generate sympathy for their cause. According to him the situation has deteriorated ever since the new provincial government came to power, which only highlights the helplessness of the government to deal with the problem. While the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of Balochistan pegged the number of cases of missing persons, pending before the Supreme Court and the Commission of Enquiry on Enforced Disappearances at 132, the VBMP believes the number to be higher and alleges that 161 Baloch political workers were the victims of extra-judicial killings in different parts of Balochistan in 2013.¹⁵⁹ The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the fact that while the VBMP has a list of 2,750 missing persons with complete details, including addresses and the time and place from where

¹⁵³ "Pakistan Urged to Ratify Treaty on Enforced Disappearance", *Dawn*, October 29, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1039195/pakistan-urged-to-ratify-treaty-on-enforced-disappearance>, accessed on March 29, 2014.

¹⁵⁴ For details see I.A. Rehman, "The Curious Case of Enforced Disappearances", *Newsline*, January 2014, pp.46-47.

¹⁵⁵ For more details see Saher Baloch, "Managed Facts", *The Herald*, March 2014, p.41.

¹⁵⁶ Malik Siraj Akbar, "Sharif's Ambiguous Peace Plans for Balochistan", *The Baloch Hal*, January 31, 2014, <http://thebalochhal.com/2014/01/31/sharifs-ambiguous-peace-plans-for-balochistan/>, aave ndment act was t focus of their election campaign and recognised d network its stregth 013ly to October 2013.ccessed on February 15, 2014.

¹⁵⁷ Interview of Sardar Akhtar Mengal, President, Balochistan National Party and former chief minister with Shahzada Zulfiqar, in Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Still Bleeding", *Newsline*, July 2013, p.28.

¹⁵⁸ Malik Siraj Akbar, "The Balochistan Mass Graves: An International Enquiry Needed", *The Baloch Hal*, January 28, 2014, <http://thebalochhal.com/2014/01/28/balochistan-mass-graves-an-international-inquiry-needed/>

¹⁵⁹ Syed Ali Shah, "Balochistan Unrest: VBMP Claims 161 Extra-judicial Killings in 2013", *Dawn*, December 31, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1077542/balochistan-unrest-vbmp-claims-161-extra-judicial-killings-in-2013>, accessed January 28, 2014.

they went missing, the real figure, on the basis of complaints, is above 12,000.¹⁶⁰ The credibility of the federal government was seriously dented when attempts were made to stop the Long March¹⁶¹ from entering Islamabad, even though they had finally made it to their destination despite pressure and threats from the intelligence agencies.¹⁶²

Any progress in tackling the problem of sectarianism within the province will be hostage to the federal government's lack of will to take strict action against those perpetrating sectarianism. Any change in state policy of providing patronage to sectarian groups, is not expected in the near future.

APPROACH OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has called upon the security forces and intelligence agencies to function within the constitution and the law, given continued reports of serious human rights violations which include disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture and extra judicial killings.¹⁶³ While the chief minister has made the issue of enforced disappearances his first priority, and has urged the security forces to stop such activities and to release the missing persons believed to be held by them, he is constrained by his obvious lack of authority and ability to rein in the Pakistan army and its intelligence agencies, and as such civilian control over governance in Balochistan continues to be limited. Although the Supreme Court has been hearing cases

related to missing persons since 2012, and has asked the government to comply with its order, the Balochistan provincial government has cited the lack of effective control over the FC for its inability to recover the missing persons.¹⁶⁴ The continuing recovery of bullet ridden bodies hampers any attempts at reconciliation. The chief minister feels the situation is being made difficult for his government by both sides: the Baloch militants as well as the intelligence agencies. The chief minister has admitted that unless all the "stakeholders" reach a common understanding it would be impossible to resolve the problem.¹⁶⁵

The chief minister has been in touch with Baloch leaders, in an attempt to arrive at a negotiated settlement. While it was expected that an all party conference would be convened to discuss the proposals for talks with the militants, it has not been held till now. A high level reconciliation and negotiation committee comprising Baloch, Pashtun and Sindhi leaders which was to be set up to initiate a dialogue with Baloch separatists, is yet to come about. While there was speculation that Dr. Baloch may have met with some exiled Baloch leaders when he travelled to London in March 2014, there were no confirmed reports. Yet, negotiations would be tricky given that some Baloch nationalist groups regard the National Party of Dr. Baloch as being pro-establishment and promoting the interests of the Punjabi dominated federal government.¹⁶⁶ In the face of demands by the separatist groups that talks would be held with the government on the condition that the option of

¹⁶⁰ Figures given by Nasrullah Baloch, Chairman, Voice for Baloch Missing Persons in an interview to Shahzada Zulfiqar, in I.A. Rehman, "The Curious Case of Enforced Disappearances", *Newsline*, January 2014, p.47.

¹⁶¹ Aamir Yasin, "Long March Participants Set to Enter Islamabad Today", *The Baloch Hal*, February 28, 2014, and Amir Mir, "Pakistan Managing Balochistan on Ad Hoc Basis", *The News*, March 20, 2014, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-239357-Pakistan-managing-Balochistan-on-ad-hoc-basis>, accessed on March 20, 2014; See also Meena Menon's interview with Qadeer Baloch "If There Is a Referendum in Balochistan People Will Vote for Independence", *The Hindu*, March 10, 2014, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/if-there-is-a-referendum-in-balochistan-people-will-vote-for-independence/article5767487.ece>, accessed on March 10, 2014

¹⁶² For details see interview by Nasrullah Baloch, Chairman, Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, to Shahzada Zulfiqar, *Newsline*, January 2014, p. 47.

¹⁶³ Intikhab Hanif, "HRCF for Talks with Baloch Insurgents", *Dawn*, October 14, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1049533/hrcf-for-talks-with-baloch-insurgents>, accessed on March 14, 2014.

¹⁶⁴ South Asia Terrorism Portal, Balochistan Assessment 2014, at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countires/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html>, accessed on June 2, 2014.

¹⁶⁵ Interview of Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, Chief Minister of Balochistan and President of the National Party with Shahzada Zulfiqar, in Shazada Zulfiqar, "Still Bleeding", *Newsline*, July 2013, pp.26-27.

¹⁶⁶ Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Obstacle Race", *Newsline*, April 2013, p.31.

independence is discussed, there is no starting point for negotiations.¹⁶⁷

There were reports that the government planned to disarm all armed groups in Balochistan and was thinking of launching an operation against the BLA, BRA, Baloch United Liberation Front and Baloch Liberation Front, which would later be expanded to other groups as well.¹⁶⁸ Balochistan being an important centre for the trafficking of arms and drugs, which feeds the supply lines of local armed groups with funds and arms, disarming the armed groups would remain a major challenge for the security forces.

CONCLUSION

The Baloch nationalists have over the last few decades been spearheading a movement which has led to a lot of violence and heartache for the civilian population in the province. Yet such incidents of stray violence have not been enough to jolt the central government into taking concrete measures to end the status quo. The nationalist movement is not under a unified command and as such it does not seem likely to assume the character of a strong and viable secessionist movement, even though there have perhaps been attempts to evolve a common agenda.

At the same time there are doubts as to whether the movement has the critical mass for a major upsurge. While the insurgency is simmering at a level which causes enough unease to the Pakistani establishment, but the challenge from the secessionist groups is not strong enough to pose a threat to the integrity of the Pakistani state. Balochistan is an economically and strategically important province of Pakistan and its full potential can only be realised if there is no insurgency. To that extent it can be expected that attempts will be made by the federal government, in tandem with the provincial government, to assuage the hurt feelings of dissidents and control unrest in the province. Yet, success will depend on the interests and machinations of the Pakistani establishment which will not easily brook interference with regard to its actions. The establishment remains sensitive to any probes or journalistic queries on the security situation in Balochistan and this is most evident in the recent attack on the anchor of Geo TV, Hamid Mir, who suspects that he was targeted by elements within the intelligence agencies for raising issues about Balochistan in his show. In these circumstances, Baloch discontent, and its manifestation under various flags and agendas, is likely to remain a prominent feature of Pakistan's political scene for years to come.

¹⁶⁷ Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Between the Devil and the Deep Sea", *Newsline*, September 2013, p.40.

¹⁶⁸ *Pakistan Security Report 2013*, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, January 2014, p.43 ; South Asia Terrorism Portal, Balochistan Assessment 2014, at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countires/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html>, accessed June 2, 2014

ANALYSING THE DEBATE IN THE VERNACULAR MEDIA IN PAKISTAN

Yaqoob-Ul-Hassan

The media has an important role in managing, and creating perceptions. It can also steer government policies and programmes in a particular direction. The media also provides space to various narratives - both that of the government, as well as the militants. Militant groups also use the media to publicise their views to generate sympathy for their cause among the people. To get that support, the militants also articulate a particular narrative drawing from religion to attract people to their cause of 'jihad'. Public support manifests itself in multiple ways. These include: sympathy for the militants' ideology; financial support; and more importantly by providing them with an ideological shield. Once that support is received, the terrorists want to create a niche for themselves in the national political discourse to legitimise their acts of violence or by drawing attention to their 'cause'. This is achieved either through the media or by securing the backing of a particular class. The Urdu language media has always served to strengthen and facilitate the conservative narrative.

This chapter will try to explore the approach of the vernacular media in Pakistan, especially the Urdu press, towards the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), terrorism and violence and the failed peace talks. This analysis covers the tenure of the Nawaz Sharif government, from May 2013, when it assumed power.

The ideology of the Taliban is not a new to Pakistan, rather it has always existed in one form or the other. 'Islam in danger' was the official line, in the 1950s and 60s. The 1980s saw a state sponsored ideology that used militants as a foreign policy tool, to influence the regional and national environment. This policy of supporting radical Islamic groups which has also been pursued in

Afghanistan since the 1960s, culminated in the establishment of Taliban rule in Kabul. The Taliban government was overthrown after the 9/11 attacks, but Pakistan only changed its tactic, and from providing open support to the Taliban, to giving it covert support. The Pakistani establishment, along with religious political parties, promoted the narrative that the US presence in Afghanistan gave rise to the problem of militancy in Pakistan. It refused to accept that the TTP had links with the Afghan Taliban. This narrative, over the years, has swung between the good Taliban and the bad Taliban; and now the ugly Taliban. When the TTP, an amalgam of the more than 60 outfits, emerged as an umbrella group in 2007 and started attacking the state, the establishment created the narrative that it was being funded by foreign agencies. The Urdu media has been at the forefront of disseminating establishment centric views.

VERNACULAR MEDIA

Urdu newspapers have the highest circulation in Pakistan, because the Urdu reading public is much larger than the elite which read English language papers. Over the years the ideological ground occupied by conservatism has expanded hugely.¹⁶⁹ It is this conservative audience that the Urdu press seeks to win over and influence. Advertising also plays a great role in this. The Pakistan army is involved a wide range of economic activities – ranging from agriculture to industry- the total value of which is an estimated \$20 billion. The capacity of the military to fund advertisements along with its other coercive organs can force the media to print the military's version of militancy in FATA.¹⁷⁰ Some journalists are closely associated with the establishment and take their brief from them. Others even promote the Army's version

¹⁶⁹ For detail see, C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, Steve Kull, "Pakistani Public Opinion On Democracy, Islamist Militancy, And Relations with the U. S.", *A Joint Study Of World Public Opinion. Org and the United States Institute Of Peace*, February 2008.

¹⁷⁰ For further detail see Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, London: Pluto Press, 2007.

since the national security debate discourages any genuine reporting of the problem or any attempts to critique the Army. Even, within the military and particularly in the intelligence agency, there are people who sympathise with Taliban and their ideology. These factors have played an important role in the Urdu media's willy-nilly support for the extremist and the militant narratives within the country.

The vernacular media has always been predisposed towards Islamic ideology. The vernacular media share similar views on a number of issues and it equally entertains the official line on these issues. For instance the Urdu media tows the establishment line on Islamic ideology, Kashmir, Afghanistan and India. It sympathises with Islamic movements, throughout the world.

Both English and Urdu media were supportive of the military, during the Swat military operation. This media backing even compelled the religious parties to support the operation. The vernacular media accepted that the Pakistani Taliban's occupation of Swat was an internal threat and therefore supported the actions taken to clear that area. But the same media not only criticised the military during the South Waziristan operation but often alleged that the Pakistani military was waging war against its own people at the behest of others.¹⁷¹ This division in the media played a significant role in the Pakistani military's reluctance to undertake an operation in North Waziristan until the Karachi airport was attacked by presumably by the Uzbek militants having a base there.

TALKS BETWEEN THE TTP AND THE GOVERNMENT

In the last couple of months there are division in the vernacular media vis-à-vis Taliban and the on-going peace talks. The Taliban's success in creating confusion within the Pakistani ruling elites and the common people, stemmed from their ability to influence them at

psychological level by appealing to their religious sentiments and packaging their demands in religious terms.

TTP has also offered a stiff resistance to the Pakistani army. Terrorist attacks, against the army and civilians, have not ceased. This onslaught by the TTP of engaging Pakistan's rulers both psychologically and militarily terms has created confusion within the vernacular media also. This perplexity within the Urdu press has increased since the talks with the Taliban began. When the Nawaz Sharif's government proposed talks with Taliban, the vernacular media was most receptive to the idea of bringing the TTP to the negotiating table. In spite of several violent incidents in which the Taliban were involved, the government kept the door for dialogue open, in spite of the pressure to undertake military operations against them. The vernacular media was very supportive and insisted that even if in the first round of talks did not yield the required results the government should continue the process and remain engaged with the Taliban and take the talks to a fruitful end.¹⁷² As time passed and terrorist activities did not cease, the hopes of peace began to fade. The vernacular media also fell prey to the confusion and was divided between those who were pro-talks and pro-operation; and those who were opposed to military operations and termed dialogue as futile.

Two incidents in Pakistan would illustrate this point further - the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, and the killing of 23 Frontier Corps personnel, by the Taliban.

When Hakimullah was killed by an American drone, every Urdu newspaper not only condemned the killing, but said that "this incident reveals that the US does not want peace and stability to return Pakistan".¹⁷³ There was a huge hue and cry following the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud. The US had offered a \$5 million bounty for his capture or death. But after his killing, the Urdu media, with few exceptions, hailed him as the peace monger among the hard core Taliban. Even the terminology used

¹⁷¹ For Detail see, "Between Radicalization Democratisation in an unfolding Conflict: Media in Pakistan" *International Media Support*, July 2009.

¹⁷² "Masbut Paishraft", *Daily Express*, January 1, 2014, www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102084558&Issue=NP_LHE&Date20140131, accessed on January 1, 2014

¹⁷³ "Drone Hamlay Main Hakeemullah Mehsud ke Halakat", *Roznama Dunya*, November 3, 2013, http://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2013-11-03&edition=LHR&id=695151_79532890, accessed on November 3, 2013

by the vernacular media was astounding; 'Qaid' which means leader—and is mostly used to show great respect and admiration—was frequently used for Hakimullah¹⁷⁴.

The leading Urdu newspaper *Nawa-i-Waqt*, known for its ultra conservative stance and its support for right wing discourse within Pakistani society, condemned the attack but was very critical of the stand taken by the government and religious political parties on Hakimullah's killing. In one editorial the paper criticised, the then leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, for calling Hakimullah martyr:

the murderer of thousands of Pakistani's is termed as a martyr...Now it is time to see whether government exploit the weakness of an enemy or just wait for someone to emerge as a leader of the TTP.. Along with the demand to stop the drone attacks by the US, Pakistan should also start dealing with its internal enemies. It should also decide whether America is its friend or foe or frenemy.¹⁷⁵

According to an editorial in *Nawa-i-Waqt*, the killing of Hakimullah provides an opportunity for a military operation.¹⁷⁶

When personnel of the 23 Frontier Corps were killed by the TTP in Mohmand Agency, and Umar Khalid Khurrasani claimed responsibility for it, the media and the ruling elite class again got divided between those who were pro-talks and those who were pro-operation. According one right wing newspaper, the *Daily Ummat*, the TTP want to impose Sharia on the country. Pakistan has an Islamic constitution but it has not been implemented in its true spirit. The enemies of Pakistan,

secularists and Western puppets want to impose secularism on the country so that the Islamic identity of Pakistan is undermined. These forces, never want peace and stability returning to Pakistan.¹⁷⁷

More importantly whenever support for the military operation appears to be on the rise, the vernacular media invokes fear among the people by recalling the 1971 military operation in East Pakistan.¹⁷⁸ Even with regard to the killings of the soldiers of the 23 Frontier Corps (FC) by the Taliban, the *Daily Jasarat* which is the voice of the Jamaat-i-Islami and propagates conspiracy theories, instead of condemning the Taliban, in an editorial stated that there is a no proof that the Taliban has killed them. It further emphasised that both talks and attacks can continue simultaneously.¹⁷⁹

We do not have any doubt on the ability of the Pakistani Army. They have the capability to fight against internal threats. Pakistani people are proud of their army but the army should not engage itself in the tribal areas and fight against its own people...Deploying military for a long in a particular area is not a victory. How long will be military deployed there?¹⁸⁰

The newspapers also said that external powers were trying to weaken the Pakistani military by creating wedge between its top echelons and the soldiers.

The other newspapers within the vernacular media were very tough on the government after 23 FC killings. The pro-operation newspapers within vernacular media not only condemned the attack but insisted that a military operation be launched against the Taliban. (See Table 1) They stated that Pakistani military had already stopped their attacks and were positively backing the talks with

¹⁷⁴ "Aman Amal Par Americe Drone Hamla", *Daily Jasarat*, November 3,2013, <http://jasarat.com/news.php?date=03-11-2013&news=01&category=editorial>, accessed on November 3, 2013

¹⁷⁵ "Taliban ka Muzakeraat say Inkaar, America ka Drone Hamlay Jaree Raknay par Israar, Pakistan Do Intehaawoon kay Darmeeyan Sandwich Ban gaya.... Beyther Saafarteekare aur Hikmet Amlī say Pakistan Mushkilaat say Nikal sakhta hai", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, November 5, 2013, www.nawaiwaqat.com.pk/editorials/05-Nov-2013/254633, accessed on November 5, 2013

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ "Muzzakeraat Ke Kaamyabi kay Imkanaat Baki Hai", *Daily Ummat*, February 25, 2014, ummatpublication.com/2014/02/25/news.php?=idr1.gif, accessed on February 25, 2014

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ "Amaan Muzakeraat Main Tatul", *Daily Jasarat*, February 20, 2014, <http://jasarat.com/news.php?date=20-02-2014&news=01&category=editorial>, accessed on February 20, 2014

¹⁸⁰ "Fouj Ke Salahyet par koi Shak Nahi Mager...", *Daily Jasarat*, February 23, 2014, jasarat.com/news.php?date=23-02-2014&news=03&category=editorial, accessed on February 23, 2014

Taliban. The drone attacks had also stopped. The atmosphere was conducive for the Taliban to show their sincerity. But after the 23 FC killings, there is no doubt, that terrorism cannot be eliminated by talks. People gave a mandate to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to initiate talks which TTP, which unfortunately the TTP saw as being the government's weakness. The government has in the past repeatedly said, that if the talks fail then a military operation would become inevitable so, "is there anything attached to talks now".¹⁸¹ People are very desperate to eliminate terrorism. The Pakistan army is also ready and waiting to take on the TTP. The time is now right to eliminate terrorism from the soil once and forever.¹⁸² In order to give peace another chance, the government is repeating the same mantra again and again.

Table 1

News Paper	Right	Right-Centre	Pro-talks	Pro-Operation
Nawa-i-Waqt		- ✓		✓
Daily Jang		✓		- ✓
Daily Express		✓		✓
Daily Dunya		✓		✓
Daily-Jasarat	✓		✓	
Daily Ausaf	- ✓		✓	
Daily Ummat	✓		✓	

This segregation of the leading daily newspapers of Pakistan, particularly in terms of their ideological orientation, is the author's own and has been done to understand the vernacular media's take on talks with the Taliban and military operations.

How long shall this process last? The cliché that terrorism and talks cannot go hand to hand which the leadership maintains for a long time is not going to help. Terrorism

has not stopped and terrorists are targeting security forces at will. In response to big attacks, the government hardens its position but after a few days it is again willing to hold dialogue with the Taliban. The government has put the lives of common people in danger by repeating this same old line.¹⁸³

Talks are only held with those who shun the path of violence. "In between, if any terrorist incidents happen, the doors for talks should be closed and the decision which was taken earlier by the government and the military, behind the closed doors should be followed."¹⁸⁴

The media raised its voice even with regard to the nature of the talks and this has gained momentum over the past couple of months. The question most frequently raised by the vernacular media is: What is the government going to discuss and with whom. The press is of the view that Taliban does not recognise the constitution and it never will. The irony is that the political and religious leaders who condemn drone attacks, but support the talks never even pay lip service to the common people, who are killed by terrorists. These people are never heard and neither are they given a chance to express their views.¹⁸⁵ Government showed a great deal of patience to initiate the talks. The splinter groups of Taliban however continued to their attacks. An editorial in *Daily Ausaf* puts it succinctly:

Those who claim to be the guardians of the Islam do not massacre the people... How is it possible that the Taliban continuously targets the security forces and mutilate their bodies but there is no

¹⁸¹ "23 Ailakar Dashatgardi Ka Nishaana, Aub Muzzakeraat Ke Koi Gonjayesh Nahi Rahi", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, February 18, 2014, <http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2014-02-18/PAGE-14/DETAIL-0>, accessed on February 18, 2014

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ "Muzzakeraat Aur Dashatgardi Saath Saath Kub Tak?", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, March 7, 2014, <http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/editorials/07-Mar-2014/286631>, accessed on March 7, 2014

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ "Hakeemullah Mehsud Ke Halakat Aur Muzzakirati Aamal", *Daily Express*, March 11, 2013, http://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPup.Window.aspx?newsID=1102005471&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20131103, accessed on March 11, 2013

response from the military? Time has come to teach the Taliban a lesson in their own language which they understand".¹⁸⁶

Thus, as discussed above there is no consensus or unanimity within the vernacular media, on the TTP, talks and terrorism. The contradictions within the vernacular media regarding the challenges faced by the polity reveal how Pakistani society in general, the media and the ruling elite in particular is divided. However, after Karachi airport attack, there is a slight shift in vernacular media's position on Taliban. Post-Karachi incident, vernacular media adopted a cautionary approach towards Taliban and the dialogue with them. Most of the Urdu dailies were rhetoric in their expression. *Daily Ummat* in an Editorial titled "Taliban has to Categorically Decide" wrote that government should use force against Taliban so they can be forced to come to the negotiation table again. "Militant attacks against the state and people have weakened Taliban's position. Now Taliban has to decide categorically that whether they want strong Pakistan or want to weak it by helping external powers"¹⁸⁷. When operation *Zarb-e-Azb* was launched the *Daily Ummat* in another editorial questioned the military operation by writing "when 80 percent terrorists have already escaped before the operation what was the need to make 7 hundred thousand people internally displaced in hot weather and in the holy month of Ramadan"¹⁸⁸. While as *Nawa-i-Waqt* in one of its editorial stated that PLM-N government's talk offer to Taliban only emboldened them. The talk offer sent a wrong message to Taliban. Military establishment always maintained the position that talks and terrorism cannot go hand to hand. "The Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* is for Pakistan's existence. It is time to unite against terrorists. If people get united then terrorists will never have any space to hide. Not giving them sanctuary can make it easy to wipe them out for

ever".¹⁸⁹

TERRORISM AND SECTARIANISM

The vernacular media perceives a link between terrorism and sectarianism. Hence, it uses terms such as terrorism, political violence and sectarianism, interchangeably. With regard to the violence in Karachi the Urdu media maintains that both criminal gangs and sectarian outfits should be dealt with by force but is critical of the fact that target killings continue unabated in Karachi, even more than six months after the government began its target operation. *The Daily Express* in its editorial opined:

The conditions are still grim. There has been no big breakthrough either. Efforts should be taken to arrest the culprits before they are in a position to incite violence. Unfortunately, it is not happening... Target operation should not specific against the criminals only but it should also include those who incite sectarian violence.¹⁹⁰

Sectarian terrorism has again engulfed the whole country. The law and enforcement agencies need to rethink their strategy. The spokesperson of the Rangers in Karachi has stated that there are many criminals who are affiliated to, and are shielded by many political parties. As an editorial in *Daily Express* aptly said:

If Rangers have collected all the important evidences against any organisation involved in terrorism in Karachi, the culprits should be booked soon. ... Even some religious political parties who participate in the elections are also supporting these extremists who are against the political system. There should be a similarity between political and ideological

¹⁸⁶ "Reyasat Ke Rut Qayeem Karnay Kayleeye Baday Faislay Keya Jayea", *Daily Ausaf*, February 20, 2014, www.ausaf.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014-02-20/p14-01.jpg, accessed on February 20, 2014

¹⁸⁷ "Taliban Ko Do Touk Main Faisla Karna Hoga", *Daily Ummat*, June 16, 2014, <http://ummatpublication.com/2014/06/16/news.php?p=idr1.gif>, accessed on July 1, 2014.

¹⁸⁸ "Aasli Dashedgard Tu Farar Hogaye", *Daily Ummat*, July 8, 2014, <http://ummat.net/2014/07/08/news.php?p=idr1.gif>, accessed on July 8, 2014.

¹⁸⁹ "Zarb-e-Abz, Fauj Ka Dashedgardoon Kay Bila Imteyaz Khatmay ka Uzzam", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, June 28, 2014, <http://nawaiwaqt.com.pk/editorials/28-Jun-2014/311916>, accessed on July 5, 2014.

¹⁹⁰ "Karachi Lahoo Lahaan: Civil Society Aagay Ayei", *Daily Express*, February 19, 2014, www.express.com.pk/epapers/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102103014&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=201401219, accessed on February 19, 2014

thinking. Unfortunately at the state level extremism is being supported, the consequences of which have been disastrous.¹⁹¹

However, the vernacular media does not give the wide and candid coverage to sectarian incidents. Very few editorials and opinion pieces, over the past one year, deal with sectarianism specifically, as compared to terrorism and drone attacks. This duplicity on part of the vernacular media and its lack of focus on sectarian violence, reveals its typically conservative mind-set and the fact that it caters to a particular sect or a class. These links between terrorists and sectarian outfits cannot be underestimated, even though their ends and objectives differ. The links between political parties and the sectarian outfits are also not flagged by the vernacular media.¹⁹² This *sunification* of the vernacular media is evident since they do not provide any space for news on sectarian incidents. It also hardly ever writes about the controversial Blasphemy Law.

BALUCHISTAN

The vernacular print media maintains that the happenings in Balochistan are because of foreign interference. The rulers of Pakistan have made the mistake of not addressing the grievances of the Baloch people. The highhandedness of the rulers has further aggravated the problems in Balochistan. According to the vernacular media it is totally wrong to assume that there is any sort of demographic transition in Balochistan, or that the Baloch people do not want people from other provinces to come and work there.¹⁹³ According to the vernacular media the happenings in Balochistan are a part of the grand design of the enemies of the Pakistan. According to an editorial in *Daily Ausaf*:

The construction of a deep sea Gwadar will improve Pakistan's economy and will put Pakistan in a great position both in the West

Asia and in Asian markets, which India and the US cannot digest. America knows that Chinese engineers are working in the construction of a Gwadar so that China can easily get the access to the warm waters. Further, America has an eye on rich resources and minerals in Balochistan. America never wants that Pakistan get benefits from these resources. Christians, Jews and Hindus want to create a greater Balochistan so that they can exploit its rich natural resources.¹⁹⁴

The entire Urdu media hailed the decision of Nawaz Sharif to make Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch of the National Party the chief minister of Balochistan. According to the media Malik is a local leader and he has the ability to deliver. Because of his activism he can bring the extremists to the negotiating table, hasten the recovery of missing persons and stop the target killings:

These tasks are not easy and these issues cannot be resolved without a change of thinking among the national political and military leadership. ... Malik is very serious on the issue; if he is not assisted by the political and military leadership, he will not like continuing as the Chief Minister ... if someone is sent home again; it would be very difficult to regain people's trust.¹⁹⁵

Although there has not been any shift in the vernacular media's take regarding the overall situations in Balochistan, but over the past couple of months the Urdu press has been criticising the government for not doing anything to address the grievances of the Baloch people. The vernacular media is also not shying from highlighting the case of missing persons. According to an editorial in *Nawa-i-Waqt*:

The case of missing persons in Balochistan is rising since 2010. The judiciary and the media

¹⁹¹ "Firqa Parst Quwatain Aek Bar Phir Sar Garam", *Daily Express*, January 6, 2014, www.express.com.pk/Eppaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102063&ISSUE=NL_LHE&Date=20140106, accessed on January 6, 2014

¹⁹² Sepha-e-Sahba's (SSP) relationship with PLM-N party.

¹⁹³ "Qudraati Wasyel say Malamal Baluchistan aur Bayrooni Mudakilat", *Daily Ausaf*, December 28, 2013, www.ausaf.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013-12-28/p14_01.jpg, accessed on December 28, 2013

¹⁹⁴ Ibd.

¹⁹⁵ "Baluchistan: Aman aur Tarki ka Khaab", *Daily Jang*, June 11, 2013, <http://jang.com.pk/jang/jun2013-daily/11-06-2013/idaria.htm>, accessed on June 12, 2013

are blaming intelligence agencies. The Government and Supreme Court have given their nod to conduct the DNA tests on the bodies buried in the unidentified graveyards. This would set the lesson for the military".¹⁹⁶

The Urdu press wants that the government should also start talks with Baloch dissidents. Wadi Jamali in an opinion column stated that the biggest problem facing Pakistan is the Balochistan issue. He further went on to say:

If the darkness in Balochistan is over then the future of country is very bright... If Nawaz Sharif is interested in addressing the grievances of the Baloch then the prophecy of the bright future can be guaranteed. ... Balochistan needs those power plants and dams which can address their alienation and despair. The Baloch rulers have always suffered from the military rule in Pakistan. The military leadership and the government should follow one path to make the Baloch to believe and realize that the whole nation and military is with them.¹⁹⁷

The vernacular media has also lambasted the government for not doing enough at the diplomatic level because it believes that since Pakistan has evidence of Indian involvement in Balochistan. It should raise this issue at various international forums. According to an editorial in *Nawa-i-Waqt*:

Pakistan has handed over the strong evidences of India's involvement in Balochistan to India.

Is it the responsibility of the government to raise this issue? Will now India not interfere and will peace return to Pakistan? People with courage should not maintain silence on these issues. It only makes your enemy strong.¹⁹⁸

However, on Afghanistan, Kashmir and India, the vernacular media by and large have the same perception. With regard to India, the emphasis is on how India is responsible for Pakistan's water woes. India's role in Afghanistan has also received a greater focus. *Abi Deashat* (water aggression) and *Balochistan main mudakhelt* (interference in Balochistan) are terms frequently used in the vernacular print media against India.

CONCLUSION

The overall developments in Pakistan in the context of globalisation and the war on terror have not impacted the vernacular media. The vernacular media's views are different and they represent the conservative viewpoint. The indoctrination of society, over a couple of decades and the narrative created by the state cannot be easily changed. An ideology or a particular narrative can be only defeated by another ideology or another narrative. While in case of Pakistan that alternative narrative is missing, or one can say that state has no interest in creating a new narrative that is contrary to that of the Taliban. The ideological division is not only between English or vernacular media but within the vernacular media also. This lack of consensus on terrorism and violence is likely to exacerbate Pakistan's security challenges further.

¹⁹⁶ "Baluchistan Badamni Case, Hokumat ke Adam Dilchaspi par Supreme Court ki Barhami", *Nawa-i-Waqt*, March 27, 2014, <http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/editorials/27-Mar-2014/2014/291226>, accessed on March 27, 2014

¹⁹⁷ "Wadi Jamali, Balochistan kay Halaat par Sanjeedgi ke Zuroorat", *Daily Ausaf*, April 29, 2014, http://www.ausaf.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014-04-29/p15_03.jpg, accessed on April 29, 2014

¹⁹⁸ "Balochistan main Mudakilat kay Souboot Bhart Kay Hawalay", *Nawa-I—Waqt*, October 7, 2014, <http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/editorials/07-Oct-2013/246649>, accessed on October 7, 2014

CONCLUSION

WHERE IS PAKISTAN HEADED?

Smruti S Pattanaik

The spectrum of terrorism and violence, being witnessed in Pakistan has a deep rooted societal and political basis that has now got so entrenched, that it has made the fight against terror extremely difficult. It is well-known that the sectarian groups and radical organisations like the TTP and other fundamentalist forces are not only closely networked but they have also an ideological affinity and provide each other sanctuaries and bases, apart from sharing their fighters. Over time, these groups have established sleeper cells in urban areas throughout the country, which have enhanced their ability to stage spectacular attacks at will. This makes the task of fighting these elements extremely difficult. As the radical ideology percolates into society, it enables these violent groups to strike a chord with people at large. Pakistan's strategy of using terrorism, as instrument of state policy has also affected its ability to fight terrorism at home. There are radicals within the ranks of the army, political parties and civil society who support these groups and their activities; and rather than accepting that Pakistan is plagued by home-grown radicalism, they invent conspiracy theories and put the blame on external powers.

Interestingly, at one point of time a former ISI chief, in an interview, defended Mullah Omar by saying, "Shouldn't they be allowed to think and say what they please? They believe that jihad is their obligation. Isn't that freedom of opinion?"¹⁹⁹ This camaraderie was clearly visible after the Mumbai attack, when the TTP openly offered its help when in a statement which said that in case of a war with

India, it would fight along with the Pakistan army. Therefore, the relationship between militants groups and the security establishment remains blurred. Chowdhury Nisar, Pakistan's present Interior Minister, holds the view that the TTP may be against the government but majority of them are not anti-Pakistan.²⁰⁰ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif while inaugurating a de-radicalisation centre in Swat said, "They (radicals) are not enemies of Pakistan but have lost their direction... They should be made healthy members of the society through constructive engagement".²⁰¹ De-radicalisation centres would prove ineffective if comprehensive step is not taken to de-radicalise the society and introduce reforms in school curriculum that teaches hatred to the children at an impressionable age. Similarly, the teaching in the government run schools is not much different from what is taught in the madrassas, and they equally preach hate-literature against the minorities as also towards the Shias that is one of the reasons for growing intolerance in the society. The International Crisis Group in a recent report said that:

Sunni orthodoxy permeated the curriculum, historical facts were distorted and social as well as physical science teaching was aimed at fostering religious intolerance and xenophobia. Violent jihad and religious martyrdom were extolled.²⁰²

In fact the emphasis on building a narrative to counter the militant discourse as per the recently passed Pakistan

¹⁹⁹ Susanne Koelbl, "Pakistan's New Intelligence Chief: 'Terror Is Our Enemy, Not India'", January 6, 2009, *Der Spiegel*, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pakistan-s-new-intelligence-chief-terror-is-our-enemy-not-india-a-599724.html>, accessed on June 14, 2014

²⁰⁰ Muhammad Anis, "Majority of Taliban not anti-state: Nisar", *The News*, March 7, 2014 <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-28965-Majority-of-Taliban-not-anti-state-Nisar>, accessed on March 8, 2014

²⁰¹ "Extremists not our enemies, they have just lost direction!", *Pakistan Today*, January 15, 2014, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/01/15/extremists-not-our-enemies-they-have-just-lost-direction/>, accessed on January 16, 2014

²⁰² International Crisis Group, "Education Reform in Pakistan", *Asia Report No 257*, June 23, 2014, p.10

Internal Security Policy (PISP), would not be of much help unless the government seriously undertakes madrassa reform and brings all the madrassas – both government funded and privately funded, under its ambit, restructures the syllabus, stops making untenable distinction between good and bad Taliban, and takes action against all the militant groups perpetuating violence. Though this may appear to be a tall task, the internal security situation requires a complete overhaul of Pakistan's approach to violence in general, and terrorism in particular. It needs to be mentioned that Pakistan has amended the Anti-Terrorism Act has been amended more than two dozen times since it was passed in 1997. Each regime that has come to power has amended and expanded the scope of the law to address the issue of terrorism. It has established a National Internal Security Apparatus to coordinate among different security agencies and design the governmental response to terrorism. Such steps were deemed necessary in view of the upswing of violence in Pakistan. According to the interior ministry sources, 867 people in FATA, 737 people in Balochistan, 252 people in Sindh, 104 people in Punjab, and 22 people in KP have been killed in sectarian violence over the past five years.²⁰³

The provinces also face the serious challenge of dealing with violence and terrorism. The links between the government and banned groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the tolerance towards groups like the Difa-e-Pakistan, which appear to have the support of the establishment, bears testimony to the fact that Pakistan has an endless capacity to tolerate groups that seriously challenge its internal security, even as the army pursues the mirage of national security through these well nurtured strategic assets. The relations between the federal and the provincial governments, differences between the political parties on the issue of violence and terrorism in Pakistan, and also differences of opinion between the army and civilian government with regard to the approach towards the TTP, only aggravates matters. The situation however is changing since the army initiated *Zarb-e-Azb* operation against militants in North Waziristan, and the political parties are supporting them. In July this year, there was also police operation in Punjab

against some militant groups so as to limit the fall out of *Zarb-e-Azb* operation.

It is quite evident by now that the PML-N government, ever since it came to power in June 2013, has been quite unsure about its approach towards violence and terrorism. There were reports in the Pakistani media that Nawaz Sharif had almost decided to initiate military action against the TTP in Waziristan in early 2014 and had prepared himself for an announcement in the parliament to that effect; however, when he reached the house, he took everyone by surprise and proposed continuation of peace talks. Nawaz's adoption of the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance and subsequent passing of the bill based on the ordinance as law in both the houses remains controversial; many political parties see this as a tool for persecuting opponents. This Bill gives the government wide-ranging powers and authorises arbitrary arrest and detention. Interestingly when the Bill was present, the Interior Minister was conspicuous by his absence while Jamaat-i-Islami voted against the bill.

PUNJAB

In Punjab, the government has reached an unwritten understanding with the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) that it would not target this province. It also went to the extent of seeking the support of the ASWJ - the latest reincarnation of SSP - in the last election and the two jointly contested the Jhang seat. Even Rana Sanaullah, the controversial former law minister of Punjab and Maulana Ludhianvi jointly campaigned for the candidates. Apart from this, the Sunni extremist group supported the PML-N candidates in Faisalabad, Bahawalnagar, Rahim Yar Khan and Layyah. This nexus between the ruling PML-N and Sunni extremist groups defeats the purpose of Pakistan's fight against terrorism, especially the groups that are involved in sectarian killings in Punjab and other places, notably Quetta.

The emergence of the Punjabi Taliban as a major ally of al Qaeda is another problem. Many believe that Punjab Taliban is part of the jihadi groups targeting Kashmir;

²⁰³ Irfan Ghauri, "Sectarian violence: Over 2,000 people killed in 5 years, Interior Ministry tells Senate", *Express Tribune*, April 23, 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/699421/sectarian-violence-over-2000-people-killed-in-5-years-says-interior-ministry/>, accessed on April 23, 2014

shares same ideology with the Pashtun TTP and draws their cadres from similarly motivated jihadists. These groups not only cooperate with each other but also provide sanctuary to each other and facilitate escape of their operatives after an attack. Bhawalpur, Multan and DG Khan are the main recruitment centres for the Deobandi militants. South Punjab has emerged as a potential powder keg of terrorism, especially in the Seraiki and the Baloch areas. Organisations like the JuD and al Khidmat organisations are active in Western Punjab. Many believe that the Punjab government is soft on militants, in its quest to placate these groups and ensure peace in the province, without taking into consideration how these groups with safe havens in Punjab pose a grave security threat to other parts of the country. Punjab is the main power base of the PML-N. It appears that the federal government is taking the view that if Punjab is safe; the other provinces really do not matter. Such a province-centric approach does not help the government to address scourge of violence in Pakistan.

SINDH

Sindh for example is reeling under violence and terrorism. The heady mix of ethnic violence, combined with political and sectarian violence further aggravates the matter. Various factions of the TTP have a presence in Karachi - the most prominent among these being the Hakimullah Mehsud and the Sajana groups who have made places like Ittehad town, Manghopir and Sohrab Goth the sites for an internecine, and intra-tribe bloodbath, as the Mehsud Taliban, Mohamand Taliban and Swat Taliban shifted their base to the port city following military operations in the tribal areas. Karachi has, thus, emerged as a second home for the Taliban.

The TTP factions have so far been able to marginalise the ANP and killed some of its leaders, virtually making it impossible for the party to function. There is also a turf battle between the ANP and the MQM since 2008, for control of the city. Now the PTI has emerged as an important force, adding a new dimension to the deeply

contested politics of Karachi. Some political parties, especially the MQM have their own armed groups. Other groups like the Jundullah is operating in Karachi, along with the LJ's Karachi wing, the SSP, the HuJI etc. Dr. Arshad Waheed who was a member of the Islamic Jamiat Tuleba (IJT) and was later the President of Islamic Medical Association is reportedly motivating the IJT cadres to join jihad.²⁰⁴ Militants groups have successfully penetrated educational institutions, which remain a cause for worry.²⁰⁵

KHYBER-PAKHTUNKHWA AND FATA

In KP and FATA the terrorism perpetrated by the TTP, remains a major concern. There is a steady flow of refugees from FATA to settled areas in the province due to the threat posed by the presence of militants as well as military operations putting an additional stress on the provincial exchequer. Several militant groups continue to operate in FATA. These range from the pro-government Taliban leaders; like Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group and Mullah Nazir's group; the TTP headed by Fazlullah along with the ETIM, IMU, Haqqani group etc.

The PTI government in the province has failed to address the issue of terrorism and now reluctantly supports the army operation in North Waziristan after vigorously arguing in favour of talks. The government has increased the salaries of policemen to incentivise them to fight the terrorists while continuing to term the 'war on terror' as America's war. The PTI's election promise that it would take steps to change the narrative of Islam that is at the root of militancy is yet to be implemented. Rather, the PTI government continues to adhere to its old narrative that the TTP is a by-product of US presence in Afghanistan. The massive twin bomb blasts in Parachinar, the suicide attack on a church in Peshawar, and sectarian killings indicate that the militants are hell-bent to expand their area of influence beyond the tribal areas despite Imran Khan's bid to pander to them. The PTI's approach towards these entities and their activities has been ambivalent, which is being criticised by security personnel.

²⁰⁴ Amir Mir, "Killing of IJT Activist in Drone hit Raises Alarm", *The News*, December 5, 2013. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-218222-Killing-of-IJT-activist-in-drone-hit-raises-alarm>, accessed on March 25, 2014

²⁰⁵ Zia ur Rahman, "Taliban Recruitment and Fund Raising in Karachi", *Combating Terrorism Centre*, April 24, 2012, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/taliban-recruiting-and-fundraising-in-karachi>, accessed on June 12, 2014

BALUCHISTAN

In Balochistan, the situation remains deeply disturbing with security forces being accused of extra judicial killings and disappearance. The government is yet to initiate talks with the Baloch separatists while violence and the 'kill and dump' tactics adopted by the security forces and militants continue. There was a hope soon after the elections that situation might improve with a new government coming to power in Islamabad. However, there has not been any major change in the security situation given the fact that the Baloch rebels perceive the provincial government led by Dr Abdul Mallik as pro-establishment. It has so far adopted a wait-and-watch policy and has not taken any steps against the LeJ, which is responsible for the continuing violence against the Hazaras. In October 2013 the International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons organised a long march from Quetta to Karachi and further to Islamabad, to highlight the problem of the missing persons. The situation in Balochistan had drawn the attention of US Congress, which had sent a fact-finding mission to Balochistan during the PPP regime. Similarly, the former Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court took *suo motu* notice of the missing person issue in the province, and asked the ISI to appear before it. However, the Pakistani establishment refuses to recognise that it is a home-grown problem. Instead, it keeps on peddling the old theory that the insurgency in Balochistan is externally fuelled.

Sectarian killings continue with impunity in the province and the Hazaras are being targeted regularly. Though these killings have been claimed by LeJ, the government has not been able to address this issue as it continues to patronise this group in Punjab and hopes to use it against the Baloch rebels in the province. It is generally believed that LeJ has a local ally in the Baloch Musallah Difa'a Tanzeem, which is close to the establishment. In January 2014, the Hazara Shias refused to bury their dead and staged a 40 hour sit in to press the government to bring the culprits to book. Many Hazaras are now leaving the country and some of them have sought refuge in Australia, to escape the carnage perpetrated by Sunni fundamentalist groups on them.

MEDIA

The vernacular media that is believed to be close to the military establishment and the intelligence agencies is largely conservative and continues to view the internal

security problem as being fomented by Pakistan's enemies who want to destabilise the country. It is rarely critical of the army and severely criticises anyone who questions the military or the intelligence agencies and labels them unpatriotic and *deshdgard* (terrorist). Therefore, it has given rise to a perception in Pakistan that the Urdu media is closer to the establishment than the English language press. The audio-visual media in general, but for some glaring exceptions, toes the establishment's line. This was clear in the coverage of the assassination attempt on Hamid Mir by majority of the television channels. Most of these channels isolated the Geo TV on the issue for having featured the allegation by Hamid Mir's brother of ISI's possible involvement in the act. Clearly under pressure from the military establishment, the civilian government had to use the Pakistan Electronic Media Regularity Authority (PEMRA) to suspend Geo TV's licence for 15 days and impose a fine on it for irresponsible journalism. The channel, which until the incident accounted for the largest viewership in Pakistan, is under informal ban by private cable operators and has not been able to recover its ground in Pakistan ever since.

While it is commendable that one influential section in the media has highlighted the military-militant nexus, brought the missing persons case to limelight, and exposed the links between politicians and militants and the unholy nexus between state actors and the non-state actors, the media as a whole is increasingly coming under attack both from the state and non-state actors. Many journalists are either being killed/attacked by the militants or tortured and killed by state agencies. Nevertheless, the media has kept the government on its toes as far as internal security challenges of Pakistan are concerned and openly questions the external angle propagated by the state agencies.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

The situation in all the provinces continues to be grave and there has not been much change in law and order situation after new governments assumed office in all the four provinces and the centre. Though there were many debates on terrorism, TTP kept on warning dire consequences to some political parties during their campaigns and also carried out violence during the campaign. As a response, the new government has felt compelled to pass some laws like the National Internal Security policy and the Protection of Pakistan Bill (PPB)

to empower security agencies and the state to deal with the issue of extremism and terrorism. In the face of widespread criticism over the ordinance, the government demonstrated due sensitivity and engaged other political parties – the PPP, MQM, PTI, ANP, JUI-F and the BNP-A with regard to some of the provisions of the PPO which was opposed by many labelling it as draconian. The Parliament has now passed a much watered down version of the PPB keeping in mind concerns expressed by various political parties.

According to some analysts, one reason for the policy paralysis (as regards taking decisive action against terrorist incidents) is that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif remains indecisive and is not very clear about the future course of action. Most of the decisions are taken by the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) and these are rarely discussed in the Parliament. Moreover, all the provinces of Pakistan have their own narratives of violence and terrorism and their prognosis of the problem and its solution.²⁰⁶ Although the government, had called for an all party meeting to discuss plan of action vis-à-vis the TTP; it was only in January 2014 that it could propose dialogue with the militant outfit. All the stakeholders in the system are not on the same page as far as terrorism is concerned, although there is an agreement that the issue needs to be addressed urgently.

The PTI and PML-N want to take the path of dialogue, whereas the army awaited instructions to undertake an operation. Even after the Karachi airport attack, the government remained ambivalent about ordering a full scale operation immediately. It is true that the government fears retaliatory attacks by the TTP but at the same time it has not gone after the local collaborators and the sleeper cells of the TTP which is now present all over the country. Zarb-e-Azb that is in progress now in the North Waziristan has now displaced around 9 lakh people from their habitat. Rehabilitation remains a problem. Both Sindh and Punjab government have refused to accommodate these IDPs into their provinces. The government has taken some action against militant groups in Rawind in Punjab so as to prevent reprisal attack; such operation remains confined to Lahore. It is likely that Pakistan will continue to struggle to address its internal security challenge through its piece meal approach towards terrorism, sectarianism, insurgency and political violence. Thus its

overall response to the issue is likely to remain inadequate and half hearted. It is also likely that the political parties would not be able to arrive at a consensus to frame a comprehensive policy to address the internal security challenges being faced by the country effectively.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Instability in Pakistan would have several implications for the region. First, it would impact stability in Afghanistan, which itself is fighting Taliban insurgency. The porous Durand line has been used by militants and terrorists to cross the border with impunity, and take the help of their ethnic compatriots as well as their co-fighters in their fight against the military establishment in Pakistan. Some of the TTP groups are operating from Kunar, Nuristan (LeT is also operating from here), and the Khost and Paktia provinces of Afghanistan. The TTP is supported by the Uzbek militants, who remain ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan. While groups like the Haqqani network, Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, Mullah Nazir group target the US and the Afghan troops in Afghanistan, other groups associated with the TTP target the Pakistan army. The major dilemma for Pakistan was how to conduct an operation without harming the Haqqani network and the so-called good Taliban. Pakistan initially believes that the breaking up of the TTP through dialogue and isolating the hard-core 'bad' Taliban will facilitate its military operation. But the Karachi airport attack in early June 2014 came as a rude shock; it demonstrated the intent of the TTP militants not to revoke their call for jihad against the Pakistani state. In the meanwhile, the US has resumed its drone attacks in North Waziristan and the Pakistan army has started operation. Reportedly, most of the militant groups have crossed the Durand line and have slipped into Afghanistan. Army operation for the time being would deny the militants a base. Peace and stability in tribal areas and denial of base to the terrorists, would certainly have salutary effect on internal security situation in Pakistan and contribute to Afghanistan's stability.

Second, in the past Afghanistan was the training ground for the terrorists operating in this region. Now, the tribal belt of Pakistan has emerged as the new hub of global jihad. The present operation against the terrorists hiding

²⁰⁶ Tasneem Noorani, "War of Narratives", *The Dawn*, June 27, 2014, http://epaper.dawn.com/print-imageview.php?StoryText=27_06_2014_009_001, accessed on June 28, 2014

in the North Waziristan, especially against the foreign fighters, may disrupt the plans of the al Qaeda affiliates for some time. The military operation is unlikely to dismantle terrorist network and the sleeper cells that are active in other parts of the country. It appears that the Punjabi Taliban had emerged as an ally of the al Qaeda in Pakistan and it retained its influence with foreign fighters like the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and the Chechens. For the time being, the PML-N government has been able to keep the Punjabi Taliban silent by means of political patronage. It also continues to have tactical understanding with the LeJ and ASWJ who are active in other provinces. In fact, it was the Punjabi Taliban leader Asmatullah Muavia who was supportive of the peace talks with the TTP. The major question that remains to be answered is: For how long can the government buy peace in Punjab by this kind of tactical alliance.

Third, Pakistan's ability to deal with the TTP and its affiliates would definitely help improve the overall internal security situation. Sectarian violence, which has raised its ugly head during the last few years, has grave implications not just for Pakistan's own stability; it also has regional ramifications, especially for countries like India that have a substantial Shia population. Pakistan's actions against all kinds of terrorist violence in the country would also help China, Iran, Afghanistan and India - all of whom have shared borders with Pakistan. China is facing threats in its restive Xinxiang province. The Uighur and the ETIM militants have taken refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan and have close links with the TTP and al Qaeda. China is apprehensive that instability in Pakistan will have an impact the stability of its border region, and any destabilisation of Afghanistan by the militant groups would also impact its proposed investments in Afghanistan. The IMU which has morphed into various groups, that are operating in FATA pose a potent threat to the region. Insurgency in Balochistan and violence in Balochistan will further aggravate regional stability as there are Baloch people across the region in Iran and Afghanistan. There has been tension on the border arising from militant activities by a shadowy group called Jaish al Adl which had taken the Iranian border guards as hostage. Iran also closed the border after the attack on Hazaras, who were returning from Iran after pilgrimage in Taftan, by Jaish al Islam. Iran is also not happy with Pakistan's inaction against the Sunni sectarian groups responsible for the killing of Shias. Both the countries have a joint border coordination mechanism in place. Iran also has a conventional agreement to fight terrorism and organized crime with Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Many in India believe that instability in Pakistan would have an impact on India given the connections between the groups in Pakistan and fundamentalist radical groups across the region. If Pakistan fails to take action against the jihadi militant groups, some of the groups that have been targeting India, or are providing funds and training militant groups to attack India, could create security problems for India. However, it is likely that Pakistan may not take action against groups like the LeT that are at the forefront of targeting India and are responsible for past ghastly attacks on Indian Parliament and the Mumbai terror attacks. In fact, Pakistan's efforts to protect its strategic assets would not allow it to deal with the challenge of terrorism at home, in a comprehensive manner, though it may succeed in weakening them, for some time.

Various radical groups, and the jihadi networks that tend to unite terrorist formations operating in Pakistan, would definitely have the potential to destabilise the region. Pakistan's unwillingness to address the issue of terrorism comprehensively would lead to more terror strikes against India and Indian interests in Afghanistan. Already al Qaeda in a video message has given a call for jihad in Kashmir, perhaps to appeal Pakistan-based jihadists that it has not forgotten their greater cause. Increased infiltration and ceasefire violations at the LoC are on the cards as far as India is concerned.

Growing radicalisation and violence has also impact on the Hindu minorities in Pakistan. There are incidents of intimidation, forced conversion and kidnapping of Hindu girls. Blasphemy laws are being misused to settle score with, and grab the property of the Hindus. Over the years many Hindus have moved to India because they have been targeted in Pakistan.

If the present Nawaz Sharif government deals with violence and terrorism effectively it will augur well for the future of democracy in Pakistan. However, its incapacity to manage the situation may lead to grave consequences for the political parties and the fledgling system of democracy. If the militants succeed, it will have a cascading effect on the economy and investment. As a next door neighbour, India would continue to be concerned about the violence and terrorism in Pakistan, and their destabilising implications for India and the region.

[AS PASSED BY THE MAJLIS-E-SHOORA (PARLIAMENT)]

A

BILL

to provide for protection against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and the prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan

WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for protection against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan, prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan and for speedy trial of offences falling in the Schedule and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014.

(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.

(3) It shall come into force at once:

Provided that this Act shall remain in force for a period of two years from the date it comes into force.

2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

(a) “armed forces” means the Military, Naval and Air Forces of Pakistan and the Reserves of such Forces;

(b) “civil armed forces” means Police, Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps, Pakistan Coast Guards, Pakistan Rangers or any other civil armed force notified by the Government as such;

(c) “Code” means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898);

(d) “enemy alien” means a militant:-

(a) whose identity is unascertainable as a Pakistani, in the locality where he has been arrested or in the locality where he claims to be residing, whether by documentary or oral evidence; or

(b) who has been deprived of his citizenship, under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (II of 1951), acquired by naturalization;

(e) “Government” means the Federal Government;

(f) “militant” means any person who:

(a) wages war or insurrection against Pakistan, or

- (b) raises arms against Pakistan, its citizens, the armed forces or civil armed forces; or
 - (c) takes up, advocates or encourages or aids or abets the raising of arms or waging of war or a violent struggle against Pakistan; or
 - (d) threatens or acts or attempts to act in a manner prejudicial to the security, integrity or defence of Pakistan; or
 - (e) commits or threatens to commit any scheduled offence;
- and includes:
- (i) a person who commits any act outside the territory of Pakistan for which he has used the soil of Pakistan for preparing to commit such act that constitutes scheduled offence under this Act and the laws of the State where such offence has been committed, including an act of aiding or abetting such offence; or
 - (ii) any person against whom there are reasonable grounds that he acts under the directions or in concert or conspiracy with or in furtherance of the designs of an enemy alien;
- (g) "Police" includes all the police forces established by the Provincial Governments or the Federal Government;
 - (h) "Preparing to commit a scheduled offence" means any act, prior to an attempt, whereby a person equips or adorns himself with the means and instruments necessary for the commission of such offence and includes the possession, storage, fabrication or transport of explosives, firearms, instruments, articles, suicide jackets or vehicles designed to be used in such commission;
 - (i) "Prosecuting agency" means a prosecuting agency established by the Government for the prosecution of offences falling under this Act;
 - (j) "Prosecutor General" means the person appointed as Prosecutor General by the Government under section 12 of this Act;
 - (k) "Schedule" means a Schedule annexed to this Act;
 - (l) "Scheduled offence" means an offence as set out in the Schedule;
 - (m) "security of Pakistan" shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it in Article 260 of the Constitution;
 - (n) "Special Court" means the Special Court established under section 8 of this Act; and
 - (o) "Special Judicial Magistrate" means the Special Judicial Magistrate appointed under section 8 of this Act.

3. Use of armed forces and civil armed forces to prevent scheduled offences.— (1) Any police officer not below BS-15 or member of the armed forces or civil armed forces who is present or deployed in any area may, on reasonable apprehension of commission of a scheduled offence after giving sufficient warning, use necessary force to prevent the commission of a scheduled offence, and in so doing shall, in the case of an officer of the armed forces or civil armed forces, exercise all the powers of a police officer under the Code.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to generality of sub-section (1), an officer of the police not below BS-15 or member of the armed forces or civil armed forces in the above situation may,—

- (a) after giving prior warning use such force as may be deemed necessary or appropriate, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the situation, against any person who is committing or in all probability is likely to commit a scheduled offence, it shall be lawful for any such officer after forming reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt may be caused by such act, to fire, or order the firing upon any person or persons against whom he is authorized to use force in terms hereof:

Provided that the decision to fire or order firing shall be taken only by way of last resort, and shall in no case extend to the inflicting of more harm than is necessary to prevent the scheduled offence which has given rise to the reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt:

Provided further that all cases of firing which have resulted in death or grievous hurt shall be reviewed in an internal inquiry conducted by a person appointed by the head of the concerned law enforcement agency:

Provided further that all cases of firing which have resulted in death may, if the facts and circumstances so warrant, be also reviewed in a judicial inquiry conducted by a person appointed by the Federal Government.

Explanation.- Reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt may be caused, may, *inter alia*, be based on the following grounds, namely:-

- (i) credible prior information about a person, who is identified on site or is suspected to be that person and such person either attempts to resist arrest by force or refuses a command to surrender and his action may lead to grievous hurt or death;
- (ii) prior information but without any clear identification of individual(s) in an area who may have been or are going to be involved in the planning, commission or financing of a scheduled offence to carry out action as mentioned in paragraph (i) above;
- (iii) appreciation of circumstances on the scene that a person can cause harm and the situation may lead to grievous hurt or, a judgment based on event/s or a sequence of event(s) on site;

- (iv) threatening movement of a person who is in possession of a fire arm or reaching for a firearm, to target law enforcing personnel or a member of the public which may lead to grievous hurt or death; or
 - (v) prior information or a judgment on site that the person may cause to signal or personally trigger an explosion which can cause harm or a person assisting in commission of such a crime that may lead to grievous hurt or death.
- (b) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a scheduled offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion or credible information exists that he has committed, or is about to commit any such act or offence; and
 - (c) enter and search, without warrant any premises to make any arrest or to take possession of any fire-arm, explosive, weapon, vehicle, instrument or article used, or likely to be used and capable of being used, in the commission of any scheduled offence:

Provided that after the search, the circumstances justifying it and the items recovered shall be reported within two days to Special Judicial Magistrate of the area by the officer conducting the search.

(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall affect the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code and the provisions of section 132 of the Code shall apply to any person acting under this section.

4. Application of Code.— The provisions of the Code, insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act, shall be applicable thereto.

5. Investigation.— (1) All the scheduled offences shall be cognizable and non-bailable.

(2) All scheduled offences, where armed forces / civil armed forces are acting in aid of civil authority, shall be inquired into and investigated by a Joint Investigation Team comprising of one gazetted police officer and two officers from the armed forces / civil armed forces. The Joint Investigation Team shall be headed by the Police Officer as aforesaid.

(3) Whenever a person is arrested or detained in custody under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 3 and it appears that the inquiry or investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours, the head of Joint Investigation Team or any other officer acting under him, excluding the time necessary for journey from the place of arrest or detention to the court shall produce him before a Special Judicial Magistrate and may apply for remand of the accused to the custody of the police or custody of any other investigating agency.

(4) A Special Judicial Magistrate may remand the accused, from time to time, in such custody as such Special Judicial Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding sixty days:

Provided that the Special Judicial magistrate shall not remand an accused person to custody under this section for a period exceeding fifteen days at a time:

Provided further that all such reports requesting for further custody of the accused shall be submitted through the Public Prosecutor.

(5) A person arrested or detained under this Act who falls within the meaning of clause (d) of section 2 of this Act shall be considered an enemy alien and subject to provisions of section 15 presumed to have joined waging war or insurrection against Pakistan.

6. Preventive detention.— (1) The Government may, by an order in writing, authorize the detention of a person for a period specified in the order shall not exceed ninety days if the Government has reasonable grounds to believe that such person is acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security, defense of Pakistan or any part thereof or external affairs of Pakistan or public order or maintenance of supplies and services:

Provided that detention of such person shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution:

Provided further that without prejudice to the above, an enemy alien may be detained by the Government to prevent him from acting as aforesaid for such period as may be determined by it from time to time in accordance with Article 10 of the Constitution.

Explanation.— A person connected or reasonably believed to be connected with the preparation, attempt or commission of a scheduled offence or a person acting in concert or under directions of an enemy alien, or a person falling under sub-section (5) of section 5 shall be deemed to be a person acting in the manner stated above.

(2) In areas where the Federal Government or the Provincial Government has called Armed Forces in aid of civil power under Article 245 of the Constitution or where any civil armed force has been called by the Federal Government or Provincial Government in aid of civil power under the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997), the said requisitioned force may detain any enemy alien or militant, in designated internment camps after a notification to that effect:

Provided that detention of such person shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution.

(3) At any time during the said notification or upon its withdrawal, such internee may be handed over to Police or any other investigating agency for formal investigation and prosecution.

(4) The Federal Government shall make Regulations to regulate the internment orders, internment camps, mechanisms for representation against the internment orders and judicial oversight of such camps, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 9.

(5) Any person, arrested or detained by the armed forces or civil armed forces and kept under arrest or detention before the coming into force of the Protection of Pakistan (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (Ordinance No. I of 2014) shall be deemed to have been arrested or detained pursuant to the provisions of this Act if the offence in respect of which such arrest or detention was made also constitutes an offence under this Act.

7. Report.— Upon completion of investigation, the Joint Investigation Team shall, through the Public Prosecutor, submit a report before the Special Court:

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (P.O.10 of 1984), such report shall be admissible in evidence within the meaning of section 173 of the Code.

8. Establishment of Special Courts etc.—(1) The Government may establish as many Special Courts under this Act as determined by it.

(2) The Government, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, may appoint any person as judge of the Special Court constituted under this Act who is or has been a Sessions Judge in any province of Pakistan, or has been an advocate of the High Court for a period of not less than ten years, and is not more than seventy years of age.

(3) A judge of the Special Court shall have all the powers of a Sessions Court as provided under the Code.

(4) The Government may provide security of tenure to a judge of the Special Court appointed under this Act as may be prescribed by the rules.

(5) The Government may, after consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, appoint any Magistrate of the First Class serving as a member of the subordinate judiciary under any High Court or any other officer of not less than BS-18 of the Pakistan Administrative Service or Provincial Management Service of any Province or any person who is or has been an advocate of the High Court for a period not less than five years, as Special Judicial Magistrate.

(6) The Special Judicial Magistrate shall have all the powers of Magistrate of the First Class provided under the Code, unless they are inconsistent with this Act.

(7) No Special Court shall take cognizance of a scheduled offence except on a report submitted under section 7.

9. Place of inquiries, investigations and trials etc.—(1) The Government, on the report of a prosecuting agency, may determine the place of custody, inquiry, investigation and trial of a scheduled offence anywhere in Pakistan.

(2) Subject to the Constitution,—

- (a) the Government, Joint Investigation Team, armed forces or civil armed forces may, in the interest of the security of its personnel or for the safety of the detainee or accused or internee, as the case may be, or for any other reasonable cause withhold the information except from a High Court or the Supreme Court regarding the location of the detainee or accused or internee or internment centre established or information with respect to any detainee or accused or internee or his whereabouts:

Provided that the judge or judges to whom the disclosure is made may decide to treat it as privileged information in the public interest; and

- (b) the Government may not in the interest of the security of Pakistan disclose the grounds for detention or divulge any information relating to a detainee, accused or internee who is an enemy alien or a militant.

(3) A person convicted of a scheduled offence subject to direction of the Government may be confined at any place in Pakistan including the prisons established by the Provincial and Federal Governments.

10. Exclusion of public from proceedings of Special Court.— In addition, and without prejudice, to any powers which a Special Court may have by virtue of any law for the time being in force to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings, if at any stage in the course of the trial of any person before a Special Court, an application is made by the prosecution on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the trial would be prejudicial to the public safety, and that, for that reason, all or any segment of the public should be excluded during any part of the hearing, the Special Court may make an order to that effect, but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place in open court.

11. Establishment of Prosecuting Agency.— The Government shall establish an independent Prosecuting Agency headed by a Prosecutor General in order to provide consultation and legal guidance to the investigating agency and to conduct the prosecution of scheduled offences.

12. Prosecutor General.—(1) The Government may appoint any person as Prosecutor General who is not less than forty-five years of age and has been an advocate of the High Court for a period of not less than ten years.

(2) The Prosecutor General may issue instructions and guidelines for the competent investigation and effective prosecution of the cases of scheduled offences.

(3) The Prosecutor General may, with prior approval of the Government, withdraw from the prosecution of any accused in a case pending before any Special Court and on submission of such request the Court may discharge or acquit the accused from the case as it may deem fit.

13. Protection of judges, prosecutors and witnesses etc.—The Government shall take appropriate measures to provide adequate security to the prosecution witnesses, investigating officers, prosecutors, Special Judicial Magistrates and Judges of the Special Courts and for this purpose may establish, anywhere in Pakistan, high security prisons with court rooms.

14. Joint trial.—(1) While trying any offence under this Act, a Special Court may also try any other offence, which an accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged, at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence.

(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any scheduled offence it is found that the accused person has committed, in addition any other offence connected with scheduled offence, the Special Court may convict an accused for such other offence also and pass any sentence authorized by this Act or, as the case may be, such other law.

15. Burden of proof.— (1) An enemy alien or a militant facing the charge of a scheduled offence on existence of reasonable evidence against him, or a person arrested in preparation to commit or while attempting to commit such an offence shall be presumed to be engaged in waging war or insurrection against Pakistan unless he establishes his non-involvement in the offence.

(2) Any person apprehended in the course of preparation, attempt or commission of a scheduled offence and from whom any weapon, material, vehicle, article or instrument designed for or capable of being used to commit or to facilitate the commission of the offence of bombing, suicide

bombing or target killing or grievous hurt shall be presumed to be guilty of preparation, attempt or commission, as the case may be, of a scheduled offence.

Explanation: A cell phone or other instrument that contains logs or evidence of calls or messages made or received that facilitate the preparation, attempt or commission of such an offence, shall be deemed to be such an instrument and any record thereon or therein shall be admissible in evidence.

16. Punishment.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Pakistan Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force, a scheduled offence shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to twenty years, with fine and confiscation of property unless the scheduled offence already provides a higher punishment and the Special Court convicting the accused may also deprive him of the citizenship acquired by him by naturalization.

17. Transfer of cases.—(1) Where, after taking cognizance of an offence, a Special Court is of opinion that the offence is not a scheduled offence, it shall, notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, return the case to the prosecuting agency for its submission before a court of competent ordinary jurisdiction.

(2) The Persecutor General may, with the approval of Government and for reasons to be recorded, withdraw a case at any stage of the proceedings from one Special Court with its permission and submit the same in other Special Court constituted under this Act.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may apply to any court of law or tribunal that any case involving any scheduled offence punishable under this Act, pending before such court or tribunal be transferred to a Special Court, then such other court or tribunal shall transfer the said case to Special Court and it shall not be necessary for the Special Court to recall any witness or again record any evidence that may have been recorded.

18. Certain provisions of the Code not applicable.—The provisions of sections 374, 426, 435, 439, 439A, 491, 496, 497, 498 and 561A of the Code shall not be applicable to the scheduled offences.

19. Appeal.—(1) An appeal against the final judgment of a Special Court shall lie to the High Court.

(2) Copy of the judgment of a Special Court shall be supplied to the accused and public prosecutor on the day the judgment is pronounced

(3) Any aggrieved person or the Government may file an appeal against the final judgment of a Special Court within a period of thirty days from the pronouncement of judgment.

20. Savings.—No member of the police, armed forces or civil armed forces acting in aid of civil authority, Prosecutor General, a prosecutor, Special Judicial Magistrates or the Judge of a Special Court shall be liable to any action for the acts done in good faith during the performance of their duties.

21. Power to make rules.— (1) The Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of foregoing power such rules may include guidelines for police and members of armed forces / civil armed forces acting in aid of civil authority while using force to prevent scheduled offences.

(3) On the notification, the rules shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.

22. Amendment of Schedule.- The Government may, by notification in the official gazette, amend the Schedule by adding or modifying any entry therein or omitting any entry therefrom.

23. Authorization.— The Federal Government may, by notification in the official gazette, authorize a Provincial Government to perform such functions and exercise such powers under this Act or the rules made thereunder as the Federal Government may deem fit.

24. Overriding effect.— (1) Subject to such conditions as the Government may specify by notification in the Official Gazette, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.

(2) In case there is any conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall prevail to the extent of inconsistency.

25. Removal of difficulties.— (1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to any provision of this Act, the President may make such order, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as may appear to him to be necessary for the purpose of removing such difficulty.

(2) An order under sub-section (1) shall be laid before each House of the Parliament in its first sitting after the order is made.

26. Validation.— All inquiries, investigations and proceedings initiated and conducted, anything done, actions taken, sentences or orders passed, rules or regulations made, notifications issued, powers conferred, assumed or exercised by any person or authority or forum between the 6th day of June, 2014 and the date this Act comes into force (both days inclusive) shall be deemed to have been validly initiated, conducted, done, taken, passed, made, issued, conferred, assumed or exercised under this Act and shall have effect accordingly.

SCHEDULE [See section 2(l)]

Scheduled Offences (1) The following acts, if committed with the purpose of waging war or insurrection against Pakistan or threatening the security of Pakistan shall be the scheduled offences and includes other offences relating to:

- (i) crimes against ethnic, religious and political groups or minorities including offences based on discrimination, hatred, creed and race;
- (ii) use of arson, fire-bombs, suicide bombs, biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear arms, plastic explosives and other materials capable of exploding or creating bombs employed to kill or cause hurt to persons or destroy property;

- (iii) use of arson and bombs on public places, government premises, sites of worship, historical places, business concerns, or other places, and risking or causing death or hurt to any person therein;
 - (iv) killing, kidnapping, extortion, assault or attack of members of the Parliament, Judiciary, Executive, Media, and other important personalities or any other person;
 - (v) killing, kidnapping, extortion, assault or attack on officers and employees of Pakistan including armed forces and law enforcement agencies;
 - (vi) killing, kidnapping, extortion, assault or attack on foreign officials, official guests, tourists, foreign visitors, or internationally protected persons etc;
 - (vii) killing, kidnapping, extortion, assault or attack on social or welfare workers, including health personnel, aid workers, and volunteers;
 - (viii) destruction of or attack on communication and interaction lines, devices, grids of stations, or systems etc;
 - (ix) destruction of or attack on energy facilities including dams, power generating and distributing systems including stations, lines and poles;
 - (x) destruction of or attack on aircrafts and airports, attack on flight crew with any weapon or endangering human life by means of weapons on aircrafts;
 - (xi) destruction of or attack on gas or oil pipelines and liquid or natural gas facilities and other means of their transport including tankers;
 - (xii) destruction of or attack on of national defense materials, premises, utilities, and installations including check posts, prisons and other fixtures;
 - (xiii) destruction of or attack on educational institutions, police stations and security organizations etc.
 - (xiv) cyber crimes, internet offences and other offences related to information technology which facilitate any offence under this Act;
 - (xv) wrecking, disrupting or attacking mass transport systems including trains, buses, cars and their stations and ports;
 - (xvi) violence or attack against maritime navigation, maritime fixed platforms, shipping and port installations and other maritime fixtures;
 - (xvii) violence against nuclear arms, sites or any other related installations;
 - (xviii) hostage taking, or attempting to take hostage any person;
 - (xix) violence against nationals occurring outside Pakistan;
 - (xx) illegally crossing national boundaries in connection with Scheduled offence;
- (2) Offences punishable under sections 121, 121A, 122, 123, 123A, 123B, 124, 124A, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139 and 140 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

(3) Preparation, abetment, attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offences specified in this Schedule.

MAJLIS-E-SHOORA (PARLIAMENT) OF PAKISTAN

A

BILL

to provide for protection against waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and the prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan

[As Passed by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)]

[AS PASSED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY]

A

Bill

Further to amend the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997

WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997), for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

WHEREAS it is expedient to address short-comings relating to the terrorism financing provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997), covering all aspects of the offence in the light of international standards and to provide for more effective measures for law enforcement agencies to investigate the offences;

WHEREAS the provisions of freezing, seizing and forfeiture of property involved in the terrorism financing offence have been strengthened to ensure that the funding of the terrorism financing offence is detected and seized after due process of law;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. Short title and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the Anti-terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2014.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of section 2, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997), hereinafter referred to as the said Act, in section 2,-

(a) After clause (h), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:-

“(ha) “freeze” means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of any money or other property;”;

(b) for clause (q), the following new clause shall be substituted, namely:-

“(q) “proscribed organization” means any organization which is listed in the First Schedule under section 11B;” and

(c) after clause (q), the following new clause (qa) shall be inserted, namely:-

“(qa) “proscribed person” means any individual who is listed in the Fourth Schedule under section 11EE;”

(d) after clause (v), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:-

“(va) “seize” means to take custody or control of money or other property in order to prohibit its transfer, conversion, disposition or movement;”;

3. Substitution of section 11B, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, for section 11B, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"11B. Proscription of organizations.- (1) The Federal Government may, by order published in the official Gazette, list an organization as a proscribed organization in the First Schedule on an *ex parte* basis, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is-

- (a) concerned in terrorism; or
- (b) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any individual or organization proscribed under this Act; or
- (c) acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any individual or organization proscribed under this Act.

Explanation.- The opinion concerning reasonable grounds to believe may be formed on the basis of information received from any credible source, whether domestic or foreign including governmental and regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, financial intelligence units, banks and non-banking companies, and international institutions.

(2) The grounds shall be communicated to the proscribed organization within three days of the passing of the order of proscription."

4. Amendment of section 11C, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 11C,-

(i) for sub-section (1), the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"(1) Where any proscribed organization is aggrieved by the order of the Federal Government, made under section 11B, it may, within thirty days of such order, file a review application, in writing, before the Federal Government, stating the grounds on which it is made and the Federal Government shall, after hearing the applicant, decide the matter on reasonable grounds within ninety days."

(ii) sub-section (3), shall be omitted.

5. Insertion of section 11CC, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, after section 11C, the following new section 11CC, shall be inserted, namely,-

"11CC. Proscription Review Committee.- The Federal Government shall constitute a Proscription Review Committee, comprising three Government officers, including a representative of the Ministry of Law and Justice, with the Chairman of the Committee being a person not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Federal Government, to decide, within thirty days, review applications filed under sections 11C and 11EE."

6. Amendment of section 11D, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 11D, in sub-section (1), for the word "reason" the words "reasonable grounds" shall be substituted.

7. Amendment of section 11E, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 11E, in sub-section (1), clause (b) shall be omitted.

8. Amendment of section 11EE, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 11EE,-

(i) for sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"(1) The Federal Government may, by order published in the official Gazette, list a person as a proscribed person in the fourth Schedule on an ex-parte basis, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such person is-

(a) concerned in terrorism;

(b) an activist, office bearer or an associate of an organization kept under observation under section 11D or proscribed under section 11B; and

(c) in any way concerned or suspected to be concerned with such organization or affiliated with any group or organization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism or acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any person or organization proscribed under this Act:

Explanation.- The opinion concerning reasonable grounds to believe may be formed on the basis of information received from any credible source, whether domestic or foreign including governmental and regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, financial intelligence units, banks and non-banking companies, and international institutions.”;

(ii) after sub-section (1), the following new sub-section (1A), shall be inserted, namely:-

“(1A) The grounds shall be communicated to the proscribed person within three days of the passing of the order of proscription.”.

(iii) in sub-section (2), the words “or Provincial Government” shall be omitted.

(iv) for sub-section (3), the following shall be substituted, namely:-

“(3) Where any person is aggrieved by the order of the Federal Government made under sub-section (1), he may, within thirty days of such order, file a review application, in writing, before the Federal Government stating the grounds on which it is made and the Government shall, after hearing the applicant, decide the matter on reasonable grounds within ninety days.”; and

(v) after sub-section (3), substituted as aforesaid, the following new sub-section shall be inserted, namely:-

“(3A) A person whose review application has been refused under sub-section (3) may file an appeal to the High Court within thirty days of the refusal of the review application.

(vi) in sub-section (4), the words “or Provincial Government” shall be omitted.

(vii) for the title “Security for good behavior”, the title “Proscription of person” shall be substituted.

9. **Amendment of section 11J, Act XXVII of 1997.-** In the said Act, section 11J shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) of that and after sub-section (1), re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new sub-section shall be added, namely:-

“(2) Any person in Pakistan or a Pakistani national outside Pakistan shall commit an offence under this Act, if he knowingly or willfully makes money or other property or services available, directly or indirectly, wholly or jointly, for the benefit of a proscribed organization or proscribed person.”.

10. Substitution of section 110, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act for section 110, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

“110. Seizure, freeze and detention.- (1) On proscription made under section 11B or, as the case may be, section 11EE,-

- (a) the money or other property owned or controlled, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by a proscribed organization or proscribed person shall be frozen or seized, as the case may be;
- (b) the money or other property derived or generated from any property referred in clause (a) shall be frozen or seized, as the case may be;
- (c) no person shall use, transfer, convert, dispose of or remove such money or other property with effect from proscription; and
- (d) within forty-eight hours of any freeze or seizure, the person carrying out the freeze or seizure shall submit a report containing details of the property and the persons affected by the freeze or seizure to such office of the Federal Government as may be notified in the official Gazette.

(2) Any person who violates any provision of sub-section (1) shall be liable to penalty of fine not exceeding ten million rupees.

(3) If a legal person violates any provision of sub-section (1), such person shall be liable to penalty of fine not exceeding ten million rupees and every director, officer or employee of such person found guilty of the violation shall be punished in terms thereof.

(4) On an application made by any affected person, the Federal Government shall inquire into the ownership and control of any money or other property that has been frozen or seized and, if it is satisfied that the money or other property has inadvertently been frozen or seized, the same shall be ordered to be released immediately.

(5) No prosecution, suit or other proceedings shall lie against the government or any other person complying or purporting to comply with subsection (1) for anything done in good faith to effect freeze or seizure.”.

11. Insertion of section 110O, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, after section 11O, the following new section shall be inserted, namely:-

“110O. Access to services, money or other property.- (1) The Federal Government may permit a person to make available to proscribed organization or proscribed person such services, money or other property as may be prescribed, including such money as may be required for meeting necessary medical and educational expenses and for subsistence allowance, and such person shall not be liable for any offence under this Act on account of provision of the prescribed services, money or other property.

(2) On an application made by a proscribed organization or proscribed person, the Federal Government may authorize such organization or person to access such money or other property or avail such services as may be prescribed.”.

12. Substitution of section 11P, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, for section 11P, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

“11P. Application by investigating officer to Court.- (1) An investigating officer may apply to a court for an order under this section for attachment of a terrorist property.

(2) An order under this section, shall-

(a) provide for attachment of the terrorist property for a period specified in the order or pending completion of the investigation; and

(b) require notice to be given to the person from whom such property was attached and to any other person who is affected by and specified in the order.

(3) Any cash attached under this section shall be held in a profit and loss account and the profit and loss so earned shall be added to it on its release or forfeiture.”.

13. Substitution of section 11R, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, for section 11R, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"11R. Evidentiary standard for forfeiture.- (1) The court may pass an order for forfeiture under section 11Q upon conviction and only if satisfied on reasonable grounds that the money or other property is a terrorist property and before so doing must give an opportunity to be heard to any person,-

- (a) who is not a party to the proceedings; and
- (b) who claims to be the owner of or otherwise interested in any of the money or other property which can be forfeited under this section.

(2) An order may be made under section 11Q, whether or not proceedings are brought against all the persons for an offence with which the money or other property is connected."

14. Amendment of section 11S, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 11S, the words and figure "or section 11R" shall be omitted.

15. Substitution of section 11U, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, for section 11U, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

"11U. De-proscription.- (1) The Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, at any time remove any organization or person from the First Schedule or Fourth Schedule, as the case may be, on the basis that no reasonable ground for proscription exists.

(2) After three years of the disposal of appeal, if any, or where no appeal was filed, from the date of the order of proscription, or from the date of any refusal of an application of de-proscription,-

- (a) the Federal Government shall conduct review of the proscriptions to determine whether any proscription may be cancelled on the basis provided for under sub-section (1); and
- (b) until a proscription is cancelled, any money or other property frozen or seized on account of the proscription shall remain frozen or seized, as the case may be.

(3) On cancellation of the proscription under this Act, any money or other property that has been frozen or seized shall be released in a timely manner."

16. Amendment of section 34, Act XXVII of 1997.- In the said Act, in section 34, for the words and commas "First, Second, Third and fifth Schedules" the word "Schedules" shall be substituted.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The Bill reflects the Government's resolve to constantly review and strengthen counter terrorism financing regime and to bring it at par with International standards.

The Bill addresses shortcomings that relate to provision on terrorist financing in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were highlighted by the Financial Action Task Force. FATF is an international body comprising many countries and international organizations that set and monitor international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-financing of terrorism (CFT). FATF publicly identifies countries with non-compliant AML/CFT standards.

The Bill aims at addressing shortcomings on terrorism financing in the Anti-terrorism Act, 1997. In particular, the Bill strengthens provisions relating to the offence of terrorism financing that cover all aspects of the offence at par with international standards. It provides for effective measure for law enforcement agencies to investigate such offences.

CH. NISAR ALI KHAN

Minister for Interior and Narcotics Control

Member-in-Charge

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**EXTRAORDINARY
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ISLAMABAD, TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2013

PART I

Acts, Ordinances, President's Orders and Regulations

SENATE SECRETARIAT

Islamabad, the 26th March, 2013

No. F. 9 (12)/2013-Legis.—The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) received the assent of the President on 22nd March, 2013, is hereby published for general information:—

ACT No. XIX OF 2013

An Act to establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan

WHEREAS, the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to the state and needs to be responded to and addressed comprehensively;

AND WHEREAS, in order to eliminate this menace, a focal institution to unify state response by planning, combining, coordinating and implementing Government's policy through an exhaustive strategic planning and necessary ancillary mechanism is needed;

It is hereby enacted as follows:

(273)

PRELIMINARY

1. **Short title, extent and commencement.**—(1) This Act may be called the National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013.

(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. **Definitions.**—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

(a) “Authority” means the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan established under section 3;

(b) “Board” means the Board of Governors constituted under section 5;

(c) “Chairman” means the Chairman of the Board of Governors;

(d) “Executive Committee” means a Committee constituted under section 8;

(e) “National Coordinator” means the National Coordinator of the Authority;

(f) “Deputy National Coordinator” means the Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority;

(g) “rules” means rules made under the Act;

(h) “regulations” means regulations made under this Act, and

(i) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules or, as the case may be, regulations.

3. **Establishment of the Authority.**—(1) As soon as may be, but not later than ninety days after the promulgation of this Act, the Federal Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, establish an Authority to be known as the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The Authority shall be an independent body answerable directly to the Prime Minister.

(3) The Authority shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers, subject to the provision of this Act, to acquire and hold property, movable and immovable, and to sue and be sued by its name. The Authority shall have administrative and financial powers to carry out the functions of the Authority.

(4) The headquarters of the Authority shall be at Islamabad and it may set up offices at such other places in Pakistan.

4. **Functions of the Authority.**—The Authority shall have the following functions, namely:—

- (a) to receive and collate data or information or intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism;
- (b) to coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies, and review them on periodical basis;
- (c) to develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans, on periodical basis;
- (d) to carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents;
- (e) to carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism;
- (f) to review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government; and
- (g) to appoint committees of experts from Government and non-Government organizations for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and functions of the Authority.

5. **Board of Governors.**—(1) The Authority shall have a Board of Governors comprising:—

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------|
| (a) Prime Minister | — | <i>Chairman</i> |
| (b) Minister for Interior | — | <i>Member</i> |

- | | | |
|---|---|--------------------|
| (c) Chief Ministers of Provinces | – | <i>Members</i> |
| (d) Chief Minister of Gilgit Baltistan | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (e) Minister for Law and Justice | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (f) Minister for Finance | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (g) Minister for Defence | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (h) Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (i) One Senator (to be recommended by Chairman Senate) | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (j) One MNA (to be recommended by Speaker National Assembly) | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (k) Secretary, Ministry of Interior | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (l) DG Inter Services Intelligence | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (m) DG Intelligence Bureau | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (n) DG Military Intelligence | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (o) National Coordinator | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (p) Chief Secretaries of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir | – | <i>Member</i> |
| (q) DG Federal Investigation Agency | – | <i>Member, and</i> |
| (r) Inspector General of Police of Provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan | – | <i>Members</i> |
- (2) The National Coordinator shall act as the Secretary to the Board.
- (3) The Board may invite any person to the meeting on special invitation.

6. **Procedure of the meeting of the Board.**—(1) The Prime Minister Azad Jammu and Kashmir or the Chief Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of un-avoidable circumstances, may nominate a member of their cabinet to attend the meeting of the Board to represent them.

(2) The Federal Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of un-avoidable circumstances, the Secretary of their Ministry shall attend the meeting.

(3) The quorum to hold a meeting shall be fifty per cent of the total membership:

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (6), the presence of heads of various intelligence agencies who are members of the Board shall be mandatory in every meeting of the Board while taking decision on any policy matter.

(4) The Board may meet as and when required but it shall meet at least once in each quarter of a year.

(5) No act or proceedings of the Board shall be invalid by reasons only of the existence of a vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of the Board.

7. **Powers and functions of the Board.**—(1) The powers and functions of the Board shall include, but would not be limited to, the following, namely:—

- (a) the Board shall exercise all the powers and functions of the Authority;
- (b) to provide strategic vision and oversee activities of the Authority;
- (c) to recommend rules and approve policies and manuals in order to carry out the purposes of this Act; and
- (d) to approve the annual budget prepared by the Authority.

8. **Executive Committee.**—(1) The Board shall be assisted by an Executive Committee comprising of the following, namely:—

- (a) Minister for Interior — *Chairman*
- (b) Secretary, Ministry of Interior — *Member*
- (c) Secretary, Ministry of Finance — *Member*

- | | | | |
|-----|---|---|-----------------|
| (d) | Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice; | - | <i>Member</i> |
| (e) | Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs | - | <i>Member</i> |
| (f) | Secretary, Ministry of Defence | - | <i>Member</i> |
| (g) | National Coordinator | - | <i>Member</i> |
| (h) | Additional Chief
Secretary (FATA) | - | <i>Member</i> |
| (i) | Chief Secretaries of Provinces,
Gilgit Baltitstan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir | - | <i>Members</i> |
| (j) | Secretaries Home Department of
the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and
Azad Jammu and Kashmir | - | <i>Members</i> |
| (k) | Additional Inspector General
incharge of Counter-Terrorism Departments
of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and
Azad Jammu and Kashmir | - | <i>Members.</i> |

(2) The National Coordinator shall also act as Secretary of the Executive Committee.

(3) The quorum to hold meeting of the Executive Committee shall be fifty per cent of the total membership.

(4) The Executive Committee may co-opt any other relevant person to the Executive Committee.

(5) The Executive Committee shall ensure effective implementation of the decisions of the Board.

(6) The Executive Committee shall perform such other functions as are assigned to it by the Board.

9. **National Coordinator.**—(1) There shall be a National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for tenure of three years.

(2) The National Coordinator shall be a professional of known integrity and competence in BPS-22 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation form bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

(3) The National Coordinator shall have the following powers, namely:—

- (a) to execute the policies and plans approved by the Board and Instructions issued by the Federal Government;
- (b) to prescribe terms and conditions of the employees and grant additional allowances or any other incentives;
- (c) to have full financial and administrative powers for effective administration of the Authority, as approved by the Board;
- (d) to engage any person or entity on contract basis to carry out assignments for the consultancy in accordance with acclaimed best practices;
- (e) to establish administrative structures at the field level for efficient implementation and accessibility of the Authority;
- (f) to submit quarterly progress reports to the Board on the financial and functional aspects of the Authority;
- (g) to perform such other functions as may be delegated by the Board;
- (h) to undertake any other assignments given by the Board in the respective fields; and
- (i) produce periodical journals relating to counter terrorism and counter extremism issues.

10. **Deputy National Coordinator.**—(1) There shall be a Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for a tenure of three years.

(2) The Deputy National Coordinator shall be an eminent professional of known integrity and competence in BPS-21 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation from bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

(3) The National Coordinator may delegate any of his powers under subsection (1) of section 9 to the Deputy National Coordinator with the approval of the Board subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in this behalf by the board.

11. **Appointment of officers, staff etc., by the Authority.**—(1) The Authority may, from time to time appoint, either through direct recruitment or through deputation, such officials, experts or consultants as it may consider necessary for the performance of functions in the prescribed manner.

(2) The Authority shall prescribe service regulations, with the approval of the Board for the appointment, promotion and transfer of officers, staff, experts and consultants, their terms and conditions of service including additional financial incentives such as special salaries, allowances, pension or gratuity etc., constitution and management of pension and gratuity and shall be competent to take disciplinary action against them.

(3) All appointments of officers and staff etc. shall be made with the approval of the Board and their security clearance shall be carried out by Directorate General ISI.

12. **Appointment of officers, staff etc., in cases of special requirement.**—Subject to the provisions of this Act, the National Coordinator may, in case of urgency, appoint officers, staff, experts and consultants on prescribed terms and conditions, provided that every such appointment shall be laid before the Board in the next meeting.

13. **Delegation of powers.**—The National Coordinator may by special order delegate his powers and functions to the Deputy National Coordinator or any other senior officer of the Authority:

Provided that the National Coordinator may delegate his powers and functions under this provision sparingly and not as a rule.

14. **Fund.**—(1) There shall be established a fund to be known as NACTA Research and Development Fund.

(2) The Fund shall consist of,—

- (a) funds or budget amount received from the Federal Government;
- (b) grants made by the international bodies, organizations and entities, in accordance with procedures laid down by the Federal Government;
- (c) such other sums as may be received by the Authority.

(3) The Fund shall be administered by the National Coordinator in such manner as prescribed.

(4) The Authority may receive international assistance in the field of counter terrorism and counter extremism under the prescribed manner.

15. Budget for the Authority.—(1) The National Coordinator shall, in respect of each financial year in accordance with the financial procedures approved by the Board, prepare the annual budget estimates of the Authority and submit the same to the Federal Government after the approval of the Board.

(2) The National Coordinator shall have full powers to incur expenditures and re-appropriate funds as per system of financial control and budgeting of the Federal Government with the approval of the Board.

16. Maintenance of accounts and internal control.—The Authority shall maintain complete and accurate books of accounts in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities as may be prescribed by the Auditor-General of Pakistan.

17. Audit.—(1) The accounts of the Authority shall be audited every year by the Auditor-General of Pakistan in such manners as may be prescribed.

(2) The Authority shall appoint its own financial advisor to regulate the financial matters and for internal audit.

18. Annual Report.—The Authority shall compile and submit an annual report on its activities and accounts to the Board.

19. Assistance and provision of information.—(1) The Federal Government and Provincial Governments and their Departments shall assist the Authority in carrying out its functions, subject to applicable laws.

(2) All Federal Ministries and Provincial Departments including Corporations, bodies, set ups, controlled or administered by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Governments shall provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of this Act, subject to applicable laws.

20. Indemnity.—No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Authority or its officers and consultants for anything done in good faith for carrying out the purposes of this Act or rules and regulations made thereunder.

21. Power of the Federal Government to issue directives.—The Federal Government may, as and when it considers necessary, issue directives to the Authority on matters of policy and such directives shall be binding on the Authority, Federal, Provincial and Local Governments and if a question arises whether any

matter is a matter of policy or not, the decision of the Federal Government thereon shall be final.

22. Power to make rules and regulations.—(1) The Federal Government may, on the recommendation of the Board, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The National Coordinator may make regulations for the following purposes, namely:—

- (a) effective and smooth functioning of the Authority;
- (b) internal working of the Authority;
- (c) terms and conditions of the employees and grant of additional allowances or any other incentives.

23. Provisions of this Act.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation to any other law for the time being enforced.

24. Employees deemed to be Public Servants.—The employees of the Authority shall be deemed to be Public Servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV 1860).

IFTIKHAR ULLAH BABAR,
Secretary.

Annex K: Proscribed Organisations

S. No	Organizations	Proscription Date	Group Leader
1.	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)	14 Aug 2001	Malik Ishaq
2.	Sepha-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	14 Aug 2001	Allam Syed Muhammad Raza Naqvi
3.	Jish-e-Mohammad (JM)	14 Jan 2002	Moulana Muhammad Azhar
4.	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT)	14 Jan 2002	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Zia-Ur-RehmanLakhvi alias Chachaji
5.	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	14 Jan 2002	Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
6.	Tehreek-e-Jaafria Pakistan (JTP)	14 Jan 2002	AllamaSajidNaqvi
7.	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)	14 Jan 2002	Maulana Sufi Mohammad
8.	Tehreek-e-Islami	14 Jan 2002	Allama Hamid Ali Moosavi&AllamaArif Hussain Hussaini
9.	Al-Qaeda	17 Mar 2003	
10.	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	15 Nov 2003	Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
11.	Khuddam-ul-Islam (Ex JM)	15 Nov 2003	Maulana Masood Azhar
12.	IslamiTehreek Pakistan (Ex TIP)	15 Nov 2003	AllamaSajid Ali Naqvi
13.	Jamia-ul-Ansar	20 Nov 2003	MaulanaFazal-ur-Rehman Khalil
14.	Jamial-ul-Furqan	20 Nov 2003	Commander Jabar&Yar Muhammad
15.	Hizb-ul-Tehrir	20 Nov 2003	NaveedAzhar Hussain Butt
16.	Khair-un-Naas International Trust	27 Oct 2004	Abu Shoib
17.	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	07 Apr 2006	HabiyarMarri
18.	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan	21 Aug 2006	

19.	Lashkr-e-Islam	30 Jun 2008	ManagalBaghAfridi
20.	Ansar-u-Islam	30 Jun 2008	MaulanaQaziMahboob-ul-Haq
21.	Haji Namdar Group	30 Jun 2008	Haji Namdar (Former)
22.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	25 Aug 2008	-
23.	Balochistan Republication Army (BRA)	08 Sep 2010	BrahamdaghBugti
24.	Balochistan Liberation Fron (BLF)	08 Sep 2010	Bebrag Baloch
25.	Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB)	08 Sep 2010	
26.	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	08 Sep 2010	KhairBakhshMarri
27.	BalochstanMusallaDefahTanzeem (BDMT)	08 Sep 2010	
28.	Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia-u-Din
29.	MarkazSabeel Organization, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia-u-Din
30.	TanzeemNaujawan-e-Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	QaziNisar
31.	Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi	10 Oct 2011	
32.	Ahl-e-SunnatWalJamat (ASWJ)	15 Feb 2012	
33.	Al Harmain Foundation (AHF)	06 Mar 2012	
34.	Rabita Trust (BT)	06 Mar 2012	
35.	Anjuman-e-Imamia Gilgit Baltistan (AIGB)	24 Apr 2012	Agha Rahat Hussain
36.	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit Baltistan	24 Apr 2012	Shafaatullah Tariq
37.	TanzeemAhl-e-SunnatWalJamat, Gilgit-Baltistan	05 Jun 2012	Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi& Mustafa Raza Khan
38.	Balochistan BunyadParast Army (BBPA)	04 Aug 2012	
39.	TehreekNafaz-e-Aman (TNA)	04 Aug 2012	
40.	TahafuzHadudullah (TH)	04 Aug 2012	
41.	Balochistan Waja Liberation Army (BWLA)	04 Aug 2012	
42.	Baloch Republican Part Azad (BPRA)	04 Aug 2012	
43.	Balochistan United Army (NUA)	04 Aug 2012	
44.	Islam Mujahidin (IM)	04 Aug 2012	

45.	Jaish-e-Islam (Jel)	04 Aug 2012	
46.	Balochistan National Liberation Army (BNLA)	04 Aug 2012	
47.	Khana-e-Hikmat	13 th Mar 2013	
48.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS)	15 th Mar 2013	
49.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Mohammad (TTM)	15 th Mar 2013	
50.	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	15 th Mar 2013	Tariq Geedar
51.	Abdullah Azam Brigade	15 th Mar 2013	
52.	East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	15 th Mar 2013	
53.	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	15 th Mar 2013	
54.	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	15 th Mar 2013	
55.	313 Brigade	15 th Mar 2013	
56.	Tehrik-e-Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	15 th Mar 2013	Faqir Mohammad
57.	Amar bilMaroofWaNahi Anil Munkir (Haji Namdar GP)	15 th Mar 2013	Haji Namdar (Former)
58.	Baloch Student Organization Azad (BSO-A)	15 th Mar 2013	Bashir Zeb
59.	United Baloch Army (UNA)	15 th Mar 2013	
60.	Jeay Sindh MuttahidaMahaz (JSMM)	15 th Mar 2013	
ENLISTED UNDER UNSCR 1267			
61.	Jamaat-ul-Daawa	10 Dec 2008	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
62.	Al-Akhtar Trust	10 Dec 2008	Muhammad Mazhar
63.	Al-Rashid Trust	10 Dec 2008	Sheikh-Ul-Mashaikh Mufti Rasheed

SUMMARY

➤ Proscribed Organization	- 60
➤ Enlisted Under UNSCR 1267	- 03
Total	- 63

((Source: Ministry of Interior))

Appendix V

Mapping of Violence in Pakistan: July 2013 to May 2014

Punjab					
Place	Date	Description	Killed	Injured	Nature of Attack
Lahore ¹	7/7/2013	Bomb blasted with ball bearings in ground floor of building, in old Anarkali area	3	37	Terrorism
Rawalpindi ²	17/7/2013	Gun battle between rival groups	2	3	Criminal activity
Toba Tek Singh ³	5/08/2013	Blast in economy class of Karachi bound Shalimar Express	1	14	Terrorism
Bhakkar ⁴	24/08/2013	Members of a radical Sunni group ASWJ clashed with minority Shia's	11	1	Sectarianism
Islamabad ⁵	23/08/2013	Gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire outside a Deobandi seminary on the outskirts of the capital	3	0	Sectarianism
Lahore ⁶	10/10/2013	Explosion in Anarkali market	1	12	Terrorism
Rawalpindi ⁷	15/11/2013	Men fire at police during Ashura. Incident leads to subsequent clashes	10	80	Sectarianism
Multan ⁸	17/11/2013	Riots break out during Ashura procession	0	25	Sectarianism
Lahore ⁹	6/12/2013	ASWJ's Maulana Shamsur Rehman killed in Lahore	2	0	Sectarianism
Rawalpindi ¹⁰	18/12/2013	Three dead in suicide blast near Rawalpindi Imambargah.	3	14	Sectarianism
Islamabad ¹¹	3/1/2014	ASWJ's Islamabad general secretary shot dead in capital	2	0	Sectarianism
Rawalpindi ¹²	8/1/2014	Professor shot dead in Rawalpindi.	1	0	Sectarianism

¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/573379/seven-people-injured-in-lahore-explosion/>

²<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/editors-picks/17-Jul-2013/2-die-3-injured-over-old-enmity>

³<http://dawn.com/news/1034227/blast-inside-karachi-bound-shalimar-express-kills-toddler>

⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/573379/seven-people-injured-in-lahore-explosion/>

⁵<http://dawn.com/news/1037832/firing-at-islamabad-madrassa-kills-three>

⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1048755/explosion-in-lahore-kills-one-injures-12>

⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/632311/muharram-10-live-updates-2/>,

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1056553/rawalpindi-violence-claims-10-lives-three-hours-break-in-curfew>

⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1056720/25-injured-in-multan-riots>

⁹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/642046/aswjs-maulana-shamsur-rehman-killed-in-lahore/>

¹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1074674/three-dead-in-suicide-blast-near-rawalpindi-imambargah>

¹¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1078147/aswjs-islamabad-general-secretary-shot-dead-in-capital>

¹²<http://tribune.com.pk/story/656367/professor-shot-dead-in-rawalpindi/>

Lahore ¹³	11/1/2014	PTI leader among five gunned down near Kasur toll plaza.	5	0	Political Violence
Lahore ¹⁴	15/1/2014	Man killed, 7 injured as two armed groups clash in Lahore.	1	7	Political Violence
Rawalpindi ¹⁵	18/1/2014	Five people gunned down in Rawalpindi.	5	2	Political Violence
Rawalpindi ¹⁶	20/1/2014	Suicide blast in Rawalpindi kills 13, injures at least 15	13	15	Terrorism
Islamabad ¹⁷	3/3/2014	Judge, 10 others killed in Islamabad blasts, firing.	11	25	Terrorism
Rawalpindi ¹⁸	9/4/2014	Rawalpindi big blast kills 23, injures 42.	23	42	Terrorism
Lahore ¹⁹	11/4/2014	Blast leaves 12 injured in Lahore.	0	12	Terrorism
Rawalpindi ²⁰	15/5/2014	Bombing outside restaurant in Rawalpindi wounds fifteen.	0	14	Terrorism
Chiniot ²¹	19/5/2014	8 die in gun & grenade attack in Chiniot.	8	5	Terrorism
Islamabad ²²	24/5/2014	Two bomb explosions in Islamabad killed one security guard and wounding another	1	1	Terrorism

Sindh					
Place	Date	Description	Killed	Injured	Nature of Attack
Karachi ²³	26/6/2013	A bomb attack targeting a Sindh High Court judge killed at least 10 persons, including two Rangers personnel, six Policemen and the driver of the judge's car, and injured 15 others.	10	15	Terrorism

¹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1079832/pti-leader-among-five-gunned-down-near-kasur-toll-plaza>

¹⁴<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-134171-Man-killed,-7-injured-as-two-armed-groups-clash-in-Lahore>

¹⁵ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1080924/five-people-gunned-down-in-rawalpindi>

¹⁶ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/660956/blast-in-rawalpindi-kills-4-injures-12/>

¹⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1090737/judge-10-others-killed-in-islamabad-blasts-firing>

¹⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1098742/at-least-23-killed-dozens-injured-in-islamabad-blast>

¹⁹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-144162-Blast-leaves-12-injured-in-Lahore>

²⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1106588/bombing-outside-restaurant-in-rawalpindi-wounds-fifteen>

²¹<http://www.nation.com.pk/national/19-May-2014/8-die-in-gun-grenade-attack-in-chiniot>

²²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1108344/one-dead-in-twin-bomb-attack-on-pakistan-capital>

²³<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

Karachi ²⁴	28/6/2013	Three persons, including a woman were killed and 18 others were injured, when dozens of Lyari gangsters carried out an armed massacre in streets of Kharadar area in Karachi.	3	18	Criminal Activity
Karachi ²⁵	1/7/2013	Individuals killed in separate incidents	4	0	Ethnic
Karachi ²⁶	9/7/2013	Separate incidents of violence. Five MQM members, one Sunni Tehreek leader and a policeman among those killed.	14	4	Ethnic/ sectarianism
Karachi ²⁷	10/7/2013	Explosives planted under car of President Zardari's Chief Security Officer Bilal Sheikh. Sheikh killed along with other security officials. This was the fourth attempt on his life.	4	7	Terrorism
Karachi ²⁸	15/7/2013	Two Rangers injured in firing near a police station	0	2	Terrorism
Karachi ²⁹	18/7/2013	Unidentified gunmen kill Imam of a Jamia Masjid	1	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ³⁰	19/7/2013	Two policemen killed, three others in separate incidents of violence, body discovered	6	0	Ethnic
Karachi ³¹	21/7/2013	Alleged members of LeJ killed due to mishandling of explosives	3	0	Sectarianism
Sukkur ³²	25/07/2013	Series of explosions and shootings, one targeting ISI office	9	0	Terrorism
Karachi ³³	27/07/2013	Separate incidents of violence, one killed from MQM	8	3	Ethnic
Karachi ³⁴	29/07/2013	Separate incidents of petty violence, policemen among dead	8	0	Political violence
Karachi ³⁵	31/07/2013	Low-intensity blast leaves two Rangers personnel injured	0	2	Terrorism

²⁴<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²⁵<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-107472-Karachi:-Four-in-violent-incidents,-two-in-police-encounter-killed-today>

²⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1023703/violence-persists-in-karachi-as-14-killed>

²⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/575103/blast-in-jamshed-quarter-karachi/>

²⁸<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-109400-Karachi:-Two-rangers-personnel-hurt-in-firing-incident>

²⁹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/578622/imam-gunned-down-in-karachi/>

³⁰<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/editors-picks/19-Jul-2013/two-cops-among-6-perish-in-karachi-violence>

³¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/580042/premature-detonations-alleged-members-of-lej-killed-due-to-manhandling-of-explosives/>

³²<http://tribune.com.pk/story/581778/death-toll-rises-to-9-after-sukkur-isi-attack/>

³³http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\27\story_27-7-2013_pg7_11

³⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/583668/subversive-acts-policeman-among-eight-killed-in-the-city/>

³⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/584512/low-intensity-blast-injures-2-rangers-in-karachi/>

Chawla Market, Nazimabad ³⁶	13/08/2013	Gunmen open fire killing police official	1	0	Terrorism
Karimabad Jamaat Khana and the Metroville Jamaat Khana in SITE ³⁷	14/08/2013	Hand-grenade explosions. TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi suspected	2	40	Terrorism
Safari Park ³⁸	15/08/2013	Three police officials, including a DSP, and three attackers killed in an encounter with armed men.	6	-	Criminal Activity
Korangi Expressway ³⁹	15/08/2013	Two people shot and wounded in an armed attack on offices of the Express media group	0	2	Terrorism
Manghopir ⁴⁰	17/08/2013	Man said to be associated with the banned TTP shot dead in alleged encounter	1	0	Terrorism
Shah Latif Town ⁴¹	18/08/2013	Suspected gangster was shot dead by unidentified assailants.	1	0	Criminal Activity
Lyari ⁴²	18/08/2013	Bullet-riddled body of young man found in Lyari	1	0	Criminal Activity
Buffer Zone ⁴³	19/08/2013	A man and nephew gunned down in an attack apparently on sectarian grounds. Man reportedly belonged to the TablighiJamaat	2	0	Sectarianism
Garden Area ⁴⁴	19/08/2013	MQM worker and Sunni Tehreek activist killed	2	0	Ethnic
Surjani Town ⁴⁵	19/08/2013	Two bodies of suspected missing persons from Balochistan found. One was a journalist	2	0	Separatism
Liaquatabad ⁴⁶	21/08/2013	Doctor killed in sectarian attack	1	0	Sectarianism
Jamshed Quarters ⁴⁷	21/08/2013	MQM leader shot dead	1	0	Ethnic
Sohrab Goth ⁴⁸	22/08/2013	Homeopathic doctor killed	1	0	Sectarianism

³⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1035211/five-including-one-policeman-killed-in-karachi-violence>

³⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/590074/violence-marks-eve-of-august-14/>

³⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1036017/dsp-among-three-killed-in-karachi-encounter>

³⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1036422/two-hurt-in-attack-on-media-house>

⁴⁰<http://dawn.com/news/1036308/suspected-militant-shot-dead-in-encounter>

⁴¹<http://dawn.com/news/1036748/suspected-gangster-shot-dead>

⁴²<http://dawn.com/news/1036748/suspected-gangster-shot-dead>

⁴³<http://dawn.com/news/1036934/man-nephew-shot-dead-in-sectarian-attack>

⁴⁴<http://dawn.com/news/1036934/man-nephew-shot-dead-in-sectarian-attack>

⁴⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/593146/balochistan-missing-persons-2-bodies-found-in-karachi/>

⁴⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1037661/sectarian-attack-claims-doctors-life>

⁴⁷<http://dawn.com/news/1037661/sectarian-attack-claims-doctors-life>

⁴⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1037661/sectarian-attack-claims-doctors-life>

Korangi-549	22/08/2013	One soldier and a civilian killed in a bomb attack on an army vehicle. Nineteen people, including 10 soldiers, injured.	2	19	Terrorism
Various places50	25.08/2013	Five bodies, including two of MQM workers found in different city areas, Spokesperson for ASWJ killed in armed attack, two men shot dead in random violence	8	0	Ethnic/ Sectarianism
Various places51	30/08/2013	Two MQM activists killed, cleric shot, gangster killed, man killed and another injured by motorcycle gunmen, body of man found	7	1	Ethnic/ Criminal Activity
Landhi52	20/08/2013	Gunmen attack two clinics, clinic allegedly owned by MQM committee member	5	4	Ethnic
Orangi Town53	29/08/2013	Trustee of an Imambargah gunned down in targeted attack apparently on sectarian grounds	1	0	Sectarianism
Lyari54	7/08/2013	Bomb targeting Provincial Minister goes off at a football tournament, injuring the minister and killing and wounding others	11	26	Terrorism
Kashmore55	9/09/2013	Gunmen attack check post, three constables killed.	3	0	Terrorism
Karachi National Stadium56	4/09/2013	Senior Pakistani naval officer killed, wife wounded by motorcycle gunmen	1	1	Terrorism
Lyari57	4/09/2013	One Ranger and three suspected militants killed in gun battle	4	0	Terrorism
Various places58	4/09/2013	Six individuals killed and 12 suspects arrested in security operations	6	0	Terrorism
Mauripur59	5/09/2013	Suspected TTP militants killed in clashes with security forces	3	0	Terrorism

⁴⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1037755/election-duty-soldier-dies-in-karachi-bomb-attack>

⁵⁰http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\26\story_26-8-2013_pg1_1

⁵¹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\30\story_30-8-2013_pg1_6

⁵²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1039763/five-dead-in-attacks-on-clinics-in-karachi>

⁵³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1039658/imambargah-trustee-killed-in-sectarian-attack>

⁵⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/587634/eight-killed-in-lyari-blast-targeting-mpa-javed-nagori/>

⁵⁵<https://www.google.co.in/search?q=Kashmore&oq=Kashmore&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l3.1221j0&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

⁵⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/599628/naval-officer-shot-dead-near-karachi-national-stadium/>

⁵⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/599628/naval-officer-shot-dead-near-karachi-national-stadium/>

⁵⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1040490/karachi-violence-12-suspects-arrested-two-bodies-recovered>

⁵⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1040725/militants-police-clash-in-karachis-mauripur-three-killed>

Various places ⁶⁰	6/09/2013	Separate incidents of violence, ANP leader killed for not paying extortion money	2	0	Political Violence
Pakistan Hotel, Super Highway ⁶¹	17/09/2013	Targeted killing of Ismaili man	1	0	Sectarianism
Metroville ⁶²	19/09/2013	Ahmadi man shot dead	1	0	Sectarianism
Landhi ⁶³	20/09/2013	Hand grenade explosion near Shia imambargah	3	15	Sectarianism
Quaidabad ⁶⁴	20/09/2013	Grenade attack on imambargah	1	12	Sectarianism
Mochko, Orangi Town ⁶⁵	22/09/2013	One ASWJ and five MQM workers killed by police	5	0	Ethnic
Umerkot ⁶⁶	22/09/2013	Two killed in tribal clashes between Rajar and Marree tribes	2	5	Political Violence
Karachi ⁶⁷	12/11/2013	MQM worker and scrap dealer shot dead	2	1	Ethnic
Karachi ⁶⁸	13/11/2013	Three suspected TTP militants and a Rangers official killed during a targeted operation	4	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁶⁹	14/11/2013	Six LeJ members killed in gunfire with security forces	6	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁷⁰	14/11/2013	Three bomb and grenade explosions near Imambargahs ahead of Ashura	0	20	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁷¹	16/11/2013	Rocket fired at police car, ASI killed and three police injured	1	3	Terrorism
Karachi ⁷²	15/11/2013	Blast near Imambargah	0	1	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁷³	17/11/2013	Four gang members killed in joint police and Rangers operation, two killed in violence in Orangi town	6	0	Criminal Activity
Karachi ⁷⁴	25/11/2013	Police and Rangers carry out security operations	3	0	Criminal Activity

⁶⁰<http://dawn.com/news/1040970/local-anp-leader-among-two-killed-in-karachi-violence>

⁶¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1043146/ismaili-man-shot-dead-on-superhighway>

⁶²<http://dawn.com/news/1043843/ahmadi-man-gunned-down>

⁶³<http://dawn.com/news/1044037/blast-near-imambargah-kills-three-injures-15-in-karachi>

⁶⁴<http://dawn.com/news/1044156/man-killed-in-grenade-attack-on-karachi-imambargah>

⁶⁵<http://dawn.com/news/1043581/five-muttahida-workers-aswj-man-shot-dead>

⁶⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1043551/two-killed-in-tribal-clash>

⁶⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1055697/mqm-man-scrap-dealer-shot-dead-in-pirabad>

⁶⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1056086/three-ttp-suspects-one-rangers-man-killed-in-karachi-raid>

⁶⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1056321/lej-militants-police-clash-in-karachis-mauripur-six-killed>

⁷⁰<http://dawn.com/news/1056139/series-of-bomb-attacks-injures-20-in-karachi>

⁷¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/632425/clashes-continue-five-injured-in-lyari-gang-war/>

⁷²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1056364/blast-near-imambargah-in-karachi-injures-one>

⁷³<http://tribune.com.pk/story/632810/law-enforcers-kill-4-suspected-gang-members-in-lyari/>

⁷⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/636779/lyari-clashes-three-killed-in-encounters-with-police-rangers/>

Karachi ⁷⁵	4/12/2013	'TTP' leader among five killed in encounters	5	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁷⁶	8/12/2013	Two brothers, cousin gunned down in Karachi	3	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁷⁷	10/12/2013	Dozen more lives snuffed out in overnight Karachi violence	12	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁷⁸	12/12/13	Seven Rangers personnel injured in Karachi explosion.	0	7	Terrorism
Karachi ⁷⁹	22/12/2013	Attack on police officer kills two, injures 15 in Karachi.	2	15	Terrorism
Karachi ⁸⁰	4/1/2014	Two policemen among at least 13 killed in Karachi violence.	13	0	Criminal/ Sectarian
Karachi ⁸¹	6/1/2014	Four more Local Bodies candidates killed in Karachi.	8	0	Ethnic
Karachi ⁸²	7/1/2014	Six bodies found in Karachi; one alleged target killer arrested.	6	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁸³	9/1/2014	Taliban bombing kills senior police officer Chaudhry Aslam,	1	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁸⁴	10/1/2014	Karachi: three TTP terrorists killed in Musharraf colony.	3	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁸⁵	18/1/2014	3 staffers killed in attack on Express	3	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁸⁶	21/1/2014	Three dead in attack on polio team in Karachi's Qayyumabad.	3	1	Terrorism
Karachi ⁸⁷	22/1/2014	Prayer leader killed in Karachi.	1	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁸⁸	23/1/2014	Local PPP leader killed, two injured in Karachi violence.	1	2	Political Violence
Karachi ⁸⁹	26/1/2014	Attacks near MQM-H chief's house kill six policemen in Karachi.	6	0	Ethnic

⁷⁵http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\12\05\story_5-12-2013_pg12_3

⁷⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1061000/two-brothers-cousin-gunned-down-in-karachi>

⁷⁷<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-129679-Dozen-more-lives-snuffed-out-in-overnight-Karachi-violence>

⁷⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1062081/seven-rangers-personnel-injured-in-karachi-explosion>

⁷⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1075317/attack-on-police-officer-kills-two-injures-15-in-karachi>

⁸⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1078333/two-policemen-among-at-least-13-killed-in-karachi-violence>

⁸¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1078595/four-more-local-bodies-candidates-killed-in-karachi>

⁸²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1078958/six-bodies-found-in-karachi-one-alleged-target-killer-arrested>

⁸³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1079405/taliban-bombing-kills-senior-police-officer-chaudhry-aslam>

⁸⁴<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-133666-Karachi:-three-TTP-terrorists-killed-in-Musharraf-colony->

⁸⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/660249/3-staffers-killed-in-attack-on-express/>

⁸⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1081723/three-dead-in-attack-on-polio-team-in-karachi-qayyumabad>

⁸⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/661896/prayer-leader-killed-in-karachi/>

⁸⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1082393/local-ppp-leader-killed-two-injured-in-karachi-violence>

⁸⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1082641/attacks-near-mqm-h-chiefs-house-kill-six-policemen-in-karachi>

Karachi ⁹⁰	4/2/2014	Four policemen shot dead in Karachi	4	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁹¹	5/2/2014	Blast derails Shalimar Express outside Karachi, one killed 20 injured.	1	20	Terrorism
Kashmore ⁹²	8/2/2014	15 injured in Kashmore bus attack shootout.	0	15	Terrorism
Karachi ⁹³	9/2/2014	Firing in Karachi leaves eight people dead.	8	16	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁹⁴	13/2/2014	TTP claimed responsibility Thursday for an explosion targeting a police bus	13	36	Terrorism
Karachi ⁹⁵	14/2/2014	Blast near Rangers' vehicle in Karachi injures two.	0	2	Terrorism
Karachi ⁹⁶	18/2/2014	Karachi raid: Security forces kill 2 suspects involved in police bus attack.	2	0	Terrorism
Karachi ⁹⁷	23/2/2014	1 dead, 3 injured in mosque firing incident in Karachi.	1	3	Sectarianism
Karachi ⁹⁸	25/2/2014	At least six killed in Karachi violence.	6	0	Criminal Activity
Karachi ⁹⁹	27/2/2014	Madrassa caretaker, son killed in Karachi firing.	1	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ¹⁰⁰	3/3/2014	Five killed in Karachi violence.	5	2	Criminal Activity

⁹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1084680/four-policemen-shot-dead-in-karachi>

⁹¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/667504/blast-derails-shalimar-express-outside-karachi-30-injured/>

⁹²<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-137052-15-injured-in-Kashmore-bus-attack-shootout-->

⁹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1085923/firing-in-karachi-leaves-eight-people-dead>

⁹⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086747/explosion-in-karachi-kills-13-people-injures-36>

⁹⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086963/blast-near-rangers-vehicle-in-karachi-injures-two>

⁹⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/672763/karachi-raid-security-forces-kill-2-suspects-involved-in-police-bus-attack/>

⁹⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/675195/1-dead-3-injured-in-mosque-firing-incident-in-karachi/>

⁹⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1089376/at-least-six-killed-in-karachi-violence>

⁹⁹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/676715/clash-between-2-asis-leaves-one-injured/>

¹⁰⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1090542/five-killed-in-karachi-violence>

Lyari ¹⁰¹	6/3/2014	Two killed, three hurt in Lyari firing, grenade attacks.	2	3	Criminal Activity
Karachi ¹⁰²	10/4/2014	PML-N lawyer shot dead in Karachi.	1	0	Terrorism
Karachi ¹⁰³	10/4/2014	Shia doctor, madressa students among 12 killed in Karachi.	12	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ¹⁰⁴	12/4/2014	Another lawyer, trader killed in 'sectarian' attacks.	2	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ¹⁰⁵	18/4/2014	Three seminary students shot dead in Karachi.	3	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ¹⁰⁶	24/4/2014	Karachi: 4 including Inspector ShafiqTanoli killed in suicide blast.	4	3	Terrorism
Karachi ¹⁰⁷	25/4/2014	4 killed, 30 injured in Karachi blast.	4	30	Terrorism
Karachi ¹⁰⁸	28/4/2014	Blast in Karachi's SITE area; three children killed	3	0	Sectarian
Karachi ¹⁰⁹	3/5/2014	Lawyer, his driver killed in Karachi firing.	2	0	Sectarianism
Karachi ¹¹⁰	12/5/2014	Gunmen kill Pakistan Navy official in Karachi.	1	0	Terrorism
Karachi ¹¹¹	21/5/2014	Blast near Rangers headquarters in Karachi; five injured.	0	5	Terrorism

¹⁰¹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-140098-Two-killed,-three-hurt-in-Lyari-firing,-grenade-attacks>

¹⁰²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1098952/pml-n-lawyer-shot-dead-in-karachi>

¹⁰³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1098781/shia-doctor-madressa-students-among-12-killed-in-karachi>

¹⁰⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1099238/another-lawyer-trader-killed-in-sectarian-attacks>

¹⁰⁵<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-145008-Karachi:-three-seminary-students-killed-in-firing->

¹⁰⁶<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-145583-Two-including-Inspector-Shafiq-Tanoli-killed-in-Karachi-blast>

¹⁰⁷<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-145717-Four-killed,-30-injured-in-Karachi-blast->

¹⁰⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1102823/blast-in-karachis-site-area-three-children-killed>

¹⁰⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1103934/lawyer-his-driver-killed-in-karachi-firing>

¹¹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1105811/gunmen-kill-pakistan-navy-man-in-karachi>

¹¹¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1107705/blast-near-rangers-headquarters-in-karachi-five-injured>

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa					
Place	Date	Description	Killed	Injured	Nature of Attack
Shergarh town in Mardan District ¹¹²	18/6/2013	At least 35 persons, including a newly-elected Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) Imran Mohmand, were killed and over 57 others were injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a funeral prayer in Shah Zaman Qala village of Shergarh town in Mardan District.	36	57	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹¹³	21/6/2013	At least 15 Shia persons were killed and 25 others were injured in a suicide attack at an Imambargah in largely Shia area of Gulshan Colony on the edge of Peshawar.	16	25	Sectarianism
Buner District ¹¹⁴	22/6/2013	Two terrorists and one Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) of Police were killed during an encounter at Ambela Phari area in Buner District.	3	0	Terrorism
Badbher area ¹¹⁵	30/6/2013	At least 18 civilians were killed and 46 injured in a car bomb attack on a convoy of the Frontier Corps in Badbher area on the outskirts of Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.	18	46	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹¹⁶	1/7/2013	Firing on security checkpoint on Peshawar ring road killing two security officials	2	0	Terrorism
Kohat ¹¹⁷	11/7/2013	Explosion targeting a mosque in a rural area	2	7	Terrorism/Sectarianism
Tank ¹¹⁸	18/7/2013	Four members of peace committees killed in separate incidents, militant shot dead by peace committee volunteer	1	0	Terrorism
Kohat ¹¹⁹	23/7/2013	A grenade attack kills two women and a child	0	3	Terrorism
Swat ¹²⁰	24/7/2013	Peace committee member killed	1	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹²¹	25/7/2013	Deputy Commandant (DC) of Frontier Reserve Police (FRP) injured by gunmen	1	1	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹²²	26/7/2013	Mortar shell explodes	1	5	Terrorism

¹¹²<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

¹¹³<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

¹¹⁴<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

¹¹⁵<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

¹¹⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1022020/two-policemen-killed-in-peshawar-attack>

¹¹⁷http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\12\story_12-7-2013_pg1_2

¹¹⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1029899/militant-peace-volunteers-killed-in-fata-tank>

¹¹⁹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C07%5C23%5Cstory_23-7-2013_pg7_3

¹²⁰http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\24\story_24-7-2013_pg7_7

¹²¹<http://dawn.com/news/1031810/senior-frontier-reserve-police-official-injured-in-peshawar-attack>

Hangu ¹²³	28/7/2013	Terrorists killed in clash with security forces	6	4	Terrorism/Police response
Dera Ismail Khan ¹²⁴	30/7/2013	TTP orchestrates jailbreak	12	7	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹²⁵	1/8/2013	Police conduct raid, trade fire with militants. One militant killed and two arrested	1	0	Terrorism/Police response
Peshawar ¹²⁶	17/8/2013	Awami National Party (ANP) leader Najma Hanif murdered	1	0	Political violence
Bajaur ¹²⁷	19/8/2013	Unidentified assailants shot and killed a tribal elder	1	0	Political violence
Wana ¹²⁸	22/8/2013	TTP leader Ghulam Jan killed in roadside bomb believed to be planted by pro-government militant group Mullah Nazir	5	0	Terrorism
Sahol Deer ¹²⁹	23/8/2013	Former Union Council (UC) Nazim of Awami National Party (ANP), Gul Hameed Khattak, gunned down, along with another man	2	1	Political violence
Hangu ¹³⁰	26/8/2013	Two militants killed and 12 others arrested during joint police, army and FC operation	2	0	Terrorism
Mardan ¹³¹	30/8/2013	Policemen ambushed by militants, one killed and another injured	1	1	Terrorism
Lakki Marwat ¹³²	31/8/2013	Unknown gunmen killed QWP leader Razaullah	1	0	Political violence
Bannu ¹³³	5/9/2013	Bombing outside a girls' school. Mostly children killed and wounded	11	3	Terrorism
Haji Anwar Khel ¹³⁴	5/9/2013	Suspected militant killed during security check, one injured	1	1	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹³⁵	5/9/2013	NATO tanker fired at	0	1	Terrorism
Kohat ¹³⁶	6/9/2013	Militants ambush buses and other vehicles, indiscriminately firing on civilians. Militants believed to be Pakistani Taliban	6	1	Terrorism

¹²²<http://dawn.com/news/1032036/one-child-killed-five-injured-as-mortar-shell-explodes-in-peshawar>

¹²³http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\28\story_28-7-2013_pg7_3

¹²⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/583919/230-prisoners-escape-in-ttps-di-khan-jail-attack/>

¹²⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1033397/one-suspected-militant-killed-two-arrested-in-peshawar-operation>

¹²⁶<http://dawn.com/news/1036311/anp-leader-najma-hanif-gunned-down-in-peshawar>

¹²⁷http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\19\story_19-8-2013_pg7_2

¹²⁸<http://dawn.com/news/1037571/key-ttp-commander-among-five-killed-in-south-waziristan-blast>

¹²⁹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\24\story_24-8-2013_pg7_4

¹³⁰<http://dawn.com/news/1038378/two-militants-killed-12-held-in-hangu>

¹³¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/597581/militant-ambush-one-constable-dead-another-injured/>

¹³²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1039635/qwp-leader-razaullah-gunned-down-in-lakki-marwat>

¹³³<http://dawn.com/news/1040729/bomb-wounds-11-outside-girls-school-in-bannu>

¹³⁴<http://dawn.com/news/1040729/bomb-wounds-11-outside-girls-school-in-bannu>

¹³⁵<http://dawn.com/news/1040729/bomb-wounds-11-outside-girls-school-in-bannu>

¹³⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/601095/terror-hit-six-killed-in-militant-attack-on-kohat-road/>

Peshawar ¹³⁷	6/9/2013	Bomb at police station, three policemen injured	0	4	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹³⁸	6/9/2013	Gunmen fire on a car	8	-	Terrorism
Kohat ¹³⁹	9/9/2013	Grenades hurled at District Police Officer's office. Exchange of fire between militants and police ensued.	4	9	Terrorism
Kohat ¹⁴⁰	10/9/2013	Two would-be suicide bombers killed by police.	2	0	Terrorism
Charsadda ¹⁴¹	13/9/2013	Militants attack check-post, guard killed	1	0	Terrorism
Upper Dir ¹⁴²	15/9/2013	Two senior army officers killed in TTP bombing.	3	2	Terrorism
Bannu ¹⁴³	15/9/2013	Attacks on tribal police	2	4	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁴⁴	20/9/2013	Hand grenade attack	3	20	Terrorism
Nowshera ¹⁴⁵	21/9/2013	Motorcycle shooting, PTI tribal leader killed.	1	5	Political violence
Peshawar ¹⁴⁶	22/9/2013	Church attacked after Sunday mass	78	120	Sectarianism
Buner ¹⁴⁷	22/9/2013	ANP local leader killed	1	0	Political violence
Lower Dir ¹⁴⁸	22/9/2013	Exchange of fire between alleged terrorists and security forces. Group allegedly trying to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.	12	2	Terrorism
Buner ¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰	22/7/2013	ANP leader killed	1	0	Terrorism
Bannu ¹⁵¹¹⁵²	25/9/2013	Rocket attack on soldiers, five terrorists killed	5	3	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁵³	27/9/2013	Bomb in bus carrying government employees	19	44	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁵⁴	29/9/2013	Bomb in market place	38	100	Terrorism

¹³⁷http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\07\story_7-9-2013_pg7_4

¹³⁸<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-117141-Peshawar-firing-Toll-rises-to-eight-as-two-more-succumb-to-injuries>

¹³⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1041638/militant-attack-in-kohat-kills-two-policemen-injures-several>

¹⁴⁰http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\10\story_10-9-2013_pg7_4

¹⁴¹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\13\story_13-9-2013_pg7_3

¹⁴²<http://tribune.com.pk/story/604596/3-army-officers-killed-2-injured-in-upper-dir-ied-blast/>

¹⁴³<http://tribune.com.pk/story/604596/3-army-officers-killed-2-injured-in-upper-dir-ied-blast/>

¹⁴⁴<http://dawn.com/news/1044038/three-killed-20-injured-in-peshawar-grenade-attack>

¹⁴⁵<http://dawn.com/news/1044411/pti-tribal-leader-killed-in-attack>

¹⁴⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/607734/fifteen-dead-in-suicide-attack-outside-peshawar-church/>

¹⁴⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/607706/anp-local-leader-killed-in-buner/>

¹⁴⁸<http://tribune.com.pk/story/607587/lower-dir-12-terrorists-2-security-officials-injured-in-clashes/>

¹⁴⁹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\23\story_23-9-2013_pg7_4

¹⁵⁰<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/23-Sep-2013/anp-leader-gunned-down-in-buner>

¹⁵¹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-119741-Three-soldiers-injured-in-Bannu-rocket-attack>

¹⁵²http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\26\story_26-9-2013_pg7_6

¹⁵³<http://tribune.com.pk/story/610166/two-killed-10-injured-in-peshawar-blast/>

¹⁵⁴<http://tribune.com.pk/story/611106/peshawar-blast-kills-2-injures-10/>

Hangu ¹⁵⁵	03/10/2013	Suicide bomber ran vehicle full of explosives into headquarters of former TTP Mullah NabiHanafi group. TTP spokesman ShahidullahShahid claimed responsibility for the attack. It is unknown if Mullah NabiHanafi was injured or killed.	17	20	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁵⁶	4/10/2013	Roadside explosion	1	1	Terrorism
Bannu ¹⁵⁷	6/10/2013	Roadside IED targeting security convoy, three soldiers killed. Ansarul Mujahideen claims responsibility.	3	8	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁵⁸	7/10/2013	Explosion near medical facility on Peshawar's outskirts	2	13	Terrorism
Bannu ¹⁵⁹	7/10/2013	IED explosion	3	7	Terrorism
Dera Ismail Khan ¹⁶⁰	19/10/2013	Suicide bomb kills KP law minister and others	8	30	Terrorism
Bannu, Peshawar and Jamrud ¹⁶¹	13/11/2013	At least three explosions in the three cities.	0	4	Terrorism
Peshawar, Bannu and Dera Ghazi Khan ¹⁶²	16/11/2013	Security forces targeted in three different locations on the same day. Two roadside bombs and a suicide bomber used in attacks	1	15	Terrorism
Swabi ¹⁶³	17/11/2013	Militants attack check post, leave it ablaze, two policemen dead	2	0	Terrorism
Kohat ¹⁶⁴	18/11/2013	Two policemen among four killed as armed groups exchanged gun fire	4	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁶⁵	22/11/2013	Drive-by shooting	2	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁶⁶	8/12/2013	Militants kill policeman in check post attack near Bannu	1	1	Terrorism
Swabi ¹⁶⁷	13/12/2013	Two police officers, one polio worker shot dead in separate incidents	3	0	Terrorism

¹⁵⁵ <http://dawn.com/news/1047173/taliban-attack-kills-17-near-hangu>, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-120898-TTP-claims-responsibility-of-attack-on-Mullah-Nabi-Hanafi-headquarters>,

¹⁵⁶ <http://dawn.com/news/1047401/blast-in-peshawar-kills-policeman-another-two-injured>
<http://dawn.com/news/1047869/tp-planning-attacks-in-peshawar-over-the-next-24-hours>

¹⁵⁸ <http://dawn.com/news/1048055/blast-on-peshawars-outskirts-kills-two>, <http://dawn.com/news/1048055/blast-on-peshawars-outskirts-kills-two>

¹⁵⁹ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\10\07\story_7-10-2013_pg1_4

¹⁶⁰ <http://dawn.com/news/1050106/kp-law-minister-among-eight-killed-in-di-khan-suicide-attack>

¹⁶¹ <http://dawn.com/news/1056089/attacks-on-security-forces-in-bannu-jamrud-and-peshawar>

¹⁶² <http://www.dawn.com/news/1056551/multiple-blasts-target-kp-police-kill-at-least-two>

¹⁶³ <http://dawn.com/news/1056763/two-policemen-killed-in-swabi-checkpost-attack>

¹⁶⁴ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\11\19\story_19-11-2013_pg1_2

¹⁶⁵ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\11\22\story_22-11-2013_pg7_3

¹⁶⁶ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1060663/militants-kill-policeman-in-checkpost-attack-near-bannu>

¹⁶⁷ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/644967/unidentified-men-kill-two-police-officers-in-swabi/>

Peshawar ¹⁶⁸	16/12/2013	Four bomb disposal unit personnel killed in Peshawar blast	4	1	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁶⁹	17/12/2013	Policeman injured in IED attack in Peshawar	0	1	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁷⁰	17/12/2013	Under threat: Another healthcare professional gunned down in Peshawar.	1	0	Terrorism
Parachinar ¹⁷¹	17/12/2013	Twin blasts in Parachinar kill two, injure four	2	4	Terrorism/Sectarianism
Khyber Agency ¹⁷²	21/12/2013	Polio worker shot dead in Khyber Agency.	1	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁷³	28/12/2013	Polio worker killed, two others injured in Peshawar firing.	1	2	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁷⁴	30/12/2013	At least three killed in Charsadda blast	3	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁷⁵	1/1/2014	Blast in Peshawar leaves three dead, six wounded	3	6	Terrorism
Tank ¹⁷⁶	2/1/2014	Policeman killed in explosion in Tank	1	0	Terrorism
Hangu ¹⁷⁷	6/1/2014	Suicide blast at school kills student in Hangu.	3	3	Terrorism/Sectarianism
Khyber ¹⁷⁸	6/1/2014	Blast in Khyber kills nine, including three children.	9	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁷⁹	9/1/2014	Three soldiers martyred, 10 militants killed in SWA clash.	13	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁸⁰	10/1/2014	Gunmen kill two workers at Sufi shrine in Peshawar.	2	0	Sectarianism

¹⁶⁸ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/646085/two-bds-officials-killed-in-peshawar-blast/>

¹⁶⁹ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1074633/policeman-injured-in-ied-attack-in-peshawar>

¹⁷⁰ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/646289/under-threat-another-healthcare-professional-gunned-down-in-peshawar/>

¹⁷¹ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/646633/blast-in-parachinar-kills-two/>

¹⁷² <http://www.dawn.com/news/1075487/polio-worker-shot-dead-in-khyber-agency>

¹⁷³ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1076922/polio-worker-killed-two-others-injured-in-peshawar-firing>

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1077305/at-least-three-killed-in-charsadda-blast>

¹⁷⁵ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1077538/blast-in-peshawar-leaves-three-dead-six-wounded>

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1077901/policeman-killed-in-explosion-in-tank>

¹⁷⁷ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1078731/suicide-blast-at-school-kills-student-in-hangu>

¹⁷⁸ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1078742/blast-in-khyber-kills-nine-including-three-children>

¹⁷⁹ <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-133481-Three-soldiers-martyred,-10-militants-killed-in-South-Waziristan-clash>

¹⁸⁰ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1079605/gunmen-kill-two-workers-at-sufi-shrine-in-peshawar>

Peshawar ¹⁸¹	12/1/2014	ANP office-bearer among three gunned down in Peshawar.	3	0	Political violence
Peshawar ¹⁸²	14/1/2014	Policeman killed in Peshawar blast.	1	0	Terrorism
Dera Ismail Khan ¹⁸³	14/1/2014	SHO among seven policemen injured in D.I Khan explosion.	0	7	Terrorism
Khyber ¹⁸⁴	15/1/2014	Two Amn Committee volunteers killed in Khyber explosion.	2	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁸⁵	16/1/2014	Blast at Peshawar Tablighicentre kills ten, injures more than 60.	10	60	Terrorism
Bannu ¹⁸⁶	19/1/2014	Explosion kills 22 in Bannu; TTP claims attack.	22	38	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁸⁷	22/1/2014	Polio security team attacked in Charsadda; seven dead.	7	9	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁸⁸	23/1/2014	Blast in Peshawar kills six.	6	9	Terrorism
Khyber Agency ¹⁸⁹	24/1/2014	Three including 2 FC troops injured in Khyber Agency blast.	0	3	Terrorism
Tank ¹⁹⁰	27/1/2014	IED attack kills policeman in Tank; injures four others.	1	4	Terrorism
Khyber ¹⁹¹	30/1/2014	Toy bomb kills two children in Khyber.	2	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁹²	1/2/2014	Four killed, 50 rounded up in Swabi raid.	4	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁹³	5/2/2014	Suicide blast near Imambargah kills nine, injures 50 in Peshawar.	9	50	Sectarianism

¹⁸¹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-133907-ANP-office-bearer-among-three-gunned-down-in-Peshawar->

¹⁸²<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-134127-Policeman-killed-in-Peshawar-blast->

¹⁸³<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-134113-D.I-Khan-SHO-Kolachi-among-seven-injured-in-explosion>

¹⁸⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1080506/two-amn-committee-volunteers-killed-in-khyber-explosion>

¹⁸⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1080731/blast-at-peshawar-tablighi-centre-kills-ten-injures-more-than-60>

¹⁸⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1081329/explosion-kills-22-in-bannu-ttp-claims-attack>

¹⁸⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1081941/polio-security-team-attacked-in-charsadda-seven-dead>

¹⁸⁸<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-135206-Six-killed-in-Peshawar-blast->

¹⁸⁹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-135285-Three-including-2-FC-troops-injured-in-Khyber-blast>

¹⁹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1083062/ied-attack-kills-policeman-in-tank-injures-four-others>

¹⁹¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1083751/toy-bomb-kills-two-children-in-khyber>

¹⁹²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1084221/four-killed-50-rounded-up-in-swabi-raid>

¹⁹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1084915/suicide-blast-near-imambargah-kills-nine-injures-50-in-peshawar>

Peshawar ¹⁹⁴	6/2/2014	Taliban commander, three guards gunned down in Waziristan.	4	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁹⁵	10/1/2014	Suicide blast in Peshawar kills four women, injures three others.	4	3	Terrorism
Dera Ismail Khan ¹⁹⁶	11/2/2014	Accidental explosion?: Three suspected terrorists killed in DI Khan.	3	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁹⁷	11/2/2014	Three explosions hit Peshawar cinema; 13 killed	13	19	Terrorism
Peshawar ¹⁹⁸	12/2/2014	Nine killed in Peshawar attack.	9	0	Terrorism
Mohmand ¹⁹⁹	17/2/2014	Mohmand Taliban claim killing 23 FC men.	23	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ²⁰⁰	17/2/2014	Fifteen people injured in blast outside school in Karak.	0	15	Terrorism
Peshawar ²⁰¹	17/2/2014	Civilians targeted: Six killed as blast derails train in Jacobabad.	6	35	Terrorism
Peshawar ²⁰²	18/2/2014	Army major killed in militant attack near Peshawar.	1	0	Terrorism
Hangu ²⁰³	22/2/2014	Helicopter shelling kills six militants in Hangu.	6	0	Terrorism
Buner ²⁰⁴	22/2/2014	QWP leader among three killed in Buner explosion.	3	0	Terrorism
Kohat ²⁰⁵	24/2/2014	Uptick in violence: Bomb kills 13 in Kohat.	13	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ²⁰⁶	27/2/2014	Pashto singer shot dead in Peshawar.	1	0	Terrorism
Khyber Agency ²⁰⁷	28/2/2014	Three suspected militants killed in Khyber Agency encounter.	3	0	Terrorism

¹⁹⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1085271/taliban-commander-three-guards-gunned-down-in-waziristan>

¹⁹⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086115/suicide-blast-in-peshawar-kills-four-women-injures-three-others>

¹⁹⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/670248/accidental-explosion-three-suspected-terrorists-killed-in-di-khan/>

¹⁹⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086328/three-explosions-hit-peshawar-cinema-13-killed>

¹⁹⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086537/nine-killed-in-peshawar-attack>

¹⁹⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1087561/mohmand-taliban-claim-killing-23-fc-men>

²⁰⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1087618/fifteen-people-injured-in-blast-outside-school-in-karak>

²⁰¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/672729/civilians-targeted-six-killed-as-blast-derails-train-in-jacobabad/>

²⁰²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1087866/army-major-killed-in-militant-attack-near-peshawar>

²⁰³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1088731/helicopter-shelling-kills-six-militants-in-hangu>

²⁰⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1088733/qwp-leader-among-three-killed-in-buner-explosion>

²⁰⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/675404/uptick-in-violence-bomb-kills-13-in-kohat/>

²⁰⁶<http://www.nation.com.pk/national/27-Feb-2014/pashto-singer-shot-dead-in-peshawar>

²⁰⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1090084/three-suspected-militants-killed-in-khyber-agency-encounter>

Landikotal ²⁰⁸	3/3/2014	Blast in Landikotal kills 2 FC personnel.	2	0	Terrorism
Jamrud ²⁰⁹	4/3/2014	Two killed as gunmen attack Nato trucks in Jamrud.	2	0	Terrorism
Hangu ²¹⁰	5/3/2014	Six FC personnel killed in Hangu explosion.	6	0	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹¹	11/3/2014	Cops escorting polio team shot dead in D I Khan.	2	0	Terrorism
Jamrud ²¹²	13/3/2014	Woman, four kids injured in Jamrud blast.	0	5	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹³	14/3/2014	Blast targeting police kills nine in Peshawar.	9	44	Terrorism
Khyber Agency ²¹⁴	24/3/2014	Blast in Khyber Agency injures three.	0	4	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹⁵	31/3/2014	Blasts in KP leave nineteen injured.	0	19	Terrorism
Tank ²¹⁶	9/4/2014	Firing incident in Tank district kills five, say police.	5	1	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹⁷	18/4/2014	1 soldier killed, 2 injured in gun attack near Peshawar.	1	2	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹⁸	19/4/2014	Army officer dies as militants ambush convoy.	1	2	Terrorism
Peshawar ²¹⁹	21/4/2014	Peshawar: Five policemen among six killed in firing.	6	0	Terrorism
Charsadda ²²⁰	22/4/2014	Three killed, 30 injured in Charsadda blast.	3	30	Terrorism
Swabi ²²¹	25/4/2014	Gun attack kills seven of a family in Swabi.	7	6	Terrorism
Peshawar ²²²	28/4/2014	Attack on Nato container injures six in Khyber.	0	6	Terrorism
Jamrud ²²³	5/5/2014	Nato container attacked in Jamrud.	2	0	Terrorism

²⁰⁸<http://tribune.com.pk/story/678270/blast-and-firing-in-landikotal-kills-2-fc-personnel/>

²⁰⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1090967/two-killed-as-gunmen-attack-nato-trucks-in-jamrud>

²¹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1091169/six-fc-personnel-killed-in-hangu-explosion>

²¹¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1092456/cops-escorting-polio-team-shot-dead-in-d-i-khan>

²¹²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1092909/woman-four-kids-injured-in-jamrud-blast>

²¹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1093091/blast-targeting-police-kills-nine-in-peshawar>

²¹⁴<http://www.nation.com.pk/national/24-Mar-2014/blast-in-khyber-agency-injures-three>

²¹⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1096641/blasts-in-kp-leave-nineteen-injured>

²¹⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1098770/firing-incident-in-tank-district-kills-five-say-police>

²¹⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/697277/security-forces-vehicle-targeted-near-peshawar/>

²¹⁸<http://www.nation.com.pk/national/19-Apr-2014/army-officer-dies-as-militants-ambush-convoy>

²¹⁹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-145345-Five-policemen-among-six-killed-in-Peshawar-firing>

²²⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1101538/three-killed-30-injured-in-charsadda-blast>

²²¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1102231/gun-attack-kills-seven-of-a-family-in-swabi>

²²²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1102819/attack-on-nato-container-injures-six-in-khyber>

²²³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1104332/nato-container-attacked-in-jamrud>

Peshawar ²²⁴	11/5/2014	Blast in Peshawar kills five, wounds 14.	5	14	Terrorism
Peshawar ²²⁵	15/5/2014	Blast in Bannu injures seven.	0	7	Terrorism
Mohmand, Khyber and Bajaur Agencies ²²⁶	24/5/2014	Eight security personnel, nine militants and a peace committee volunteer were killed in roadside blasts and clashes	18	0	Terrorism
Bannu ²²⁷	28/5/2014	Three soldiers were killed and two others, including an army captain, sustained injuries in an explosion in Janikhel area in the Frontier Region	3	2	Terrorism
Bajaur ²²⁸	31/5/2014	16 militants and one soldier were killed as security forces backed by gunship helicopters thwarted a cross border militant attack on a checkpost near the Pak-Afghan border in the Bajaur tribal region.	17	0	Terrorism

Balochistan

Place	Date	Description	Killed	Injured	Nature of Attack
Quetta ²²⁹	6/6/2013	Five persons, including two militants, were killed and 15 SFs, including an officer, injured in a clash with suspected members of a banned outfit in Kharotabad area	5	15	separatism
Quetta ²³⁰	15/6/2013	At least 24 people, including 14 female students, four nurses and at least three FC personnel along with Quetta Deputy Commissioner and two others were killed and 27 injured when unidentified terrorists blew up a bus of Sardar Bahadur Khan (SBK) Women University, followed by another blast inside the Bolan Medical College hospital in Quetta.	25	27	Terrorism

²²⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1105613/blast-in-peshawar-kills-five-wounds-14>

²²⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1106713/blast-in-bannu-injures-seven>

²²⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1108380/eight-troops-among-18-killed-in-blasts-clashes>

²²⁷<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-253087-Three-soldiers-killed-in-FR-Bannu-IED-blast>

²²⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1109736/bajaur-clash-kills-one-soldier-16-militants>

²²⁹<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³⁰<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

Qilla Saifullah District ²³¹	16/6/2013	At least three Policemen were killed when militants attacked a checkpoint in the Muslim Bagh area.	3	0	Terrorism
Dera Bugti District ²³²	23/6/2013	Six militants were killed during an operation by SFs in Matt area of Sui in Dera Bugti District.	6	0	Separatism
Quetta ²³³	29/6/2013	Three dead bodies were recovered from the Eastern bypass area of Quetta the provincial capital of Balochistan.	3	0	Separatism
Quetta ²³⁴	30/6/2013	28 persons were killed and 60 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up near an Imambargah in Aliabad area of Hazara Town in Quetta.	29	60	Sectarianism
Wadh Tehsil of Khuzdar District ²³⁵	30/6/2013	Three persons were shot dead by unidentified militants when they opened fire on passenger buses in Kaka Heer and Darra Kahala areas of Wadh Tehsil of Khuzdar District.	3	0	Terrorism
Tehsil Tambo ²³⁶	1/7/2013	Armed men open indiscriminate fire on three sleeping labourers	3	0	Separatism
Khuzdar ²³⁷	1/7/2013	Armed men on a motorbike open fire on a passenger bus from Karachi to Quetta	3	-	Terrorism
Khuzdar ²³⁸	4/07/2013	Gunmen attack Nato tanker	3	0	Terrorism
Chaman ²³⁹	5/7/2013	Blast on Afghan-Pakistan border, Afghan security officers killed, Afghan frontier border commander killed	6	19	Terrorism
Quetta ²⁴⁰	16/7/2013	Four Hazaras among a total of six gunned down in targeted killing	6	0	Sectarianism

²³¹<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³²<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³³<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³⁴<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³⁵<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/majorincidents2013.htm>

²³⁶<http://beta.dawn.com/news/1022019/three-labourers-killed-in-nasirabad-ambush>

²³⁷<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/01-Jul-2013/3-die-in-khuzdar-bus-attack>

²³⁸<http://beta.dawn.com/news/1022798/gunmen-torch-nato-container-in-khuzdar-kill-three>

²³⁹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/572858/suicide-blast-near-pakistan-afghanistan-border-kills-4/>

²⁴⁰<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/16-Jul-2013/4-hazaras-among-6-killed-in-quetta>

Quetta, Chaman, DeraBugti ²⁴¹	23/07/2013	Militants fire on cab in Quetta killing two Hazaras, two killed in blast in Chaman, three bodies found in DeraBugti	7	0	Sectarianism
Quetta ²⁴²	23/07/2013	Two Hazaras killed by gunmen	2	0	Sectarianism
Khuzdar ²⁴³	26/07/2013	PML-N leader shot dead	1	0	Political violence
Gwadar ²⁴⁴	28/07/2013	Unidentified gunmen kill seven Pakistan Coast Guards personnel killed and injure as many	7	7	Separatism
Quetta ²⁴⁵	12/08/2013	Assailants opened indiscriminate fire on people coming out of a mosque after Eid prayers in a bid to target former minister Ali MadadJattak, who escaped unhurt	11	31	Terrorism
Bolan ²⁴⁶	12/08/2013	Security operation killed six militants	6	0	Separatism
Mastung ²⁴⁷	12/08/2013	Two militants killed after attack on FC check post	2	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁴⁸	12/08/2013	Two FC men injured by roadside bomb	-	2	Terrorism
Dera Murad Jamali ²⁴⁹	12/08/2013	Landmine blast	1	3	Terrorism
Quetta ²⁵⁰	13/08/2013	Bicycle bomb: improvised explosive device weighing up to five kilogram's	2	1	Terrorism
Harnai ²⁵¹	13/08/2013	Body recovered	1	0	Separatism
Bolan ²⁵²	14/08/2013	Five suspected militants planting a bomb on railway tracks killed	5	0	Separatism
Turbat ²⁵³	15/08/2013	Two activists of the BNM and BSO-Azad were killed in encounter with security forces	2	0	Separatism
Bolan ²⁵⁴	16/08/2013	Terrorist attack on a passenger train	4	32	Terrorism

²⁴¹ <http://dawn.com/news/1031097/seven-killed-in-balochistan-violence>

²⁴² http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C07%5C23%5Cstory_23-7-2013_pg1_4

²⁴³ <http://dawn.com/news/1032017/pml-n-leader-gunned-down-in-khuzdar>

²⁴⁴ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\07\28\story_28-7-2013_pg1_2

²⁴⁵ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/589002/tragedy-on-eid-11-dead-as-ex-minister-escapes-assault/>

²⁴⁶ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/589002/tragedy-on-eid-11-dead-as-ex-minister-escapes-assault/>

²⁴⁷ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/589002/tragedy-on-eid-11-dead-as-ex-minister-escapes-assault/>

²⁴⁸ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/589002/tragedy-on-eid-11-dead-as-ex-minister-escapes-assault/>

²⁴⁹ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\12\story_12-8-2013_pg7_3

²⁵⁰ <http://dawn.com/news/1035450/bicycle-bomb-kills-two-in-quetta-say-officials>

²⁵¹ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\13\story_13-8-2013_pg7_6

²⁵² <http://tribune.com.pk/story/590074/violence-marks-eve-of-august-14/>

²⁵³ <http://dawn.com/news/1035945/two-activists-killed-in-encounter-with-fct>

²⁵⁴ <http://dawn.com/news/1036495/train-attack-armed-clashes-leave-two-more-militants-dead-in-bolan>

Bolan ²⁵⁵	17/08/2013	Clashes between militants and security forces continued for second consecutive day after attack on train. Eight militants killed	8	0	Terrorism
Quetta and Mastung ²⁵⁶	18/08/2013	Separate instances of violence: tribal elder gunned down, doctor kidnapped and rocket fired in Quetta; container truck was set on fire in Mastung district	3	4	Terrorism
Quetta ²⁵⁷	19/08/2013	Two FC personnel and assailant killed in shootout	3	0	Terrorism
Kalat ²⁵⁸	23/08/2013	A bullet-riddled body recovered	1	0	Separatism
Sibi ²⁵⁹	30/08/2013	Insurgent killed, eight injured in security operation that used attack helicopters	1	8	Separatism
Turbat ²⁶⁰	31/08/2013	Armed militants killed in security operation by FC following attack	10	-	Separatism
Quetta ²⁶¹	09/09/2013	Explosives placed on bicycle	2	8	Terrorism
Gwadar ²⁶²	13/09/2013	Gunmen kidnap and kill three Punjabi labourers	3	0	Ethnic
Panjgur ²⁶³	13/09/2013	Two clerics killed in shooting	2	0	Sectarian
Quetta ²⁶⁴	14/09/2013	Firing by security personnel during search operation	1	1	Separatism
Sibi ²⁶⁵	22/09/2013	Remote-controlled blast	0	21	Terrorism
Pishin ²⁶⁶	23/09/2013	Bombing of security patrol	7	5	Separatism
Awaran ²⁶⁷	3/10/2013	Blast targeting soldiers involved in quake relief efforts. Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claims responsibility for the attack. Two army soldiers killed.	2	3	Separatism
Chaman ²⁶⁸	3/10/2013	Suicide attack on Pak-Afghan Friendship Gate (Bab-e-Dosti)	6	15	Terrorism
Khuzdar ²⁶⁹	6/10/2013	JWP leader Daad Ali Bugti killed by gunmen	1	0	Separatism

²⁵⁵<http://dawn.com/news/1036495/train-attack-armed-clashes-leave-two-more-militants-dead-in-bolan>

²⁵⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/584941/balochistan-unrest-three-killed-in-quetta/>

²⁵⁷<http://tribune.com.pk/story/592102/attack-on-picket-terrorist-two-fc-men-killed-in-shootout/>

²⁵⁸http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\24\story_24-8-2013_pg7_2

²⁵⁹http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\08\30\story_30-8-2013_pg7_1

²⁶⁰<http://tribune.com.pk/story/598222/firefight-in-mand-frontier-corps-repels-attack-kill-7-militants/>

²⁶¹<http://tribune.com.pk/story/601612/explosion-near-sariab-road-quetta-leaves-2-dead/>

²⁶²<http://tribune.com.pk/story/603362/gunmen-kidnap-kill-labourers-in-gwadar/>

²⁶³http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\09\13\story_13-9-2013_pg1_3

²⁶⁴<http://dawn.com/news/1042771/man-killed-in-firing-by-fc-personnel>

²⁶⁵<http://tribune.com.pk/story/607949/roadside-bombing-blast-in-sibi-injures-21/>

²⁶⁶<http://tribune.com.pk/story/608045/two-dead-in-attack-on-police-mobile-in-pishin/>

²⁶⁷http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\10\03\story_3-10-2013_pg1_2

²⁶⁸http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C10%5C03%5Cstory_3-10-2013_pg1_3

²⁶⁹<http://dawn.com/news/1047866/jwp-local-leader-shot-in-khuzdar>

Mand, near I-P border ²⁷⁰	6/10/2013	Five bodies with gunshot wounds recovered	5	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁷¹	9/10/2013	Bicycle bomb outside police station	6	35	Separatism ⁰
Quetta ²⁷²	15/10/2013	Grenade attack on convoy of the Balochistan Constabulary. Lashkar-i-Balochistan claimed responsibility	0	11	Separatism
Notal area (Dera murad jamali) ²⁷³	21/10/2013	Bomb explodes on train	7	16	Separatism
Quetta-Taftan Highway of Mastung District ²⁷⁴	26/10/2013	At least two soldiers were killed when car bomb hit a FC van escorting a bus of Shia pilgrims in Dringarh area on the main Quetta-Taftan Highway of Mastung District. Frontier Corps and Balochistan Levies convoys were escorting five passenger buses of Shia pilgrims on the highway when they found a suspected car parked on the road.	0	2	Sectarianism
Quetta ²⁷⁵	30/10/2013	Blast takes place on a crowded street	4	18	Separatism
Mach in Bolan district ²⁷⁶	1/11/2013	Unidentified militants shot dead at least six Hazara Shia coal miners and injured another in a sectarian attack	6	0	Sectarianism
Pishin ²⁷⁷	12/11/2013	Security forces kill militant and arrest seven others	1	0	Separatism
Nasirabad (Near the border of sindh) ²⁷⁸	19/11/2013	Gunmen kill NATO truck driver and set fire to truck	1	0	Terrorism
Gwadar ²⁷⁹	19/11/2013	Grenade attack on shop	0	5	Separatism
Turbat ²⁸⁰	18/11/2013	Three bullet ridden bodies found	3	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁸¹	25/11/2013	Man shot dead in sectarian attack	1	0	Sectarianism

²⁷⁰ <http://dawn.com/news/1047866/jwp-local-leader-shot-in-khuzdar>

²⁷¹ http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\10\11\story_11-10-2013_pg1_1

²⁷² <http://dawn.com/news/1049911/grenade-attack-in-quetta-injures-11>, <http://dawn.com/news/1049956/five-security-men-among-16-injured-in-grenade-attacks>

²⁷³ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1050795/jaffar-express-struck-by-explosion-seven-killed>

²⁷⁴ <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>

²⁷⁵ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1053061/four-killed-in-quetta-bomb-attack>

²⁷⁶ <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>

²⁷⁷ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1055888/security-forces-kill-one-arrest-seven-militants-in-balochistan>

²⁷⁸ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/633341/gunmen-kill-nato-truck-driver-in-balochistan/>,

²⁷⁹ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1057168/five-injured-in-grenade-attack-on-shop-in-gwadar>,

²⁸⁰ <http://www.dawn.com/news/1056984/militants-kill-four-torch-nato-tanker-in-balochistan>

²⁸¹ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/636631/targeted-killing-hazara-man-shot-dead-in-quetta/>

Mastung ²⁸²	26/11/2013	Tribal clashes	5	3	Clan rivalry
Khuzdar ²⁸³	2/12/2013	Four persons, including a schoolteacher, were killed by unidentified gunmen	4	1	Separatism
Naseerabad ²⁸⁴		Six people killed in Balochistan clash.	6	1	Separatism
Turbat ²⁸⁵	24/12/2013	Clash between militants and security forces kills six in Turbat	6	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁸⁶	1/1/2014	Suicide bomber in Quetta kills three after targeting pilgrims bus.	3	30	Sectarianism
Naseerabad (Pat Feeder area) ²⁸⁷	4/1/2014	MPA injured in Quetta explosion; two killed in Naseerabad blast.	2	1	Separatism
Quetta ²⁸⁸	12/1/2014	Three people killed in Balochistan violence.	3	0	Separatism
Khuzdar ²⁸⁹	15/1/2014	Four militants killed during operation in Balochistan's Khuzdar.	4	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁹⁰	22/1/2014	Seven Levies men killed, Spaniard wounded in Mastung clash.	7	1	Separatism
Quetta ²⁹¹	22/1/2014	Bus bombing kills 24 Shia pilgrims.	24	40	Sectarianism
Quetta ²⁹²	25/1/2014	Three killed in security forces action in Panjgur.	3	0	Separatism
Awaran ²⁹³	31/1/2014	Bomb kills three security personnel in Awaran:	3	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁹⁴	9/2/2014	Gunmen kill nine in Balochistan violence.	9	0	Separatism

²⁸²<http://dawn.com/news/1058726/tribal-feud-claims-five-lives-in-dasht>

²⁸³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1060254/four-men-killed-in-khuzdar>

²⁸⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1060702/six-people-killed-in-balochistan-clash>

²⁸⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1076125/clash-between-militants-and-security-forces-kills-six-in-turbat>

²⁸⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1077718/suicide-bomber-in-quetta-kills-three-after-targeting-pilgrims-bus>

²⁸⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1078353/mpa-injured-in-quetta-explosion-two-killed-in-naseerabad-blast>

²⁸⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1080049/three-people-killed-in-balochistan-violence>

²⁸⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1080513/four-militants-killed-during-operation-in-balochistans-khuzdar>

²⁹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1081943/seven-levies-men-killed-spaniard-wounded-in-mastung-clash>

²⁹¹<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/22-Jan-2014/bus-bombing-kills-24-shia-pilgrims>

²⁹²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1082599/three-killed-in-security-forces-action-in-panjgur>

²⁹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1083988/bomb-kills-three-security-personnel-in-awaran-officials>

²⁹⁴[www.dawn.com/news/1085921/gunmen-kill-nine-in-balochistan-violence http://](http://www.dawn.com/news/1085921/gunmen-kill-nine-in-balochistan-violence)

DeraBugti ²⁹⁵	14/2/2014	Four suspected militants killed in Dera Bugti operation.	4	0	Separatism
Quetta ²⁹⁶	28/2/2014	Afghan official shot dead in Chaman.	1	0	Terrorism
Khuzdar ²⁹⁷	9/3/2014	BNP local leader killed in Khuzdar, two persons killed in Quetta.	3	0	Terrorism
Quetta ²⁹⁸	11/3/2014	Two killed, three injured in Turbat firing.	2	3	Separatism
Turbat ²⁹⁹	22/3/2014	Five militants killed in Turbat: official.	5	0	Separatism
Nasarabad area of Loralai district ³⁰⁰	27/3/2014	Attack on polio team kills policeman in Balochistan.	1	0	Terrorism
Quetta ³⁰¹	3/4/2014	Three people killed, two women injured in Quetta firing.	3	2	Separatism
Jaffarabad ³⁰²	5/4/2014	Blast injures four in Jaffarabad	0	4	Separatism
Sibi ³⁰³	9/4/2014	Terror in Sibi: Passenger train bombed; 17 dead.	17	48	Separatism
Quetta ³⁰⁴	12/4/2014	Two Shia Hazaras gunned down in Quetta.	2	0	Sectarianism
Quetta ³⁰⁵	19/4/2014	Policeman among two killed in Quetta firing incidents.	2	1	Separatism
Quetta ³⁰⁶	21/4/2014	Three people gunned down in Quetta.	3	0	Separatism
Quetta ³⁰⁷	3/5/2014	Blast targets FC vehicle in Bolan; one killed.	1	0	Separatism
Panjgur district (Hilly areas) ³⁰⁸	5/5/2014	At least 10 suspected militants killed in Balochistan.	10	0	Separatism
Quetta ³⁰⁹	8/5/2014	2 killed, 16 injured in Quetta blast.	2	16	Separatism

²⁹⁵<http://www.dawn.com/news/1086768/four-suspected-militants-killed-in-dera-bugti-operation>

²⁹⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1090027/afghan-official-shot-dead-in-chaman>

²⁹⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1092040/bnp-local-leader-killed-in-khuzdar-two-persons-killed-in-quetta>

²⁹⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1092450/two-killed-three-injured-in-turbat-firing>

²⁹⁹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1094846/five-militants-killed-in-turbat-official>

³⁰⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1095928/attack-on-polio-team-kills-policeman-in-balochistan>

³⁰¹<http://www.dawn.com/news/1097266/three-people-killed-two-women-injured-in-quetta-firing>

³⁰²<http://www.dawn.com/news/1097915/blast-injures-four-in-jaffarabad>

³⁰³<http://tribune.com.pk/story/693195/terror-in-sibi-passenger-train-bombed-17-dead/>

³⁰⁴<http://www.dawn.com/news/1099414/two-shia-hazaras-gunned-down-in-quetta>

³⁰⁵<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-145114-Policeman-among-two-killed-in-Quetta-firing-incidents>

³⁰⁶<http://www.dawn.com/news/1101334/three-people-gunned-down-in-quetta>

³⁰⁷<http://www.dawn.com/news/1103936/blast-targets-fc-vehicle-in-bolan-one-killed>

³⁰⁸<http://www.dawn.com/news/1104344/at-least-10-suspected-militants-killed-in-balochistan>

³⁰⁹<http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-147072-Two-killed,-16-injured-in-Quetta-blast>

Khuzdar ³¹⁰	12/5/2014	Blast wounds at least 19 in Khuzdar.	0	19	Separatism
Khuzdar ³¹¹	15/5/2015	Two shot dead in Khuzdar.	2	3	Political Violence
Oshab, near Turbat in Kech district ³¹²	22/5/2014	FC camp attacked in Balochistan: 1 person killed.	1	0	Separatism
Khuzdar ³¹³	25/5/2014	Gunmen open fired at a checkpoint near Wadh tehsil on the Quetta-Karachi Highway	8	1	Separatism

Collected by - Shreyas Deshmukh and Yaqoob-ul-Hasan

³¹⁰<http://www.dawn.com/news/1105629/blast-wounds-at-least-19-in-khuzdar>

³¹¹<http://www.nation.com.pk/national/15-May-2014/two-shot-dead-in-khuzdar>

³¹²<http://tribune.com.pk/story/711180/fc-camp-attacked-in-balochistan-1-person-killed/>

³¹³<http://www.dawn.com/news/1108512/eight-levies-personnel-shot-dead-near-wadh>

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