The tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. I argue that nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war.
Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.
The earliest years of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities between rivals can be the most harrowing. India and Pakistan have certainly followed this pattern. But over time, rivals can moderate their competition, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Formal arms control treaties, like those negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, are unlikely for southern Asia. India and Pakistan can, however, employ tacit agreements, confidence-building, and nuclear risk-reduction measures to allay mutual concerns over nuclear weapons.
Major powers have tried to use military training programmes, manifested through military-to-military cooperation running the gamut of training exchanges to joint exercises, to defence-related dialogues through seminars and the like, in order to engage and influence other countries in the furtherance of their strategic interests. The US model is notable for being innovative, flexible, scalable, and broad in its approach, and this has fetched it considerable dividends.
Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship.
The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarizes the role of actors within and outside Northern Ireland, and the processes and mechanics of the Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about continuing sectarian division.
Being a non-NPT state with advanced nuclear capability, India's contributions to the non-proliferation movement have often been scrutinized. India was for long treated as part of the 'proliferation problem'. Since the 1998 tests, there is a steady process of integrating India with the international nuclear community. However, India is reluctant to assimilate with many of the US-promoted counter-proliferation initiatives though it has largely adopted the normative standards of the NPT system.
This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.
