The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be resolved by merely accusing countries like Rwanda and Uganda of interference; Kinshasa has to review its response to the crisis.
In November 2012, the M23 rebel group (which takes its name from the March 23, 2009 peace agreement signed between the Congolese government and the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People)), after prolonged fighting with the UN-backed Congolese forces, took control of the city of Goma in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite initiatives taken by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region since July 2012 to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC, the M23 managed to consolidate its position and gained control over additional terrain with the help of allied armed groups and the continued support of the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces.1 The M23 rebellion also aggravated tensions between Congo and its neighbour, Rwanda, with the Kabila government accusing Kigali of orchestrating insurgency to grab the mineral wealth of eastern Congo. This article analyses the role of regional actors, especially Rwanda and Uganda, in fuelling the DRC crisis while briefly touching upon the part played by other influential actors such as the US and the UK in the region.
The takeover of Goma by M23 rebels exposed the loopholes in the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in the country and the inability of the peacekeepers to protect civilians. Following the UN Security Council condemnation of the M23 takeover of Goma, a joint statement was brought out by DRC’s Joseph Kabila and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame which called on the rebel groups to immediately cease violence. Subsequently, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) issued a communiqué that restricted the M23 to a 20- kilometre zone around Goma. Though the government and the rebel group remained committed to negotiations, the peace talks mediated by Uganda faltered amid tensions between both parties.
Meanwhile, two reports prepared by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo that were released last year, laid bare the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in fuelling the conflict in the DRC. The first report, released in May 2012, stated that Rwandan authorities were seemingly complicit in recruiting soldiers for the Congolese rebel leader, Gen. Bosco Ntaganda. The November 2012 report stated that the “…government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice.”
The report further added that “senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and facilitation of external relations.”2
It further alleged that units of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces jointly supported the M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese army base in Rumangabo and that both governments had also cooperated to support the creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 and have consistently been advocating the cause of the rebels. The report also noted that Uganda and Rwanda were not the only supporters of the rebels, but, “some criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces continue to sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels.” In addition, “several traders have contributed to financing M23 rebels using profits resulting from the smuggling of Congolese minerals into Rwanda.” According to the experts, Ugandan troops were deployed along the Congolese border to ensure that M23 territory was not left unprotected during imminent offensive. The UN report also disclosed the M23’s de facto chain of command that culminated with Rwanda’s defence minister, General James Kabarebe.
Both, Rwanda and Ugandan have denied these allegations. An official statement issued by the Rwandan government stated that: “Rwanda has maintained from the outset that the current instability in eastern DRC is a matter for the Congolese government and military.” It further added that “Rwanda’s national interest is served by containing conflict and building deeper bonds of peace with our neighbours.”33 Terming the UN reports “fictitious”, Kagame in turn went on the offensive and called on the Congolese government to take responsibility for the rebel fighting as it was an internal matter between “the different shades of Congolese”.4 It is ironic that while the UN Reports accuse Rwandan and Ugandan of being involved in the crisis, Paul Kagame, along with other leaders, publicly urged the M23 to pull out of Goma in November, 2012 while Uganda is leading the efforts to resolve the conflict.
The Past
Interference in each other’s internal affairs is not a new phenomenon in Central African politics. It has been a part of the DRC’s history since the time of the Zaire dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. In the past, Kigali supported the oppressed Banyamulenge in South Kivu when they raised up against the persecution of the Bukavu Zairian authorities. Arms and irregular Rwandan troops infiltrated across the border as the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire) prepared to launch its rebellion against Mobutu’s government in late 1996. Throughout the rebellion, Paul Kagame denied the involvement of regular Rwandan forces in the struggle. The intervention of Ugandan forces under Yoweri Museveni was also largely underplayed due the success of the ADFL. Both Museveni and Kagame played a key role in the overthrow of Mobutu. Rwanda along with Uganda was also involved in the Congolese war and invaded the DRC to prevent Laurent Kabila from ‘taking the war to Rwanda’.5 During the war, an anti-Kabila faction backed by Rwanda came close to seizing power in Kinshasa.
The Rwandan Patriotic Army and other outside forces remained in the DRC after the signing of the Lusaka Accords of 1999. UN Reports in 2001 revealed the extent of Ugandan and Rwandan involvement in the plunder of the DRC’s natural resources. Subsequent UN Reports also exposed the objective of the Rwandan government to repopulate the region with Rwandans in addition to using its military might to extract and exploit the wealth of the occupied lands. Rwanda was also accused of supporting Laurent Nkunda and his movement, the CNDP that in 2008 threatened to overthrow the Congolese government.
Other Actors – The UK and the US
The position of Rwanda’s allies - especially the US and the UK - on Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC crisis has not been consistent. Recently, Tony Blair, the former UK Prime Minister and personal adviser to Paul Kagame, defended Rwanda saying that the causes of the conflict were complex and that Kigali should not be singled out for blame. He also argued in favour of Rwanda stating that the UN report is “dispute(d) over the facts”.6 But, on the other hand, the UK announced that it was stopping the 21 million pound aid and described the UN report as “credible and compelling”.77 The UK, once among Kagame’s closest allies chose to distance itself, which was a severe diplomatic blow for Kigali.
The United States suspended its $200,000 military aid to Rwanda in July 2012 because of concerns over human rights abuses by the Rwandan government.8 But critics have argued that this is a small sum compared to the $200 million aid programme. Domestically, the US was under pressure from NGOs following the seizure of Goma by the M23 rebels. The NGOs noted that the US had failed to respond to the crisis and had failed to change Rwanda’s policy. The US has also been criticised for its muted response to the crisis. The US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice was censured for attempting to block the publication of evidence gathered by the UN group of experts.9 Subsequently, in December 2012, President Obama urged President Kagame to halt support for rebels in eastern DRC and the US also imposed sanctions against two leaders of the M23.
Other external actors such as the European Union, the Netherlands, and Sweden also suspended aid to Rwanda whose inputs from aid amounts up to 40 per cent of its total budget. Though it is believed that the withdrawal of aid forced Rwanda to stop its support to the M23 rebels, but with the German resumption of aid to Kigali, there are apprehensions about Rwanda being ‘let off the hook in return for cosmetic peace’.10
Peace deal of February 2013
After the takeover of Goma by the M23 rebels and the release of the UN report that accused Rwanda and Uganda of backing the rebels, tension mounted in the Kivus and the ICGLR started a series of meetings that eventually culminated in the Kampala peace talks between the M23 and Kinshasa. In February this year, 11 African countries including Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Ugandan, Tanzania and Zambia came together to sign the ‘Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region’ as per which they agreed to preserve and protect the territorial sovereignty as well as the peace and stability of the DRC. The agreement calls on the neighbouring states to refrain from covertly supporting armed groups in the region. The deal also demanded a commitment from the Congolese government to deepen democratisation and reorganise its security sector, and initiate basic financial and structural reforms. The most crucial aspect of the agreement is the establishment of the 11+4 regional oversight mechanism that includes the UN, the African Union, the 11-country ICGLR and the 14-member Southern African Development Community which is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Thus, the agreement and the regional oversight mechanism involve all the regional actors in the peace process.
Given allegations of Ugandan and Rwandan involvement in the DRC rebel movement, their commitment at least on paper is crucial and is a first step towards peace in the region. Observers hope that the regional oversight mechanism will open up lines of communication and facilitate cooperation between the interested states. However, the M23 has refused to recognise the treaty, as they were not involved in the drafting process.11
Though the peace deal is a much awaited and a welcome development for the region as a whole, it is not without its shortcomings. It has been criticised for not addressing specific issues related to improving the tense security situation and the root causes of the conflict. A major problem is the lack of progress in the negotiations between the M23 rebels and the Kinshasa government because both the sides refuse to make concessions. Experts opine that despite the peace deal, eastern Congo remains susceptible to the resumption of conflict.
The framework has also been criticised for its exclusive top-down focus which lays emphasis on the regional dynamics and the Congolese government’s need to implement democratisation and financial and security sector reforms.12 It neglects to take into account the role of crucial local actors in the eastern provinces. Another drawback is its overemphasis on the role of Uganda and Rwanda to the neglect of internal dynamics in the region and the rebel groups operating here. The government’s handling of the crisis is also flawed. By playing on the anti-Rwandan feelings of the several militias excluding the M23 operating in the North Kivu area and forging alliances with them, the government has paved the way for the undisciplined militias to terrorise the local population and to stir up ethnic rivalries.13
Towards the end of February, the M23 split into two factions; one loyal to Bosco Ntaganda and the other to Sultani Makenga. Fighting between the two groups led Ntaganda’s men surrendering to UN peacekeepers or to the Makenga faction. Subsequently, Ntaganda handed himself over to the US embassy in Kigali and this raised questions as to why he surrendered himself in Rwanda and not Uganda. However, his surrender raises hopes that Makenga and his faction will sign a peace deal with the Kabila government.
While the peace agreement was being signed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed the formation of a UN Security Council-authorised Intervention Brigade to be comprised of several thousand troops from the existing UN peacekeeping force in Congo. The brigade, according to the proposal, was to be “tasked with containing the expansion of both Congolese and foreign armed groups, neutralising these groups and disarming them”.14 In the last week of March, through the UNSCR 2098, the Security Council authorised the deployment of an intervention brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations, with or without the Congolese national army against the armed groups that threatened peace and security in the eastern part of the DRC. The brigade consisting of a total of 3,069 peacekeepers is to be based in North Kivu whose aim is to neutralise armed groups, reduce the threat posed to state authority and civilian security and make way for stabilisation activities.15 The brigade will also support the political objectives of the peace deal signed in February.
This brigade is a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping because it is for the first time, that the UN has authorised a brigade for peace enforcement that would open fire without being fired upon first and would have the capacity to carry out targeted offensive operations, either unilaterally or in support of the Congolese army, to neutralise armed groups. However, there is widespread scepticism that the UN too, could now become a party to the conflict which may compromise its neutrality and impartiality
Meanwhile, the M23 has rejected the UN’s decision and criticised it for taking the “war option” against “one of the partners for peace” instead of promoting dialogue to end the conflict.16 While at the moment, talks in Kampala between the M23 and the Congolese government are continuing with the mediation of Uganda, experts warn against any complacency in international efforts to bring peace to the country. As stated earlier, the crisis in eastern DRC cannot be resolved by merely accusing countries like Rwanda and Uganda of interference. Kinshasa has to review its response to the crisis and bring all stakeholders on board and accommodate their concerns, to amicably resolve the conflict. In this light, it becomes all the more imperative for Kabila to strike a peace deal with the M23 and address issues of governance in the country, especially in eastern Congo.
1. UN Security Council Panel of Experts Report on the Democratic Republic on the Congo, November 15, 2012, pg. 6,7
5. Colin M Waugh (2004), Paul Kagame and Rwanda – Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, North Carolina: McFarland and Company Inc., pg. 130.
14. "Secretary-General urges special ‘intervention brigades’ within United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo”, Security Council 6928th Meeting, SC/10929, March 5, 2013.
Crisis in Eastern Congo and the Role of External Actors
More from the author
The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be resolved by merely accusing countries like Rwanda and Uganda of interference; Kinshasa has to review its response to the crisis.
In November 2012, the M23 rebel group (which takes its name from the March 23, 2009 peace agreement signed between the Congolese government and the CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People)), after prolonged fighting with the UN-backed Congolese forces, took control of the city of Goma in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite initiatives taken by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region since July 2012 to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC, the M23 managed to consolidate its position and gained control over additional terrain with the help of allied armed groups and the continued support of the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces.1 The M23 rebellion also aggravated tensions between Congo and its neighbour, Rwanda, with the Kabila government accusing Kigali of orchestrating insurgency to grab the mineral wealth of eastern Congo. This article analyses the role of regional actors, especially Rwanda and Uganda, in fuelling the DRC crisis while briefly touching upon the part played by other influential actors such as the US and the UK in the region.
The takeover of Goma by M23 rebels exposed the loopholes in the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in the country and the inability of the peacekeepers to protect civilians. Following the UN Security Council condemnation of the M23 takeover of Goma, a joint statement was brought out by DRC’s Joseph Kabila and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame which called on the rebel groups to immediately cease violence. Subsequently, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) issued a communiqué that restricted the M23 to a 20- kilometre zone around Goma. Though the government and the rebel group remained committed to negotiations, the peace talks mediated by Uganda faltered amid tensions between both parties.
Meanwhile, two reports prepared by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo that were released last year, laid bare the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in fuelling the conflict in the DRC. The first report, released in May 2012, stated that Rwandan authorities were seemingly complicit in recruiting soldiers for the Congolese rebel leader, Gen. Bosco Ntaganda. The November 2012 report stated that the “…government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice.”
The report further added that “senior officials of the Government of Uganda have also provided support to M23 in the form of direct troop reinforcements in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and facilitation of external relations.”2
It further alleged that units of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and the Rwandan Defence Forces jointly supported the M23 in a series of attacks in July 2012 to take over the major towns of Rutshuru territory and the Congolese army base in Rumangabo and that both governments had also cooperated to support the creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 and have consistently been advocating the cause of the rebels. The report also noted that Uganda and Rwanda were not the only supporters of the rebels, but, “some criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces continue to sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels.” In addition, “several traders have contributed to financing M23 rebels using profits resulting from the smuggling of Congolese minerals into Rwanda.” According to the experts, Ugandan troops were deployed along the Congolese border to ensure that M23 territory was not left unprotected during imminent offensive. The UN report also disclosed the M23’s de facto chain of command that culminated with Rwanda’s defence minister, General James Kabarebe.
Both, Rwanda and Ugandan have denied these allegations. An official statement issued by the Rwandan government stated that: “Rwanda has maintained from the outset that the current instability in eastern DRC is a matter for the Congolese government and military.” It further added that “Rwanda’s national interest is served by containing conflict and building deeper bonds of peace with our neighbours.”33 Terming the UN reports “fictitious”, Kagame in turn went on the offensive and called on the Congolese government to take responsibility for the rebel fighting as it was an internal matter between “the different shades of Congolese”.4 It is ironic that while the UN Reports accuse Rwandan and Ugandan of being involved in the crisis, Paul Kagame, along with other leaders, publicly urged the M23 to pull out of Goma in November, 2012 while Uganda is leading the efforts to resolve the conflict.
The Past
Interference in each other’s internal affairs is not a new phenomenon in Central African politics. It has been a part of the DRC’s history since the time of the Zaire dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. In the past, Kigali supported the oppressed Banyamulenge in South Kivu when they raised up against the persecution of the Bukavu Zairian authorities. Arms and irregular Rwandan troops infiltrated across the border as the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire) prepared to launch its rebellion against Mobutu’s government in late 1996. Throughout the rebellion, Paul Kagame denied the involvement of regular Rwandan forces in the struggle. The intervention of Ugandan forces under Yoweri Museveni was also largely underplayed due the success of the ADFL. Both Museveni and Kagame played a key role in the overthrow of Mobutu. Rwanda along with Uganda was also involved in the Congolese war and invaded the DRC to prevent Laurent Kabila from ‘taking the war to Rwanda’.5 During the war, an anti-Kabila faction backed by Rwanda came close to seizing power in Kinshasa.
The Rwandan Patriotic Army and other outside forces remained in the DRC after the signing of the Lusaka Accords of 1999. UN Reports in 2001 revealed the extent of Ugandan and Rwandan involvement in the plunder of the DRC’s natural resources. Subsequent UN Reports also exposed the objective of the Rwandan government to repopulate the region with Rwandans in addition to using its military might to extract and exploit the wealth of the occupied lands. Rwanda was also accused of supporting Laurent Nkunda and his movement, the CNDP that in 2008 threatened to overthrow the Congolese government.
Other Actors – The UK and the US
The position of Rwanda’s allies - especially the US and the UK - on Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC crisis has not been consistent. Recently, Tony Blair, the former UK Prime Minister and personal adviser to Paul Kagame, defended Rwanda saying that the causes of the conflict were complex and that Kigali should not be singled out for blame. He also argued in favour of Rwanda stating that the UN report is “dispute(d) over the facts”.6 But, on the other hand, the UK announced that it was stopping the 21 million pound aid and described the UN report as “credible and compelling”.77 The UK, once among Kagame’s closest allies chose to distance itself, which was a severe diplomatic blow for Kigali.
The United States suspended its $200,000 military aid to Rwanda in July 2012 because of concerns over human rights abuses by the Rwandan government.8 But critics have argued that this is a small sum compared to the $200 million aid programme. Domestically, the US was under pressure from NGOs following the seizure of Goma by the M23 rebels. The NGOs noted that the US had failed to respond to the crisis and had failed to change Rwanda’s policy. The US has also been criticised for its muted response to the crisis. The US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice was censured for attempting to block the publication of evidence gathered by the UN group of experts.9 Subsequently, in December 2012, President Obama urged President Kagame to halt support for rebels in eastern DRC and the US also imposed sanctions against two leaders of the M23.
Other external actors such as the European Union, the Netherlands, and Sweden also suspended aid to Rwanda whose inputs from aid amounts up to 40 per cent of its total budget. Though it is believed that the withdrawal of aid forced Rwanda to stop its support to the M23 rebels, but with the German resumption of aid to Kigali, there are apprehensions about Rwanda being ‘let off the hook in return for cosmetic peace’.10
Peace deal of February 2013
After the takeover of Goma by the M23 rebels and the release of the UN report that accused Rwanda and Uganda of backing the rebels, tension mounted in the Kivus and the ICGLR started a series of meetings that eventually culminated in the Kampala peace talks between the M23 and Kinshasa. In February this year, 11 African countries including Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Ugandan, Tanzania and Zambia came together to sign the ‘Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region’ as per which they agreed to preserve and protect the territorial sovereignty as well as the peace and stability of the DRC. The agreement calls on the neighbouring states to refrain from covertly supporting armed groups in the region. The deal also demanded a commitment from the Congolese government to deepen democratisation and reorganise its security sector, and initiate basic financial and structural reforms. The most crucial aspect of the agreement is the establishment of the 11+4 regional oversight mechanism that includes the UN, the African Union, the 11-country ICGLR and the 14-member Southern African Development Community which is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement. Thus, the agreement and the regional oversight mechanism involve all the regional actors in the peace process.
Given allegations of Ugandan and Rwandan involvement in the DRC rebel movement, their commitment at least on paper is crucial and is a first step towards peace in the region. Observers hope that the regional oversight mechanism will open up lines of communication and facilitate cooperation between the interested states. However, the M23 has refused to recognise the treaty, as they were not involved in the drafting process.11
Though the peace deal is a much awaited and a welcome development for the region as a whole, it is not without its shortcomings. It has been criticised for not addressing specific issues related to improving the tense security situation and the root causes of the conflict. A major problem is the lack of progress in the negotiations between the M23 rebels and the Kinshasa government because both the sides refuse to make concessions. Experts opine that despite the peace deal, eastern Congo remains susceptible to the resumption of conflict.
The framework has also been criticised for its exclusive top-down focus which lays emphasis on the regional dynamics and the Congolese government’s need to implement democratisation and financial and security sector reforms.12 It neglects to take into account the role of crucial local actors in the eastern provinces. Another drawback is its overemphasis on the role of Uganda and Rwanda to the neglect of internal dynamics in the region and the rebel groups operating here. The government’s handling of the crisis is also flawed. By playing on the anti-Rwandan feelings of the several militias excluding the M23 operating in the North Kivu area and forging alliances with them, the government has paved the way for the undisciplined militias to terrorise the local population and to stir up ethnic rivalries.13
Towards the end of February, the M23 split into two factions; one loyal to Bosco Ntaganda and the other to Sultani Makenga. Fighting between the two groups led Ntaganda’s men surrendering to UN peacekeepers or to the Makenga faction. Subsequently, Ntaganda handed himself over to the US embassy in Kigali and this raised questions as to why he surrendered himself in Rwanda and not Uganda. However, his surrender raises hopes that Makenga and his faction will sign a peace deal with the Kabila government.
While the peace agreement was being signed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed the formation of a UN Security Council-authorised Intervention Brigade to be comprised of several thousand troops from the existing UN peacekeeping force in Congo. The brigade, according to the proposal, was to be “tasked with containing the expansion of both Congolese and foreign armed groups, neutralising these groups and disarming them”.14 In the last week of March, through the UNSCR 2098, the Security Council authorised the deployment of an intervention brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations, with or without the Congolese national army against the armed groups that threatened peace and security in the eastern part of the DRC. The brigade consisting of a total of 3,069 peacekeepers is to be based in North Kivu whose aim is to neutralise armed groups, reduce the threat posed to state authority and civilian security and make way for stabilisation activities.15 The brigade will also support the political objectives of the peace deal signed in February.
This brigade is a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping because it is for the first time, that the UN has authorised a brigade for peace enforcement that would open fire without being fired upon first and would have the capacity to carry out targeted offensive operations, either unilaterally or in support of the Congolese army, to neutralise armed groups. However, there is widespread scepticism that the UN too, could now become a party to the conflict which may compromise its neutrality and impartiality
Meanwhile, the M23 has rejected the UN’s decision and criticised it for taking the “war option” against “one of the partners for peace” instead of promoting dialogue to end the conflict.16 While at the moment, talks in Kampala between the M23 and the Congolese government are continuing with the mediation of Uganda, experts warn against any complacency in international efforts to bring peace to the country. As stated earlier, the crisis in eastern DRC cannot be resolved by merely accusing countries like Rwanda and Uganda of interference. Kinshasa has to review its response to the crisis and bring all stakeholders on board and accommodate their concerns, to amicably resolve the conflict. In this light, it becomes all the more imperative for Kabila to strike a peace deal with the M23 and address issues of governance in the country, especially in eastern Congo.
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