

Background

Maoist Movement in India: An Overview

Sandeep Kumar Dubey

Sandeep Kumar Dubey is Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

August 6, 2013

Summary

It is clear from the above account of the Maoist movement that the movement has been violent and comparatively strong enough to challenge, at least, the security forces and pose threats to the local government officials. The movement is primarily spearheaded by a Maoist party, i.e. the CPI (Maoist) which derives its ideological and militaristic inspirations from the China's Mao Tse Tung's thoughts which propagates agrarian armed revolution to capture political power. Indian Maoists/Naxalites aim at overthrowing the Indian State through the agrarian armed revolution and capturing the political power. The CPI (Maoist) has spread to one-third of the country's geographical area (primarily in forest areas) and established an efficient networking in urban areas through its mass organizations. It has also in place a proper research and development programme which is responsible for the development of sophisticated arms and ammunitions. In addition to it, the CPI (Maoist) has set up an intelligence network to collate and analyse the information as to the planning, movement and operation of the security forces. They are challenging the Indian state on many fronts-from propaganda to military actions. Although they say that they are in a strategic defensive mode in which they, on occasions, conduct counter-offensive attacks on security forces and civilians, the data on the killings of security forces and civilians reveal enormity of the Maoists' threat to the internal security of the country. The governments at the centre and the states, time and again, have acknowledged the threat as the biggest internal security threat/challenge ever faced by India. The Central and the State governments have made some efforts on two fronts, development as well as security, to curtail the Maoist menace. However, the governments have not been really successful in countering the Maoists' propaganda against the Indian state, which would give them strategic leverage vis-à-vis the Indian state in psychological warfare. The governments need to instil confidence into the affected mass towards the State through providing them with development, opportunity and sense of security.

Disclaimer: Views expressed in IDSA's publications and on its website are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or the Government of India.

Maoist movement in India has a long history, dating back almost 40 years. This movement primarily survives on poverty, disparity and discontent among the masses. These phenomena are very common in today's society, almost all over the world and in the developing countries in particular. India is not averse to these phenomena. Although, in India, the origin of the Maoist movement can be traced to the Telangana Uprising (1946-1951), an armed peasant uprising, the real movement spearheaded by a Maoist Party¹ i.e. the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI (ML) in short, started in 1969 only. However, very soon, serious differences arose among the Party's leaders on its strategic/tactical lines – for example, on whether to participate in elections or not – and as a consequence, the CPI (ML) split into many factions due to the differences. The Maoists, sometimes also referred as Naxalite/Left Wing Extremist (LWE), faced splits and fratricides almost for two decades (1970s-1980s). In 1990s, they held several rounds of talk with each other to initiate the process of unification. The two major Maoist blocks of that time were the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) of Bihar and the CPI (ML) People's War Group of Andhra Pradesh. These two Maoist groups merged to form a new unified Maoist group, the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist) in short, in 2004. Even after this merger, there are still 23 officially identified LWE groups currently active in the country.² The LWE/Naxalism/Maoism has been referred many a time by the policy-makers of the country as the biggest internal security threat ever faced by India. In the year 2006 itself, the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, while addressing the meeting of Chief Ministers on Naxalism, said, "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of Naxalism is the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country."³

The CPI (Maoist) is the biggest and most violent LWE group in the country. It is credited with almost 80 per cent of the violence stoked by the LWE groups. On February 27, 2013, replying to Question Number 371, the Union Minister of State in the MHA informed the Rajya Sabha that since the year 2001, the Left Wing Extremists have killed 5801 civilians and 2081 security personnel. The ratio of the security personnel and the CPI (Maoist) cadres killed in 2010, 2011 and 2012 are 285:172, 142:99 and 114:74 respectively.⁴ These

¹ A Maoist document *Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution* quotes Lenin saying, "The Proletariat, in its struggle for power, has no weapon other than organization (party)." It also quotes Mao saying, "If there is to be revolution, there must be a revolutionary party." See *Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution*, Chapter 8, available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-MaoistDocs/Founding/StrategyTactics-pamphlet.pdf> (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

² See Annexure, Question No. 217, Rajya Sabha, December 12, 2012, available at <http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

³ See PM's Speech at the Chief Ministers' Meet on Naxalism', Prime Minister's Office, Government of India, available at <http://pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=302>

⁴ See Annexure of Question No. 113, Lok Sabha, March 5, 2013, available at <http://164.100.47.132/Annexure/lsq15/13/as113.htm> (Accessed on June 3, 2013)

data inform us about the gravity of the challenge. In recent past, there has been some curtailment in the total violence committed by the CPI (Maoist). The Annual Report of the MHA, 2011-12 reads, "The CPI (Maoist) continue to remain the most dominant and violent outfit among the various Left Wing Extremist groups, accounting for more than 90% of total Left Wing Extremist incidents and 95% of the resultant killings."⁵ The Annual Report, 2012-13, MHA, says, "The CPI (Maoist) continue to remain the most dominant and violent LWE group, accounting for more than 80% of violence and the killings."⁶ Although the reduction of ten per cent in the CPI (Maoist)-induced violence is a good sign for the security forces, both the security forces and the policy-makers have miles to go to arrest the unbridled growth of Naxal violence in the country.

In this background paper, attempts have been made to sketch the trajectory of the Maoist movement in India, keeping in view the CPI (Maoist)'s history (including organisation and proliferation), ideology, strategy and tactics.

EVOLUTION OF THE CPI (MAOIST)

The history of the communist party in India goes way back to 1920s. The Indian Communists met in Tashkent in 1920 and tried to form an Indian communist party.⁷ On December 26, 1925, the Communist Party of India or CPI was formed at a conference in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh.⁸ The ideal of the Party was to introduce a communist revolution in India. In fact, in 1946, they (the CPI) succeeded to some extent in mobilizing the people, on the principle of armed struggle, in Telangana, Andhra Pradesh. It continued for almost five years or so. This movement is known as Telangana Uprising (1946-51). On October 21, 1951, the communist leaderships, both in the USSR and India, decided to terminate the whole movement. Almost on the same ideological line and at the same time, another peasant armed uprising led by the Kisan Sabha, a peasants front of the CPI, took place in Bengal. It is known in the history as Tebhaga Uprising (1946).⁹ After some time, like the Telangana uprising, even this movement also went down to death.

Following the Indo-China war (1962), serious differences emerged within the CPI as to whether support India or China (a socialist country).¹⁰ This ideological tussle culminated

⁵ See Annual Report, 2011-12, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, available at [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)1112.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)1112.pdf) (Accessed on May 25, 2013)

⁶ Chapter 2, Internal Security, Annual Report, 2012-13, MHA, pp. 17-18, available at [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)1213.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)1213.pdf) (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

⁷ See 'Party Programme, Communist Party of India', available at <http://www.comunistparty.in/p/party-programme.html> (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

⁸ See 'Brief History of CPI', available at <https://sites.google.com/a/communistparty.in/cpi/brief-history-of-cpi> (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

⁹ See Prakash Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2007, p. 4

¹⁰ See Biplab Dasgupta, *The Naxalite Movement*, Allied Publication, New Delhi, 1974, p. 23.

into a major split within the Party, giving birth to Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI (Marxist), at the Seventh Congress of the CPI, held in Calcutta from October 31 to November 7, 1964.¹¹ The CPI came to be known as pro-Soviet Party and the CPI (M) as pro-Chinese party.¹² The CPI (M) decided to participate in election. A group within the CPI (M), known as *Dakshin Desh* led by Kanhai Chatterjee, was highly critical of the 'revisionism' of the Party. The *Dakshin Desh* group advocated/promoted armed agrarian revolution based on Mao's thought, in place of parliamentary democracy. However, the CPI (M) went ahead with its resolution to participate in elections. The United Left Front led by the CPI (M) and People's United Front led by the CPI, both formed in December 1966, came together to form a broad left front, called United Front, in West Bengal. On March 25, 1967, the United Front government headed by CPI (M) formally came to power in West Bengal.

On May 25, 1967, an armed peasant uprising led by Kanu Sanyal of CPI (M) broke out at Naxalbari village in Siliguri district of West Bengal. This uprising is known as Naxalbari Movement. Apparently, to maintain law and order in the state (West Bengal), the United Front government led by the CPI (M) ordered a police action against the Naxalites. On June 27, 1967, a section of extremist cadres of the CPI (M) staged a demonstration in front of the West Bengal Assembly, protesting against the alleged anti-peasant stand/policies of the Government of West Bengal.¹³ Although the Naxal movement was crushed within 72 days, it gained tremendous support from the 'communist revolutionaries' belonging to the state units of the CPI (M). On November 12-13, 1967, these revolutionaries met in a conference held in Calcutta and formed the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR) within the CPI (Marxist). Renamed as All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) on May 14, 1968 (after the Burdwan plenum in April 1968), it decided to boycott all elections.¹⁴ The *Dakshin Desh* group led by Kanhai Chatterjee stayed away from the AICCCR. The AICCCR in its plenary session in Calcutta during April 19-22, 1969 decided to launch a party as a political vanguard and thus broke away from the CPI (M). On April 22, 1969, on the hundredth birth anniversary of Lenin, the Central Organising Committee of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar¹⁵ was formed, although it was only

¹¹ *Ibid*; also see 'About Us, Communist Party of India (Marxist)', available at <http://cpim.org/about-us> (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

¹² Biplab Dasgupta, *op.cit.* p. 25, n.10.

¹³ See Sumanta Banerjee, *India's Simmering Revolution: the Naxalite Uprising*, Selected Service Syndicate, New Delhi, 1984, p. 89.

¹⁴ See C. Bhaskara Rao, 'The Problem of Fragmentation in the Naxalite Movement' in Pradip Basu, ed., *Discourses on Naxalite Movement* (Kolkata: Setu Prakashani, 2010), p. 352.

¹⁵ Charu strongly rejected the Parliamentary path to reform the society. Only once in his life, he fought a by-election in the Siliguri assembly constituency as the candidate of the undivided Communist party in 1963, but failed to make it and miserably, lost his deposit as well. See Biplab Dasgupta, *The Naxalite Movement*, Allied Publishers: New Delhi, 1974, p.5.

May 1, 1969, when the formal announcement of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or CPI (ML) was made by the Naxalbari leader Kanu Sanyal, in a rally held in Calcutta.¹⁶ The AICCCR was dissolved. The *Dakshin Desh* group led by Kanhai Chatterjee did not join the CPI (ML) too due to the differences over the Party line. Later *Dakshin Desh* group also broke away from the CPI (M) and formed a new party, still with old name, *Dakshin Desh*, on October 22, 1969. In 1975, it was renamed as Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).

Although this period (late 1960s and early 1970s) was of splits and factionalism, the gross violence was never affected by it. It is estimated that during the period March 1970 to June 15, 1971, total 139 people were killed in Naxal violence.¹⁷ During the period of 1970-71, a total of 75 policemen were estimated to be killed by the Naxalites.¹⁸ To curtail the Naxal violence, a massive crack down by the state government was initiated. On July 1 to August 15, 1971, the Government of India along with the concerned state governments undertook joint operations, code named 'Operation Steeplechase', by the army and the police in the bordering districts of West Bengal, Bihar and Odisha.¹⁹ It was a big setback for the Naxalites. They were almost flushed out from the areas. A large number of Naxalites were arrested from the various states. It is estimated that a total number of 8,400 Naxalites were put under the bar.²⁰ The topmost Naxal leaders including Kanu Sanyal, Nagbhusanam Patnayak and Ashim Chatterjee were arrested.²¹ On July 16, 1972, even Charu Mazumdar was arrested from the Entally area of East Calcutta.²² At the time of his arrest, Charu Mazumdar had been suffering from cardiac asthma.²³ He passed away due to ill health in the Lal Bazar police lock-up, Alipur Jail, on July 28, 1972.²⁴

With the death of Charu Mazumdar, the central authority of the CPI (ML) collapsed, leading the Party to break into many factions. Meanwhile, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah and others formed a Central Organising Committee (COC), CPI (ML) in December 1972, as a breakaway faction of the CPI (ML). In August 1974, the Andhra Pradesh State Committee of COC, CPI (ML) was organised, with Seetharamaiah, Appalasuri and

¹⁶ C. Bhaskara Rao, *op.cit.* n. 14, p.353

¹⁷ See Prakash Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2007, p. 92

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.99

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 112

²¹ *Ibid*

²² *Ibid*

²³ See Thirty Years of Naxalbari: An Epic of Heroic Struggle and Sacrifice, available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/PM1999-2006/publications/30%20years/contents.htm> (accessed on May 5, 2013)

²⁴ See P.V.Ramana, How to Deal with LWE/Naxalism, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 20, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_MeasurestodealwithNaxal.pdf (accessed on May 7, 2013)

Mahadevan representing Telangana region, coastal Andhra Pradesh and Rayalseema respectively. As happened in the past, soon various factions emerged within the COC CPI (ML) as well. In January 1978, Kondapalli parted ways with COC CPI (ML) and formed a new COC CPI (ML). Later, on April 22, 1980, International Lenin Day, Kondapalli formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (People's War Group, PWG).²⁵ Kondapally became the general secretary of the Party.²⁶ Although in this period (1980s), splits overshadows mergers,²⁷ the CPI(ML) Unity Organisation²⁸ of N. Prasad (Bihar) and Bhowani Roy Chowdhury (West Bengal), and the COC CPI (ML) (Andhra Pradesh) led by Appalsuri, came together to form CPI (ML) Party Unity in 1982.

The period of 1990s is marked by a phase of reunion and merger.²⁹ In September 1993, the MCC, the CPI (ML) (PWG) and the CPI (ML) Party Unity formed All India People's Resistance Forum (AIPRF) to coordinate their struggle in different locations of the country. In August 1998, the Party Unity merged with CPI (ML) (People's War Group) renaming it as People's War. In January 2003, the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India-Maoist (RCCI-M) merged with the MCC to form the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). On September 21, 2004, the ever greatest merger took place between the CPI (ML) People's War of Andhra Pradesh and the MCCI of Bihar, thus giving birth to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (Maoist).³⁰ The CPI (Maoist) is the biggest Left Wing Extremist (LWE) organisation in the country.

THE CPI (MAOIST)

The CPI (Maoist), founded on September 21, 2004, is currently headed by its General Secretary Muppala Lakshmana Rao *alias* Ganpathy who hails from Karim Nagar, Andhra Pradesh. The CPI (Maoist) is of the opinion that only they are the true legatees of the Maoist movement in India and follow the correct mass-line, whereas others are either revisionist or Right/Left opportunist. The immediate task before the CPI (Maoist), as they assert, is to "establish full-fledged people's liberation army (PLA) and base areas by developing and transforming the guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases."³¹ However, the

²⁵ It was banned by the Andhra Pradesh government on May 20, 1992.

²⁶ In 1992, Muppala Lakshmana Rao *alias* Ganpathy expelled and replaced Kondapalli Seetharamaiah.

²⁷ P.V.Ramana, *op.cit.* n.24.

²⁸ This group was formed in 1978 under N Prasad's leadership, initially confined to Jehanabad-Palamu of Bihar.

²⁹ P.V.Ramana, *op.cit.* n. 24.

³⁰ See CPI (Maoist) completes its much-awaited historic Unity Congress-9th Congress, available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/NinthCongress/CompletesUnityCongress.pdf> (Accessed on March 23, 2013)

³¹ See Chapter 1, Constitution of the CPI (Maoist), available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Founding/Constitution.doc> (Accessed on May 20, 2013)

long-term goal of the Party is to capture the political power by violently overthrowing the Indian State.

Organisational Structure

As per a document, entitled *Constitution of CPI (Maoist)* (2004),³² the highest body of the Party shall be the Party Congress. The Party Congress shall be held once in five years as per the decision of Central Committee (CC). Between the two Congresses, the Central Committee, which is elected by the Party Congress, shall be the highest body of the Party. In between two CC meetings, Politburo (PB) formed by the CC enjoys the same rights as the CC does. The CC elects the General Secretary of the Party, who *ex officio* heads the PB. The CC and the PB consist of 37 and 14 members respectively.³³ After the CC, the sequential hierarchy is following:

- Special Area Committee/Special Zonal Committee/State Committee
- Regional Committee
- Zonal Committee/District/Divisional Committee
- Sub-Zonal/Sub-Divisional Committee
- Area Committee
- Local level committees i.e. village/Factory/College party committee

The basic unit of the Party is Party Cell which consists of three (minimum) to five (maximum) members. Party Cell can be formed area-wise, profession wise or production wise. For the maintenance and supervision of the people's army, the CC constitutes Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC is structurally a huge body. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the following departments are under the direct command of the CMC:³⁴

- Technical Research and Arms Manufacturing Unit (TRAM)
- Regional Commands (RCs)
- Special Action Teams (SATs)
- Military Intelligence (MI)
- Publications and Editorial Board of 'Jung'

³² *Ibid*

³³ See P.V. Ramana, 'Growth of the CPI (Maoist)' in Gurmeet Kanwal and Dhruv C Katoch, ed., *Naxal Violence: The Threat Within* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2012), p. 101.

³⁴ See FAQs, Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, available at <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-FAQ.pdf> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

- Central Military Instructors Team (CMIT)
- Communications
- Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC)
- People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)

The Maoists have decentralised all the central units of their Party to increase the efficacy of each unit. For example, at the State level, they have State Committees, State Military Commission etc.³⁵ The various Special Area Committees/Special Zonal Committees/State Committees are following:³⁶

- Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC)
- Andhra Orissa Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC)
- North Telangana Special Zonal Committee (NTSZC)
- Bihar Jharkhand North Chhattisgarh – Special Area Committee (BJNCSAC)
- West Bengal State Committee (WBSC)
- Punjab State Committee (PJSC)
- Maharashtra State Committee (MRSC)

The Maoists have also formed many Regional Bureaus (RBs) to monitor and coordinate the activities of the Party in various parts of the country. These Bureaus are following:³⁷

- North Regional Bureau (NRB)
- South Western Regional Bureau (SWRB)
- East Regional Bureau (ERB)
- Central Regional Bureau (CRB)
- Odisha-Chhattisgarh Regional Bureau (O-CRB)

They have developed a strong intelligence network in their areas of influence. The intelligence set-up is known as the People's Security Service (PSS).³⁸ They also operate through their front organisations under the guise of different names and functions. According to the MHA, their front organisations exist in 20 States of India.

³⁵ *Ibid*

³⁶ See Rishi Chhikara, People's Liberation Guerrilla Army of CPI (Maoist), Available at http://www.claws.in/administrator/uploaded_files/1348462724MP%20-35.pdf (Accessed on June 4, 2013)

³⁷ See Regional Bureaus of the CPI (Maoist), India, available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/Regional_maoist_map.htm (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

³⁸ See FAQs, Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, available at <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-FAQ.pdf> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

People's Liberation Guerrilla Army

Some experts believe that the formation of the PLGA on December 2, 2000 was a turning point in the Maoist movement.³⁹ It observed its 12th anniversary as one week celebration from December 2 to December 8, 2012. It is reported that Maoists celebrate the PLGA week mainly for the recruitment of fresh cadres. For example, last year in 2011, during PLGA week celebration 5,000 youths and adolescent girls were recruited by the Maoists.⁴⁰ The cadre strength of PLGA is estimated to be 9,000 to 12,000.⁴¹ The PLGA consists of mainly three forces – main force, secondary and base force.⁴²

| Main Force | Secondary Force | Base Force |
|---|---|------------------------|
| a. Companiesb | a. Special Guerrilla Squads | a. People's Militia |
| b. Platoons | b. Local Guerrilla Squads | b. Gram Rakshak Dal |
| c. Special Action Teams (Assassination Squads) | c. Platoons | c. Area Rakshak Dal |
| d. Intelligence Units | d. District/Divisional level action team (Assassination Squads) | d. Self-defence Squads |

Source: FAQs, Naxal Management Division, MHA

The CPI (Maoist) has a very large number of People's Militia in place. It is estimated that in Bastar region alone, the strength of people's militia is 30,000.⁴³

Proliferation

Maoist strategy is to expand the ongoing war against the Indian State in space, time and material. The Maoists have already spread into almost one-third of the country's geographical area. So far as time is concerned, they have managed to sustain the movement for almost 40 years. And as to material, they have already acquired modern weapons and artillery; they have Central Military Commission (CMC) in place to expedite their

³⁹ See K. Srinivas Reddy, 'Formation of PLGA a turning point in the Maoist movement', *The Hindu*, December 5, 2010, available at <http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/05/stories/2010120562591200.htm> (Accessed on June 1, 2013)


⁴⁰ See Lalmohan Pattanaik, 'PLGA Week: Maoists recruit 5,000 youth in Malkangiri' *The Pioneer*, December 22, 2011, available at <http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/bhubaneswar/29619-plga-week-maoists-recruit-5000-youth-in-malkangiri.html> (Accessed on May 4, 2013)

⁴¹ Ramana, *op. cit.*, n.33.

⁴² See FAQs, Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, available at <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-FAQ.pdf> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁴³ See P.V. Ramana, 'Maoist People's Liberation Guerrilla Army', available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistPeoplesLiberationGuerrillaArmy_pvrmana_121211 (Accessed on May 24, 2013)

research and development (R&D) for the in-house development of arms and ammunitions. Recently, it was reported that the Maoists have already stockpiled 6000 rocket launchers.⁴⁴



Reportedly, they have a grand design to create a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) or Red Corridor from Pashupati (Nepal) to Tirupati (Andhra Pradesh).⁴⁵ This includes most of the area of Eastern Ghat. They are also making efforts to replicate the same in the Western Ghat too, although they have not been so successful. Their presence in the forest of Karnataka has been reported in media quite recently.⁴⁶ Tamil Nadu and Kerala are not averse to their penetration. The eastern part of Maharashtra which includes Gadchiroli, Gondia etc. is largely affected by the Maoist presence. It is reported that they have already penetrated in the Golden Corridor which stretches from Pune to Ahmedabad, including


⁴⁴ See Maoists have stocked over 6,000 rocket launchers, *The Times of India*, May 28, 2012, available at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Maoists-have-stocked-over-6000-rocket-launchers/articleshow/13583424.cms> (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

⁴⁵ See Jairam Ramesh, From Tirupati to Pashupati?, *The Hindu*, October 14, 2011, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/from-tirupati-to-pashupati/article2536063.ece> (Accessed on June 5, 2013)

⁴⁶ See 'Police confirm presence of Maoists in Kerala-Karnataka border', *Deccan Chronicle*, February 14, 2013, <http://www.deccanchronicle.com/130214/news-current-affairs/article/police-confirm-presence-maoists-kerala-karnataka-border> (Accessed on June 6, 2013)

Nashik, Surat and Vadodara.⁴⁷ In fact, Maoists have succeeded in penetrating into the National Capital Region (NCR). Moreover, it is now no more secret that some Maoists have been arrested from Delhi, the national capital, as well.⁴⁸

Recent reports in media indicate their presence in North-East India too.⁴⁹ Maoist cadres, under the umbrella of the Upper Assam Leading Committee (UALC) of the CPI (Maoist), have already sneaked into Dhemaji, Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sonitpur and Chirang districts of Assam and Lohit and lower Dibang valley districts of Arunachal Pradesh.⁵⁰ Apparently, Maoists' strategy is to give their movement a pan-India shape to wage an all-out war against the Indian State in one go to create panic at all-India level as to get leverage vis-à-vis the Indian government in psychological warfare.



⁴⁷ See P. V. Ramana, Maoists in 'Golden Corridor Area', December 19, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistsinGoldenCorridorArea_pvramana_191211 (Accessed on June 7, 2013)

⁴⁸ See P. V. Ramana, Maoists in Delhi and NCR: Wake-up Time for Police, March 24, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistsinDelhiandNCRWakeuptimeforPolice_pvramana_240311 (Accessed on June 7, 2013)

⁴⁹ See R Dutta choudhury, 'Maoists forming nexus with NE ultra outfits', *The Assam Tribune*, December 19, 2012, <http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=dec2012/at092>

⁵⁰ See Question No. 2572, Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India March 20, 2013, available at <http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx> (Accessed on June 3, 2013)

Reportedly, they have identified seven strategic areas in the country. Those areas are corridors stretching between:⁵¹

- Bihar-Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh-Andhra Pradesh;
- Chhattisgarh-Orissa;
- Bihar-Jharkhand-West Bengal;
- West Bengal-Assam;
- Manipur-Tripura;
- Jammu and Kashmir-Uttarakhand-Punjab-Haryana-Delhi; and
- Gujarat-Maharashtra

IDEOLOGY

Actually, the whole movement is an ideological movement based on a mixture of three ideologies – Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, (MLM) in short. To put it in simple way, the movement is about communist revolution to establish socialism and thereafter, to reach the stage of communism. For this, they would need to, as they claim, overthrow the Indian State through armed struggle to capture the political power and introduce New Democratic Revolution (NDR) in India. They say that through the NDR only, it is possible to resolve the contradiction between the great masses of the Indian people and the feudal system. They *prima facie* seem to be following the Marxist *praxis* that philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

In the introduction to one of their founding documents, entitled *Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution*, they say that theory should guide the Programmeme; Programmeme should guide the Strategy; and Strategy should guide the Tactics. It would be very much pertinent to analyse them step by step to unveil the Maoist design to overthrow the Indian state.

THEORY

Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is actually based on the Theory of Contradiction, i.e. the law of the unity of opposites. As Mao says, this is the basic law of materialist dialectics.⁵² According to the Theory, contradictions arise by the means of concrete analysis of concrete

⁵¹ See P. V. Ramana, Maoists in 'Golden Corridor Area', *Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA)*, December 19, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistsinGoldenCorridorArea_pvramana_191211 (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁵² See Mao Tse Tung, 'On Contradiction', *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm (Accessed on May 20, 2013)

conditions on grounds. There are contradictions between the idealist outlook and the materialist outlook of the world; between proletariat and bourgeois; between labour and capital; between feudalism and common masses and so on. Contradiction is universal; it is in every thing. The contradiction in Mathematics is plus and minus; in Physics, it is positive and negative electricity; in Mechanics, it is action and reaction; in Social Science, it is the class struggle and so on. As per the Theory, the contradictions of the modern society are colonies and imperialism, the great masses of people and the feudal system. In India, the Maoists claim, there are four major contradictions:⁵³

1. The contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people;
2. The contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses;
3. The contradiction between capital and labour;
4. The internal contradiction among the ruling classes;

They claim that the first two contradictions are the fundamental contradictions in the present day Indian society. The contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses is the principle contradiction. Although the fundamental contradiction has the potentiality to turn into the principle contradiction, it is the principle contradiction which develops into class struggle through antagonism. Any stage of the revolution is based on the principal contradiction.

PROGRAMME

The document, entitled *Party Programme (2004)*⁵⁴, gives details of the Maoists' programmes as to their so-called Indian revolution. Programme, in Maoist parlance, sets up guiding principles for the formation of strategy. The Programme of the CPI (Maoist) can be summarized in the following points:

- To declare the Independence of India in 1947 fake in essence
- To take the path of armed struggle for the seizure of political power
- To follow the Chinese path of armed struggle
- To capture political power by encircling from countryside to countrywide
- To unite with the Maoist forces of South Asia to overthrow Indian State
- To declare India as a prison house of nationalities

⁵³ See 'Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution', prepared by the Central Committee (P) of CPI (Maoist), available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-MaoistDocs/Founding/StrategyTactics-pamphlet.pdf> (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

⁵⁴ See Party Programme, available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Founding/Programme-pamphlet.pdf> (Accessed on June 8, 2013)

- To support unequivocally the nationalities struggles
- To promote woman/Dalit/minority/nationality question as a class question
- To raise the slogan of 'Boycott Election'
- To carry forward armed agrarian revolutionary war
- To introduce New Democracy or People's Democracy
- To establish a People's Democratic Federal Republics of India
- To promote proletarian internationalism

STRATEGY

Maoist document *Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution*⁵⁵ says that their strategy is guided by the Programme. They aim to introduce their so-called revolution in India through armed struggle. For that, Maoists would need, they assess, to be relied on armed agrarian revolution and their three magic weapons—party of the proletariat, people's army and revolutionary united front. At present, the party of proletariat is the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (Maoist), and the people's army is the People's Guerrilla Army (PLGA). To form a revolutionary united front, they distinguish real friends from real enemies. Their three main enemies are imperialism, feudalism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism. On the other hand, motive forces of the Indian Revolution are proletariat, peasants and some section of petty bourgeoisie. National bourgeoisie as a class, as per their class analysis, is vacillating and cannot be fully relied upon. The landlord class and comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie (CBB) are the main enemies and can never be relied upon.

The central task of the Indian Revolution is to capture political power through people's protracted war as envisaged by Mao Tse Tung of China. People's protracted war is a method of war which is meant to expand a war in time and space to harass the enemy forces. Maoists think that the Indian armed forces are superior to their forces only from the tactical point of view. They believe that they can destroy the Indian armed forces bit by bit as a full meal is eaten up mouthful by mouthful. In fact, they plan to attack on the Indian State when the government is weak, for example, at the time of full-fledged war with neighbouring countries or a war on a world scale.

Maoists say that the people's protracted war will pass through three strategic stages—Stage of Strategic Defensive, Stage of Strategic Stalemate and Stage of Strategic Offensive. Currently, as they claim, they are at the Stage of Strategic Defensive—where they cannot open an all-out war against the Indian state. Transforming guerrilla zones into red base areas and the PLGA to People's Liberation Army (PLA) are two immediate objectives as

⁵⁵ This whole section is based on the Maoist Document, '*Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution*', *op.cit.* n. 53.

part of their overall strategy. The final task/objective of the Maoists is to capture the urban areas, thus capturing the State power. They see their so-called Indian revolution as a part of world revolution.

TACTICS

In a document, entitled *Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution* (2004),⁵⁶ Maoists have widely discussed their tactics to wage/prolong the war against the Indian State. They say that tactics must be guided by the strategy. Their tactics are:

- To formulate clear and concise propaganda slogans
- To transform the slogans into Agitation via Action to Party Directive
- To follow the class line and the mass line
- To build mass organisation and to carry out mass movement
- To build the Party amongst the dalit masses
- To mobilize women/dalits/tribal/minorities into the revolutionary movement
- To mobilise urban population on mass issues
- To form a United Front (UF) of the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie
- To adopt the method of hit and run in short, swift and sudden manner
- To acquire relatively better and larger number of arms and ammunition
- To develop appropriate forms of military organizations
- To pursue tactical counter offensive
- To transform the guerrilla warfare via mobile warfare to positional warfare

Abductions

As part of their tactics, Maoists employ the method of abduction too. On February 16, 2011, they abducted the Collector of Malkangiri District in Odisha, Vineet Krishna. On March 14, 2012, they abducted two Italian nationals, Paolo Bosusco and Claudio Colangelo, from Daringibadi P.S. of Kandhamal District of Odisha and just ten days later, Jhina Hikaka, an MLA, Odisha was abducted by them on the night intervening March 23-24, 2012. Alex Paul Menon, District Magistrate of Sukma District of Chhattisgarh, was abducted by the CPI (Maoist) on April 21, 2012.⁵⁷ Apparently, their abduction tactics is

⁵⁶ This document is available at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Founding/StrategyTactics-pamphlet.pdf> (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

⁵⁷ Question No. 4421, Rajya Sabha, May 16, 2012, available at <http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

to get their demands – demand for the release of their jailed cadres, for example – fulfilled by the State Governments. It is not that they only abduct high-profile people; they also abduct labourers/workers engaged in developmental activities to hamper/stop the developmental projects.

Number of Civilians Kidnapped and Killed by the LWE Groups

| 2009 | | 2010 | | 2011 | | 2012 | | 2013(up to April 15) | |
|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---|
| No. of Civilians abducted | No. of Civilians killed after abduction | No. of Civilians abducted | No. of Civilians killed after abduction | No. of Civilians abducted | No. of Civilians killed after abduction | No. of Civilians abducted | No. of Civilians killed after abduction | No. of Civilians abducted | No. of Civilians killed after abduction |
| 437 | 100 | 517 | 118 | 378 | 77 | 313 | 59 | 103 | 8 |

Source: Compiled from the questions answered in Lok Sabha

Improvised Explosive Devices

The Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) play a key role in Maoists' over all tactics of counter-offensive measures against the security forces. They have trained a large number of people's militia into planting the IEDs. Reportedly, at least, the base force of 30,000 people is well-equipped with the technology for making and planting the IEDs.⁵⁸ IEDs are made with the help of ammonium nitrate, which Maoists have easy access to because of the mismanagement of the chemical by the concerned agencies. Recently, the pilferage of this chemical has been reported in various newspapers. A report says, "India imports a sizeable amount of this explosive for use in its mines and a portion of it goes missing. Of the total 3.4 lakh tons that was being imported through Vizag Port in 2011-12, about 3500 tons went missing. It was officially attributed to spillage as the import takes place in a bagged form."⁵⁹ Another report says, "[A]bout 3,500 tonnes of the 3.5 lakh tonnes imported annually goes missing, and it is attributed to spillage."⁶⁰ There is an urgent need to stop the pilferage of ammonium nitrate to incapacitate the Maoists' existing counter-offensive capability.

⁵⁸ See K. Srinivas Reddy, 'Formation of PLGA a turning point in the Maoist movement', *The Hindu*, December 5, 2010, <http://www.hindu.com/2010/12/05/stories/2010120562591200.htm> (Accessed on June 6, 2013)

⁵⁹ See 'Call for stringent rules to check pilferage of ammonium nitrate', *The Hindu*, February 23, 2013, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/call-for-stringent-rules-to-check-pilferage-of-ammonium-nitrate/article4444947.ece> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁶⁰ See 'Ammonium nitrate, after loose imports, falls into rebel hands', *The Hindu*, December 26, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/ammonium-nitrate-after-loose-imports-falls-into-rebel-hands/article4239841.ece> (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

FINANCE

Although reportedly Maoists collect Rs.1, 500 crore annually through extortion,⁶¹ there is no exact estimate of the vastness of the Maoist economy. Apart from extortion, they have other ways and means to grow their economy. The CPI (Maoist)'s *Constitution* says, "The Party funds shall be obtained through the membership fees, levies, donations, taxes, penalties, and the wealth confiscated from the enemies." However, their economy is based mainly on extortion money/levies – from business houses, road contractors, *tendu* contractors, bus and truck owners, petrol pumps and shop keepers. In an interview on November 21, 2009, a former CPI (Maoist) Politburo member Mallojula Koteswar Rao *alias* Kishenji said, "There are no extortions. We collect taxes from the corporates and big bourgeoisie, but it's not any different from the corporate sector funding the political parties. We have a half-yearly audit. Not a single paisa is wasted. Villagers also fund the party by voluntarily donating two days' earnings each year. From two days of bamboo cutting in Gadchiroli we earned Rs 25 lakh. From *tendu* leaf collection in Bastar we earned Rs 35 lakh. Elsewhere, farmers donated 1,000 quintals of paddy."⁶²

The *tendu* leaves (*beedi* wrappers) are widely found across central India. According to the All India Bidi Industry Federation, in India annual production of *bidi* is around 550 billion pieces per year.⁶³ In a meeting of the Chief Ministers of the nine Naxal-affected states, convened by the Home Minister, Sushil Shinde, on June 5, 2013, the States decided to collect the *tendu* leaves on their own to check the flow of the extortion money/levies.⁶⁴

They also do illegal poppy cultivation. Recently, it was reported in media that the standing poppy crops were destroyed/recovered in 10 acres of land at Singurahi village, Aurangabad district, a Naxal-affected area.⁶⁵ It is suspected that Maoists are cultivating the poppy to finance their movement. They are doing so in their strongholds of areas of Chattishgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Bihar.⁶⁶ It is estimated that a farmer can earn Rs.1.5

⁶¹ See P.V. Ramana, 'The Maoist-Business Nexus', October 3, 2011, available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheMaoistBusinessNexus_PVRamana_031011 (Accessed on June 7, 2013)

⁶² See 'I Am The Real Desh Bhakt', *Tehelka*, November 21, 2009, available at http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main43.asp?filename=Ne211109i_am.asp (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁶³ See http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/public_hearings/F2000196.pdf (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁶⁴ See Maoist-hit states resolve for uniform approach to deal Naxals, *The Economic Times*, June 5, 2013, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-05/news/39764699_1_naxals-maoist-hit-states-andhra-pradesh (Accessed on June 11, 2013)

⁶⁵ See Poppy seeds spell moolah for Maoists, *The Telegraph*, March 12, 2011, available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110312/jsp/bihar/story_13699926.jsp (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁶⁶ See Maoists raise funds through poppy sale, *Deccan Herald*, August 8, 2012, available at <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/270324/maoists-raise-funds-through-poppy.html> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

crore by growing poppy crops on only one acre of land.⁶⁷ It is also reported that in India, one kg of opium seed is for Rs. 35,000 to 50,000.⁶⁸ Mining companies also contribute to a great extent to their economy as tax payers to the Maoists.⁶⁹ Finance plays a major role in any insurgency/extremism/terrorism. It is the lifeline of a movement, in fact. Former DG, BSF, Prakash Singh, says, "You choke their (Maoist) finance and ammunition and they are finished."⁷⁰

STATE RESPONSE

The Government of India has made some interventions to tackle the Naxal challenge effectively. Reportedly, in 2006, the Government of India came up with a 14-point policy to deal with the Naxalism.⁷¹ The Government is, it seems, trying to tackle the Naxal challenge on two fronts – security as well as development fronts. Apart from the security approach, it has also initiated various development programmes/activities in the Naxal affected areas to eradicate social disparity. The Ministry of Home Affairs has created a separate division, namely, the Naxal Management Division w.e.f. October 19, 2006 to monitor and coordinate the implementation of various development initiatives in the LWE affected areas.

Ban on the LWE Organisations

On June 22, 2009, the Government of India has put ban on the CPI (Maoist) along with all its formations and front organisations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.⁷² The number of the banned organisations is 24.⁷³ The State Governments of Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra also have banned the CPI (Maoist) specifically and the State

⁶⁷ See Poppy seeds spell moolah for Maoists, *The Telegraph*, March 12, 2011, available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110312/jsp/bihar/story_13699926.jsp (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁶⁸ See Poppy seeds spell moolah for Maoists, *The Telegraph*, March 12, 2011, available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110312/jsp/bihar/story_13699926.jsp (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

⁶⁹ See Anoop A.J., 'Maoist Funding: Dimensions, Sources and Implications', available at <http://www.vifindia.org/article/2011/january/14/Maoist-Funding-Dimensions-Sources-and-Implications> (Accessed on June 5, 2013)

⁷⁰ See Prasanna Mohanty, Maoists' financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows, *Governance Now*, April 7, 2010, available at <http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/maoists-financing-blood-flows-long-cash-flows> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁷¹ P V Ramana, Measures to Deal with Left -Wing Extremism/Naxalism, available at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_MeasurestodealwithNaxal.pdf (Accessed on March 24, 2013)

⁷² See Question No. 265, December 12, 2012, Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India, <http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx> (Accessed on March 20, 2013)

⁷³ See the Annexure 1 of Question No.217, December 7, 2011 in the Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India, available at <http://164.100.24.219/annex/224/As217.docx> (Accessed on March 20, 2013)

Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha have banned both the CPI (Maoist) as well as their front organisations.⁷⁴

Development Measures

The Central and the State Governments have taken various developmental initiatives to deal with Naxal phenomenon. The Integrated Action Plan (IAP) and the Road Requirement Plan (RRP) are the two mega plans of the Government of India under implementation. The IAP was initiated in November, 2010, by the Planning Commission of India to provide public infrastructure and services in 82 Selected Tribal and Backward Districts. The IAP is currently extended to 2012-13 with a block grant of Rs 30 crore per district.⁷⁵ The RRP is to improve road connectivity in 34 LWE affected districts in eight States.⁷⁶ Various other development schemes are following:

- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS),
- Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY),
- Tribal Sub Plan (TSP),
- Indira Awas Yojana (IAY),
- Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme (AIBP),
- National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP),
- Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA),
- National Rural Health Mission (NRHM),
- Skill Development
- Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF)

The Central Government is also implementing Civic Action Programme to bridge the gap between the local population and security forces. The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) and the Schedule Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 are being implemented at the cutting edge.

Security Measures

Constitutionally speaking, 'Police' and 'Public Order' are the State subjects. The Central Government supplements the efforts of the State Governments through various

⁷⁴ See Starred Question No. 265, n. 72

⁷⁵ See Question No. 2702, Rajya Sabha, March 13, 2013, available at <http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=139023> (Accessed on June 4, 2013)

⁷⁶ See Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=540 (Accessed on March 22, 2013)

development and security related schemes/measures. Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme and Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) are the two main schemes of the Central Government. The SRE scheme is meant for reimbursing the expenditure incurred by the concerned States on anti-Naxal operations. The SRE is in implementation since April 1, 1996. It was revised in 2005 increasing the reimbursement rate from 50% to 100%.⁷⁷ At present, 106 LWE affected districts have been included under the SRE scheme.⁷⁸ Under the SIS, financial assistance is provided by the Central Government to the concerned State Governments for building critical infrastructure needed to facilitate operations by the security forces.

At present, the total number of 532 coys of CAPFs have been deployed in the LWE affected areas.⁷⁹ In the anti-naxal operations, 81 battalions of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) have been deployed to assist the State Police.⁸⁰ Apart from this, ten battalions of Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) raised during the period from 2008-11 have been deployed for the same cause. Also, 34 India Reserve (IR) battalions and three Specialised India Reserve Battalions (SIRBs) have been raised to improve the efficacy of anti-naxal operations. Under the 11th Five Year Plan, the scheme of 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) Schools to be set up in the LWE affected States was approved. There is a new scheme started by the Central Government to build 400 Fortified Police Stations in the LWE affected regions.⁸¹

Involvement of the Army

For many in India, to tackle any internal security challenge, the easy way-out is to involve the Army. So is the Naxalism. But, the rim land *versus* heartland argument and the stress factor within the Indian Army seriously challenge the mindset. In fact, Defence Minister A. K. Antony has repeatedly rejected the demand for the deployment of the Indian Army to the Naxal-affected areas. He recently said, "There is no proposal like that (of the involvement of Indian Army). We extend our support without direct involvement. The real answer is to strengthen the local police and para-military forces"⁸²

⁷⁷ See Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=540 (Accessed on June 1, 2013)

⁷⁸ See Starred Question No. 265, Rajya Sabha, Parliament of India, December 12, 2012.

⁷⁹ Question No.6622, Lok Sabha, May 7, 2013, available at <http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/QResult15.aspx?qref=140672> (Accessed on June 12, 2013)

⁸⁰ Chapter 2, Internal Security, Annual Report, 2012-13, MHA, p. 19, available at [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)1213.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)1213.pdf) (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁸¹ See Naxal Management Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=540 (Accessed on June 12, 2013)

⁸² See No Proposal to Deploy Army in Naxal-Hit States: Antony, *Outlook*, May 27, 2013, available at <http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=799122> (Accessed on June 11, 2013)

Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policy

The main objectives of the Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation (S&R) Policy of the Central Government are “to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore Naxalites” and “to ensure that the Naxalites who surrender do not find it attractive to join the Naxal movement again.”⁸³

A new S&R policy was formulated at the meeting of Chief Secretaries, Directors General of Police (DGPs) of nine LWE-affected States convened by the Ministry of Home Affairs on March 4, 2013.⁸⁴ It is in effect since April 1, 2013. The salient features of this New Surrender Policy are following:⁸⁵

- The surrenderee will be imparted training in a trade/vocation of their liking or befitting their aptitude;
- A higher ranked LWE cadre will get immediate grant of Rs. 25 lakh and monthly stipend of Rs. 4,000.
- A middle/lower ranked LWE cadre will get an immediate grant of Rs.1.5 lakh and a monthly stipend of Rs. 4,000.
- The incentives for surrendered weapons/explosives range from Rs.10 to Rs. 35,000.

The following agencies are responsible for the process of screening/identification and rehabilitation of the surrenderee:

- ADG/IG (Special Branch/CID) as the S&R Officer
- Representative of State Home Department
- Representative of State Police
- Representative of Central Armed Police Forces

⁸³ See ‘Guidelines For Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation Of Naxalites In The Naxal Affected States’, Naxal Management Division, MHA, available at <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-GuidSurReh.pdf> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁸⁴ See Sandeep Joshi, ‘New surrender policy for Maoists from April’, *The Hindu*, March 5, 2013, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/new-surrender-policy-for-maoists-from-april/article4476100.ece> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)

⁸⁵ See ‘Guidelines For Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation Of Naxalites In The Naxal Affected States’, Naxal Management Division, MHA, available at <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/NM-GuidSurReh.pdf> (Accessed on June 2, 2013)